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Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1982



CHINA AND AFGHANISTAN
Yaacov Vertzberger

Czechoslovakia
Vladimir V. Kusin

Book Reviews
Jan S. Prybyla Astrid von Borcke
Philip Dion Harley D. Balzer
Aurel Braun Douglas S. Blaufarb
Karen Dawisha Peter W. Rodman

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Problems of Communism

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MAY-JUNE 1982 VOL XXXI

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Cover: A June 28, 1977, Landsat photo of the conjunction of Afghanistan, the USSR, China, and Pakistan (scale reduced to 1:1,000,000). US Government photo.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Afghanistan in China's Policy
Yaacov Vertzberger

The coup of 1978 in Kabul and particularly the Soviet invasion in December 1979 have sharply increased the salience of Afghanistan and adjacent areas in the foreign policy thinking of China. Beijing views events there as part of a Soviet master plan aimed at controlling the oil routes of the Middle East, undermining the independence of Europe, and encircling China. The Chinese response has been to seek a united front with Western Europe, Japan, Pakistan, and the United States to counter Soviet expansionism.

Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation
Vladimir V. Kusin

In throwing out political liberalism, Czechoslovakia's post-1968 leadership also jettisoned economic reform. Excessive investment (similar to that in Poland under Edward Gierek, but in this case domestically financed), successive disruptions in the price and supply of imported oil, and a highly inflexible economic system combine to pose a major threat to the country's growth prospects.

* * *

Essay-reviews

China's Economic Development: Demise of a Model
Jan S. Prybyla

Since the late 1970's, the critique by the post-Mao leadership in China has tended to demolish the "Chinese model" of economic development as a viable alternative for underdeveloped countries. The Chinese themselves now seek to find an alternative approach to development that will prove effective. In this search, the fundamental challenge that confronts them is to avoid a situation in which the state subsidizes most of its sources of revenue, including industry, agriculture, and transportation.

Communism and Philippine Reality
Philip Dion

The history of communism in the Philippines suggests a general inability or unwillingness of party leaders to discern the true concerns of the masses they would lead in revolution. Only in the Huk effort against the Japanese and a brief postwar peasant rebellion did the party seem to be at least partially in step with broad social currents. Today, the divided Communist movement appears to be of only marginal importance as Philippine society undergoes the throes of modernization.

Romania's Travails
Aurel Braun

A worsening of the economic situation in Romania is accentuating a sense of dissatisfaction among the population. Continued poor economic conditions might even restrict the ability of the Ceausescu regime to pursue distinctive domestic and foreign policies within the Soviet bloc.

(Essay-reviews continued on next page)

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Moscow in the Middle East
Karen Dawisha

The Soviet Union has been able to exploit local conflicts in the Middle East to increase its own influence there. As long as sources of tension—and particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict—persist, containment and reduction of the Soviet role in the area will be difficult.

Dilemmas of Single-Party Rule in the Soviet Union
Astrid von Borcke

In the 1980's, the Soviet political system may experience a crisis arising from the combined effects of an intensified arms race, economic slowdown, and its own inadequacies. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the dominant and most pervasive of all Soviet bureaucracies, faces the still unresolved dilemma of balancing modernization-rationalization with maintenance of political power.

The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia
Harley D. Balzer

The situation of the Soviet scientific-technical intelligentsia today still reflects the impact of the Cultural Revolution of 1928–31. This "revolution" shaped the current Soviet leadership and the institutions in which the scientific-technical intelligentsia work. It also reinforced traditional attributes of the Russian style with regard to science and technology. Finally, the Cultural Revolution failed to end the struggle for professional autonomy; it merely moved professional interests to seek to influence Soviet political life from the inside.

Terrorist Trends and Ties
Douglas S. Blaufarb

Because of the sharp disjunction between their alleged goals and the means they advocate, urban terrorists in the industrialized democracies are viewed by their contemporaries as dangerously disturbed minds rather than the vanguard of the future. By encouraging many kinds of terrorist groups, Moscow may not be pursuing a global strategy, but as several recent studies make clear, the USSR does thereby achieve maximum disruption of other societies at minimal cost and political risk to itself.

Western Intellectuals and Communist States
Peter W. Rodman

Since the 1920's, significant numbers of Western intellectuals have made pilgrimages to Communist countries. Yearning to believe in the virtue of regimes they have regarded as moral experiments of vast importance to mankind, they have not looked closely at the realities of life in these countries. This suspension of disbelief has stemmed largely from a rejection of their own societies and a compulsive faith that other, better societies lie within reach.

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Afghanistan in China's Policy

By Yaacov Vertzberger

Central Asia—particularly Afghanistan—is today an area of pivotal concern in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Events in Afghanistan, including the Saur revolution of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion and occupation, have had far-reaching implications for the PRC's conceptions of its national security, both in regard to global politics and with respect to its own military requirements. This impact is evident in China's policy not only in the region, but also toward the Third World, Europe and Japan, and the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the US.

The importance Beijing accords the region is a very recent development. Traditionally, Central Asia played a minor role, or at least not a decisive one, in the foreign policy of the Middle Kingdom. Central Asia was at the periphery, and the great distances and difficult terrain inevitably had their effect. Beijing's influence was generally limited, although it fluctuated according to the strength of the Chinese regime. Relations between the Chinese empire and local rulers were basically twofold: "For Central Asia, relations with China meant trade: For China the basis of trade was tribute."[1] No real vassalage system was involved, only a symbolic recognition of the supremacy of China and its Emperor, the Son of Heaven. Occasionally, these quasi-tributary relationships engendered tension, hostility, and even violence. Nevertheless, major incidents were exceptional and relatively short-lived. Even Russian expansionism and annexation of Kokand and West Turkestan, the Chinese annexation of Eastern Turkestan in 1884, and the emergence of modern Afghanistan did not substantially change the relatively minor role Central Asia played in China's foreign policy.[2]

To understand how China's Afghan policy has evolved from one of benign neglect to one rooted in crisis diplomacy with global dimensions, we shall first trace relations between the two countries from October 1949 (when Communist rule was established in China) to December 1979 (when Soviet military power descended upon Afghanistan). This provides a setting for a more detailed examination of Beijing's perceptions about and reactions to Moscow's Afghan venture.

Sino-Afghan Relations, 1949–79

In 1949, the newly formed Communist regime in China took no more interest in Afghanistan than had previous Chinese governments. It perceived hardly any promise for a Marxist party or movement of any significance in Afghanistan. It likewise saw only the slightest prospect for success—if indeed any at all—in penetrating Afghanistan's society and economy, characterized by tribalism and Islamic religious fanaticism, all particularly marked in the agrarian sector, which, according to the Maoist scheme, should have been the first

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[1] J. F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368–1884," in J. K. Fairbank, Ed., *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 209. On trade relations, see M. Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1975, pp. 70–83, 163–65.

[2] Rossabi, op. cit., pp. 284–87, argues that Imperial, Republican, and Communist China basically pursued the same objective in Inner Asia, though they used different means.

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target. Although the Afghan government was one of the first to recognize the PRC, doing so as early as January 12, 1950, the PRC reacted coolly. It initiated contact with Afghanistan only in 1954, when, in the wake of the Geneva Conference and in an attempt to widen its international connections, it adopted the *Panshila* principles of peaceful coexistence. The two countries finally established full diplomatic relations only on January 20, 1955.

In the following years, China began to evince a more active interest in its relations with Afghanistan. Its concern was hardly over events in Afghanistan itself. Rather, what interest China did show in Afghanistan derived primarily from its concerns over broader regional politics. From the late 1950's until well into the 1970's, then, China's relations with Afghanistan tended to ebb and flow with the tide of events in the region—particularly in southern Asia and the Middle East.

In southern Asia, the key event was the uprising in Tibet in 1959. China's ruthless suppression of the Tibetans brought relations between China and India to the point of conflict. Those relations deteriorated even further after Premier Zhou Enlai's unsuccessful border-dispute talks with Jawaharlal Nehru in April 1960. China thereafter moved to strengthen its ties with India's neighbors and attempted to settle boundary disputes with the other countries of southern Asia—successfully with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan, and unsuccessfully with Bhutan. This was the atmosphere in which the PRC and Afghanistan signed, during Zhou Enlai's visit to Kabul in November 1960, a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Nonaggression, modeled after those China had signed with Burma and Nepal.[3]

In this period, the settlement of border disputes was the most important development in Sino-Afghan rela-

[3] The full text of the agreement is given in *Peking Review*, No. 51, December 1960, p. 18.

Mohammad Daoud is welcomed by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Beijing airport for a visit in an unspecified year (prior to 1964), during Daoud's first tenure as Afghan Prime Minister.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

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tions. The original boundary between China and Afghanistan had been drawn by Great Britain and Russia at the 1895 Pamir Conference. In order to leave a buffer zone between themselves, the two treaty powers awarded a 300-kilometer-long salient—known as the Wakhan Corridor—to Afghanistan. According to subsequent Afghan governments, the border between Afghanistan and China was about 100 kilometers long (75 kilometers long according to Chinese sources), running from the Afghanistan-Pakistan-China trijunction to the Afghanistan-China-USSR trijunction, at 37°3'N and 74°33'E.[4] China, which had not been present at the Pamir Conference, refused to recognize this settlement and demanded the Wakhan Corridor for itself, as part of its claim to all of the Pamir mountains.

The Chinese position on the issue, however, was flexible. From the 1950's, the PRC had in practice recognized the Afghan claims.[5] In November 1963, it signed a border agreement renouncing its own claims. In so doing, it hoped to gain an additional means of isolating India and to win a propaganda advantage in the Third World: China could contrast India's "rigid attitude" with its own readiness to act "fairly" and "moderately" in settling border disputes.

Increased Chinese trade and aid soon followed the 1963 border agreement. Trade between China and Afghanistan was small in scale, although it did grow annually, particularly in the form of barter exchange. The Chinese aid program was effective, if modest in scale. It amounted to only 3–5 percent of what the US and the Soviet Union each extended to Afghanistan and ranked as one of China's smallest aid programs to an Asian non-Communist country. While China substantially increased its aid to Afghanistan in 1972—it offered US$44 million for Afghanistan's Fourth Five-Year Plan—Afghanistan was still only 15th on China's foreign aid list, in contrast to third on the Soviet aid list.[6] In this period, China clearly attached relatively little importance to Afghanistan and saw no point in competing with the Soviet Union there economically.

In the Middle East, China's concern has been primarily the role of outside powers in regional politics. China regards the Middle East as the imperialist West's vulnerable zone, through which a blow might be struck at imperialist interests, with the cooperation of at least some of the Middle Eastern states. Perhaps even more important, however, China fears Soviet penetration of the region. In broad, abstract, strategic terms, a Soviet-dominated Middle East would be yet another piece in the encirclement of China and would serve as a springboard for Soviet advances in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Clearly, then, "the Middle East was far from marginal in China's world outlook and foreign policy considerations,"[7] and it was important to have good relations with Afghanistan, which in geopolitical terms links South and Central Asia with the Middle East.

China's Muslim minority has also kindled an active though limited Chinese interest in Afghanistan. The bulk of China's Muslims live in Xinjiang, the strategically sensitive region on China's western border, and maintain religious and other relations with ethnically similar populations across the border in Afghanistan and the USSR. The existence of this minority has contradictory implications for China. On the one hand, China's Muslims represent a means by which the Soviet Union could penetrate the "bamboo curtain" along China's borders to intervene in the PRC's internal affairs. This larger dimension has raised the need for China to settle its border disputes with its Muslim neighbors. On the other hand, China has attempted to use its Muslim peoples as a bridge to fellow Muslims elsewhere, in Southeast Asia and Africa, for example, but particularly in the Middle East.[8]

Thus, China's interest in South Asia and the Middle East long tended to determine its interest in Afghanistan. In the early 1960's, when regional tensions were high and it showed an increased interest in the Middle East, China made a strong effort to improve relations with Afghanistan. From late 1965 to late 1971, Beijing evinced little interest in the Middle East, and even less in Afghanistan. In 1971, when the PRC once again came to perceive the Middle East and Europe as vital Soviet targets—domination of the Middle East and Europe would secure the Soviet rear and thus serve as a precondition for the encirclement of China[9]—China began to attach more strategic importance to Afghanistan. Hence, it reinforced its efforts to demonstrate a presence in Afghanistan, though it well understood that

[4] Shen-Yu Dai, "China and Afghanistan," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 25, January-March 1966, fn. 25; and Rahul Ram, *Politics of Central Asia*, London, Curzon Press, 1974, p. 35.

[5] H. C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1966, pp. 320–21.

[6] In the period 1954–1979, total Soviet aid to Afghanistan amounted to US$1.3 billion, while in the period 1956–1979, Chinese aid to Afghanistan totaled only US$75 million. See US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 108–09. See also R. S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 126; Sreedhar, "Sino-Afghan Economic Relations," *China Report* (Delhi), September-December 1976, pp. 7–9; J. F. Copper, *China's Foreign Aid*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976, p. 65; M. J. Fry, *The Afghan Economy*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974, p. 228; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 8, 1976, p. A/16, Oct. 14, 1976, p. A/23, and Jan. 4, 1977, pp. A/11–12.

[7] See Y. Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1944–74*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 5.

[8] Ibid., pp. 18–19.

[9] Ibid., p. 163.

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Signing of the Sino-Afghan border treaty on November 22, 1963, in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Afghan Minister of the Interior Abdul Kayeum congratulate each other after the signing. In the immediate background from center to right are the then Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Liu Xiaoqi; Chairman of the National People's Congress's Standing Committee, Chu De; and Premier Zhou Enlai.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

it could not challenge the USSR on equal terms in this respect.

The Afghan coup of 1973, which deposed King Zahir Shah and brought Mohammad Daoud to power, seemed to fit the pattern of previous years. Beijing had ample cause for concern. After all, Daoud was not entirely an unknown quantity. In Chinese eyes, he was the architect of the special relationship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the 1950's, and his coup was perceived as Soviet-inspired, an expression of Soviet expansionism south toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.[10] Daoud's partners in the coup, moreover, were members of the Parcham party, a Marxist group identified with the Soviet Union. Neither the man nor his partners augured well for Chinese interests. Thus, when China recognized the new Afghan regime in July 1973, it was not at Beijing's initiative but on that of Daoud and at the request of the Afghan government.[11]

Over the next few years, Chinese interest in Afghanistan increased, as regional developments gave reason for apprehension. First, the more China's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, the greater its worries over the Soviet military and economic presence in Afghanistan became. For example, Chinese concern was evident when a high-ranking Soviet military mission led by Marshal K. S. Moskalenko visited Afghanistan in October 1973. Second, Daoud was taking an aggressively nationalist stand on the Pushtunistan issue, and the Soviet Union might well support his claims. This threatened China's close ally Pakistan, still weakened from its military defeat by India in 1971.

All in all, however, China reconciled itself to devel-

[10] *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 1973, p. 11,613C.

[11] *Peking Review*, Aug. 3, 1973, p. 9.

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opments in Afghanistan with a healthy pragmatism. Its fears over the Daoud regime's Soviet ties abated somewhat in December 1974, when Daoud sent his brother, Mohammad Naim Khan, as special ambassador to meet with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, and Vice-Premier Li Xiannian. Daoud clearly wanted to improve Sino-Afghan relations and underline the importance that he attached to Afghanistan's ties with China. China, for its part, utilized the visit to indicate that the Afghans would do well to improve their relations with their neighbors in order to prevent the superpowers from interfering in local conflicts.[12] China also agreed to expand its economic aid to Afghanistan, offering a long-term, interest-free development loan of US$55 million.[13]

Nor did the Pushtunistan issue come to much. In 1975, Daoud made efforts, with the support and mediation of the Shah of Iran, to improve his relations with Pakistan and reduce his dependence on the USSR. Daoud began the process with a visit to Tehran in April 1975 and followed up with a visit to Islamabad in August 1976. Although no practical agreement was reached, the atmosphere was considerably improved. The amelioration of Pakistan-Afghan relations allowed China more easily to reconcile good relations with Afghanistan with good relations with Pakistan. China could also emphasize its common interests with both states[14] and claim that the amicable relations developing among South Asian states would reduce the ability of the world powers to manipulate regional affairs.[15]

The Saur revolution of April 1978, in which Daud was overthrown by Nur Mohammad Taraki, caught Beijing as unprepared as any other world capital. The Chinese knew little about the relatively anonymous figures who rose to lead the Afghan government, let alone their ideological orientation and foreign policy preferences.[16] That the general line would be pro-Soviet was clear, although the extent of Soviet influence was not. By now, moreover, China was not unused to a pro-Soviet line in Afghan politics. History had shown that even an Afghan leadership with an initially strong pro-Soviet bias could change its direction. Daoud was a case in point.

Still, as after Daoud's takeover in 1973, a doubtful Beijing did not take the initiative. Only at the request of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) did it recognize the new Afghan regime[17]—and only after the new Afghan leadership had confirmed its policy of strict nonalignment (no bilateral or multilateral military arrangements) and had assured Beijing it had no intention of becoming an "Asian Cuba."[18] Taraki himself stressed his desire to consolidate friendly relations with China.

Chinese apprehensions were soon aroused, however, by a number of developments. In December 1978, the DRA signed a friendship treaty with the USSR. Described by the two parties as a step toward the creation of an "effective security system in Asia," the pact was evocative of the Soviet effort to establish a collective security system in Asia, which Daoud had once refused to join.[19] Moreover, the Soviet Union increased its presence, in the form of an ever-growing number of civilian and military advisers, in response to mounting rebel activity in Afghanistan (from March 1979). The Afghan resistance, Chinese observers noted, extended not only to religious circles and government officials, who had been supporters of the old regime, but to all social sectors. To China, this resistance represented a reaction not so much against the Taraki government as against Soviet intervention *imposed* on the Afghan government and cloaked in legality by the friendship treaty.[20] Finally, China became increasingly annoyed at Soviet accusations that it, Pakistan, the United States, Iran, and Egypt were meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Such accusations raised Chinese premonitions of a Soviet takeover in Afghanistan and, eventually, conflict with China.[21] China had for some years entertained no illusions about Soviet motivations and intentions. But an actual Soviet presence in Afghanistan would greatly increase the dangers of the Soviet threat.

Events in the latter half of 1979 moved quickly toward the realization of China's worst fears. China's sense of the legitimacy of the Afghan regime was shaken greatly when Hafizullah Amin seized power from Taraki in September 1979. Amin did make new promises about pursuing a policy of nonalignment while stressing Afghanistan's special relationship with the Soviet Union. But

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[12] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1974, p. A/16.

[13] *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (London), 1975, p. 26,921; *Peking Review*, Dec. 13, 1974, p. 4.

[14] *Peking Review*, Sept. 3, 1976, p. 30; *FBIS-CHI*, June 4, 1976, p. A/14, and Aug. 26, 1976, p. A/15.

[15] Daoud sounded these themes himself on occasion. See, for example, his speech at the opening ceremony of the first Loya Jirgah (Grand National Assembly) on expanding and strengthening friendly ties with China (*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 1, 1977, p. A/6). He went even further in 1978, criticizing "outside interference" in the Horn of Africa—clearly hinting at the USSR but not naming it—in his joint communique with the late President Anwar al-Sadat during his visit to Egypt a few weeks before Daoud's overthrow (*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1978, p. A/19).

[16] Spokesmen for the Taraki regime denied that they were Communists, arguing that no Communist party exists in Afghanistan. They described the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as a party of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, craftsmen, and middle-class bourgeoisie. See the interview with Hafizullah Amin in *Newsweek* (New York, NY), July 3, 1978.

[17] *FBIS-CHI*, May 8, 1978, p. A/18.

[18] *FBIS-CHI*, May 11, 1978, p. N/1, and May 18, 1978, p. A/11.

[19] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1978, p. A/4.

[20] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) commentaries of June 11 and 29, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 18, 1979, p. F/1, and July 10, 1979, p. C/1.

[21] Xin Changlin, "Afghanistan in Turmoil," *Beijing Review*, June 15, 1979, p. 24.

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Soviet military equipment seen in December 1979 at Kabul airport at the height of Moscow's lightning invasion of Afghanistan.

—F. Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

even this question became irrelevant following Amin's overthrow at the hands of Soviet forces, which in December 1979, invaded Afghanistan and installed the Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as prime minister.

Implications of Soviet Intervention

China strongly condemned the Soviet action, rejecting all Soviet attempts to justify it. Beijing scoffed at the Soviets' claim that they had been invited in. Amin obviously would not have sought his own ouster and execution. Karmal held no public post at the time and was not even in Afghanistan during the coup. How could he have invoked the friendship treaty to legitimize intervention? In addition, China saw no external threat to Afghanistan, as claimed by the Soviet Union—except that from the Soviet Union itself. Nor did it see any threat to the USSR. Finally, China denied that the Soviet action fell within the framework of the UN charter.[22]

At the same time, Beijing moved toward different conclusions about events in Afghanistan since April 1978. Seen in retrospect, the "so called 'April Revolution' only eliminated a few Afghan leaders who refused to take orders from Moscow,"[23] and what followed was nothing less than a series of coups d'état planned and aided by the Soviet Union. The result was chaos, disintegration, instability, and the complete subjugation of Afghanistan to the USSR. As in the case of the Amin regime, China refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Karmal government and also rejected the legality of the treaty Karmal signed with Moscow, which allowed Soviet troops to remain "temporarily" on Afghan soil. The implication was clear: it was actually the non-Marxist Muslim guerrilla groups of Afghanistan that were the standard-bearers of the "national liberation struggle."[24]

Thus, China was prepared to commit itself in principle to support the Afghan resistance groups. The extent of its aid would be dictated by pragmatic considerations, such as the need to oppose Soviet adventurism, and by China's perceptions of the risks and opportunities involved.

[22] New China News Agency, Dec. 29, 1979, in British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East* (hereafter—*SWB-FE*), Dec. 31, 1979, 6307/C1/9–10; and *Renmin Ribao* editorial, Dec. 31, 1979, in *SWB-FE*, Jan. 3, 1980, 6309/C/4–5; and *FBIS-CHI*, May 7, 1981, p. F/1.

[23] *Renmin Ribao*, July 1, 1980, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1980, p. C/5.

[24] Xinhua (in English), June 18, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 19, 1980, p. C/1.

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AFGHANISTAN – THE LARGER PICTURE



SOURCE: Adapted for *Problems of Communism* by the Cartographic Services Laboratory, University of Maryland, College Park, MD., from U.S. Department of State map "Azimuthal Equidistant projection centered on Kabul, Afghanistan," No. 804490, April 1980. As noted in the original, boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

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The Soviet invasion clearly gave Afghanistan and its environs new importance in Chinese perceptions and calculations. The significance was seen as both strategic and military.

Strategic implications. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Chinese had come to view the Afghan revolution as part of a Soviet master plan. Vietnam was one facet; Afghanistan was another:

Situated south of Central Asia, Afghanistan is strategically very important. The old tsars drooled over it long ago. The new Soviet tsars have assumed the mantle from the old tsars. To get hold of the passage leading out of the Indian Ocean and to control the strategic sea route of the West and Japan, the Soviet Union is energetically trying to control Afghanistan to open a land route south to the Indian Ocean while attempting to grab naval and air bases in Vietnam as a foothold and carve out a sea path through the Indian Ocean.[25]

In this context, the December 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty was now perceived by Beijing as another link in a chain of treaties forged by Moscow with countries bordering on China (India, Vietnam, and Mongolia being seen as already tied to the Soviet Union).

With the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan became even more critical. Beijing saw events in Afghanistan as another key step—like the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea—in a well-orchestrated Soviet master plan for world hegemony. Xinhua commentary emphasized the logic of this master plan:

The Soviet Union moves from north to south while its proxy, Vietnam, moves from east to west to carry out Moscow's southward strategy that aims at controlling the oil-producing regions in the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf area on the one hand and Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca on the other, with the Gulf area and the Strait of Malacca being the most strategically important. The Soviet Union will not be satisfied or stop its step without hitting its strategic targets. Control of Afghanistan and Indochina is only the first two steps in the southward strategy, and the next step is to seize "oil-supply centres" of the West in the Middle East and near east, control the passage from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and cut off "the life line of the West at sea." Only by realizing these objectives can the Soviet Union complete its plan to divide and surround strategic points in Western Europe so as to give strategic support through coordinated action. Thus the entire Euro-Asian continent would be under its armed threat from north to south. And the Soviet Union would hold an ever-present threat with a military blockade from the sea. Therefore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its control of Kampuchea through Vietnam are neither isolated and temporary steps, nor local problems of concern to only one or two areas, but an overall problem concerned with the destiny of many countries and the future of the world.

The Soviet Union has not yet completed its strategic deployment. When will it be completed? To put it specifically, the Soviet Union will have basically obtained the strategic position outlined above when it achieves the following: First, it controls the oil resources in the Middle East, Northern Africa and the Gulf region, second, it controls Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca and third, it can have its own way in southern Africa and particularly on the east African coast along the Indian Ocean.[26]

In January 1979, forces of the Hanoi-backed Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation enter Phnom Penh, from which the Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot had withdrawn.

—MTI/SYGMA.

[25] Xue Yuan, "Turmoil in Afghanistan," *Renmin Ribao,* June 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 18, 1979, p. F/2.

[26] *FBIS-CHI,* June 19, 1980, pp. C/1–2. See also Observer, "Critical Choice," *Renmin Ribao,* June 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 20, 1980, pp. C/1–3; and Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), July 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* July 14, 1980, p. C/2.

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As the Chinese see it, the Soviet plan for global hegemony has two components, diplomatic and military, employed simultaneously or alternately. On the diplomatic front, détente serves the final objective by lulling its target nations, dividing them, and serving as a smokescreen for the "new tsars' " real intentions.[27] Behind what they put forth as their peace-loving facade, the Soviets exploit every opportunity that comes their way. Despite détente, the Soviets exploited the turbulent situation in the Middle East and the Gulf area to carry out a more daring military action than ever before. By using the military clause of a friendship treaty as a pretext to intervene in a non-Communist-bloc country, they extended their grasp even beyond the confines implied by the Brezhnev Doctrine.[28]

Furthermore, in the Chinese view, the Soviet global strategy is indirect in approach. The primary target is Western Europe. But the main thrust—a flanking attack—is through Africa and Asia.[29] For China, the critical question will be the reaction of the West and Japan. Will they be reluctant to resist Soviet demands and to enter into some form of cooperation directed against the Soviet threat? Or will the Soviet threat be the catalyst for just such cooperation. What direction events will take, according to China, depends on what positions the United States and the Third World take and on what pressures they can bring to bear on Western Europe and Japan to stand fast.

As for China, the Soviet strategy is "encirclement and isolation" (a nuclear attack would be counterproductive, since it would "yield no useful results" and "put the Soviet Union in a passive position strategically"). Encirclement is pursued by stationing large numbers of troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, by occupying the Wakhan Corridor, and by engaging Vietnam to threaten China from the south.[30] In the long run, the threat to China would be a multidirectional surprise attack; to prepare for it, China would have to disrupt the progress of the four modernizations, which in turn would weaken it in no small measure. Isolation of China is pursued through an unconstrained effort to disrupt any cooperation between the PRC and other states, such as the United States, Japan, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). If encircled and isolated, China fears it may have no choice but to give in to Soviet demands.

Beijing seems to have no doubts about its interpretation of Soviet strategic intentions: "It is precisely because Afghanistan is of vital strategic importance to the Soviet global strategy that the Soviet Union has taken the risk of seizing it."[31] Therefore, Chinese spokesmen argue, the Soviet claim of being only temporarily in Afghanistan cannot be taken seriously. Furthermore, neither the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan nor the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea can be seen as spontaneous decisions or accidents. Both were carefully calculated moves. The Chinese leadership claims to have no illusions. They are vehement that the USSR and Vietnam will not retreat until the situation becomes extremely difficult.[32]

Military implications. The Chinese leadership has a healthy respect for the military strength of the USSR. In particular, it is well aware that the Soviets can fight and win different kinds of wars without having to resort to nuclear weaponry. And as Afghanistan demonstrated, the USSR is more than willing to make use of its military machine directly and offensively, and not just through proxies. All this poses difficult problems for China's defense strategists.

One problem is that posed by the high mobility demonstrated by the Soviet military on the sea and in the air. In Beijing's view, such mobility enables the Soviets to supply their allies and proxies quickly and effectively. It allows them to fight strategically along internal lines, since they can shift an attack's center of gravity as the situation on the battlefield dictates. It allows Soviet naval power to dominate the Indian Ocean. Finally, it permits the Soviets to concentrate large forces on short notice at any point along their borders.

The Chinese military considers this last capability to be the salient feature of the Soviet offensive military threat—sudden preemptive strikes, usually carried out at night or just before dawn and preceded by negotiations with the country soon to be invaded.[33] The sudden attack is especially effective against a country—such as China—that has no sophisticated early-warning system.

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[27] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1980, p. C/3.

[28] *SWB-FE*, Jan. 3, 1980, 6309/C/5.

[29] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 11, 1980, p. C/3; "Moscow's 'Dumb-bell' Strategy," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 8–9. See also "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," ibid., Jan. 28, 1980, p. 19; and Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong, "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," ibid., June 22, 1981. Some Chinese leaders argue that the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, as the principal targets of Soviet aggression, should be principally responsible for containing the Soviets; they thus justify giving priority to economic development over investment in the military. See C. F. Chyba, "U.S. Military-Support Equipment Sales to the People's Republic of China," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), April 1981, p. 479.

[30] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Feb. 18, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 19, 1981, p. C/4.

[31] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Aug. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, p. C/7.

[32] Zu Lie, "Détente or Offensive," *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing), July 16, 1980, pp. 5–7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, p. C/8.

[33] See "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 28, 1980, pp. 15–19.

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A view of the tortuous terrain along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan.

—Christine Osborne/Camera Press.

This may explain why the PRC since 1979 has agreed to operate an electronic intelligence-gathering station in Xinjiang jointly with the United States.[34]

Another problem is that posed by the de facto Soviet annexation of the Wakhan salient and the large-scale introduction of Soviet troops there to facilitate communications and to seal off the local passes to China and Pakistan. The PRC perceives such moves as a Soviet attempt to gain a "strategic edge over China and Pakistan."[35] The Soviets can now supply their own troops without harassment from Afghan guerrillas during passage through the northern border area. They can use the Wakhan area as a supply and ordnance depot. Most important, they have in effect physically separated Afghanistan and China and brought the Soviet border right up to Pakistan.[36] Thus situated, they can exert a direct military influence on the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, thereby increasing their leverage over India. Finally, by occupying the salient and evacuating the area's inhabitants, the Soviets can seal off the only direct land route from China for supply of the Afghan insurgents.

A third area of concern is that for the Soviet military, Afghanistan has become a ground for testing weapons under combat conditions. According to the Chinese, the Soviets have tested light and heavy military equipment, such as new assault rifles, grenade launchers, self-propelled artillery, and armored personnel carriers. They have tested battle management equipment, including computers,[37] and have had the chance to evaluate the effectiveness of their battlefield tactics and logistics in a limited war and to make the necessary adjustments in training and equipment.[38] Finally, they have tested unconventional means of warfare, including

[34] *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), June 19, 1981, pp. 1–2. The facilities are manned by Chinese technicians and monitor Soviet missile tests.

[35] *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 5, 1980, p. F/1.

[36] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Mar. 13, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 16, 1981, pp. C/3–4.

[37] *FBIS-CHI,* July 2, 1980, p. C/1.

[38] Li Yunfei, "The People of Afghanistan Are Fighting a Protracted War," *Renmin Ribao,* June 25, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI,* July 2, 1981, p. F/4.

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

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chemical and biological weapons, just as the Vietnamese have done in Laos and Kampuchea.[39]

All these factors are highly relevant to Chinese military thinking: "people's war" has been one of the principal PRC military doctrines for waging war in the modern era (probably against the Red Army), and Afghanistan represents a classic case of "people's," or guerrilla, warfare. The Chinese have been encouraged by the relative success of the Afghan insurgents against superior Soviet military deployment and firepower, which, to Beijing, has shown that "when a small nation is invaded, its people can mobilize all patriotic forces and adopt military tactics which conform to the specific conditions of their own nation to deal with even such military superpowers as the Soviet Union."[40]

Is the Chinese leadership whistling in the dark? Or do they really believe what they say? It is hard to tell for certain, but it is reasonable to assume that what has happened in Afghanistan has not gone without effect. Afghanistan has undoubtedly contributed to the disputes within and between military and political elites in Beijing over "people's war,"[41] and it has surely affected decisions on the procurement of military equipment, and the size and distribution of the military budget.

Policy conclusions. What conclusions on policy has Beijing drawn from the Afghan crisis and its implications?

First, China's policy for thwarting the Soviet master plan is resistance, not appeasement. Concessions to the USSR, China contends, would only be a prelude to another world war, as in 1939. Indeed, Western weakness in the face of Soviet aggression in Indochina, Angola, and the Horn of Africa has only encouraged further Soviet aggression.[42] Resistance, by contrast, is clearly effective. It is graphically demonstrated in Afghanistan, where the Red Army has been unable to stamp out the resistance. A relatively small number of poorly armed guerrillas have pinned down 100,000 Soviet troops. According to Chinese sources, the Soviets have suffered over 10,000 casualties, Soviet soldiers

Members of the Afghan liberation movement stand guard over three Soviet prisoners in Quetta south of Qandahar, in December 1981. The three are identified as V. A. Bidenka, 18; Yu. G. Povarnitsin, 19; and Mohamed Kuli, 19.

—Roland Neveu/Gamma-Liaison.

are tired, and morale is low.[43] Thus, the Afghan rebels "have exploded the myth of the invincibility of Soviet hegemonism.[44] China estimates that to turn the tide, the USSR may have to employ up to 300,000 troops and invest even more money than the US$3–4 million it now spends every day.[45] Otherwise, it may sink even deeper into what has begun to resemble a Vietnam-type quagmire.

Second, the Chinese have concluded that the only means of resisting Soviet imperialism and hegemonism is to build the broadest possible international united front, one that will include China and the Third World, Western Europe and Japan, and the United States. This represents a major departure. According to Mao Zedong's theory of the "differentiation of the three worlds," the United States and the Soviet Union are

[39] See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 13, 1980, p. C/2. On this point, the Chinese cite Western sources.

[40] Yi Li, "What the Afghan War Tells Us," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 1, Jan. 1, 1980, pp. 47–48, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 22, 1980, p. F/2, and Aug. 11, 1980, p. C/2. For a detailed description of Soviet counterinsurgency tactics and their failure, see N. P. Newell and R. S. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1981, Ch. 7.

[41] On the two schools in that debate, see E. Joffe and G. Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1978, pp. 15–19. Further hints of an ongoing debate can be found in the lecture to the People's Liberation Army Military Academy by Su Yu, a leading member of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, as reported by New China News Agency (in Chinese), Jan. 19, 1979, in *SWB-FE*, Jan. 23, 1979, 6023/BII/4–6.

[42] *FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1980, p. C/1.

[43] *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 6, 1980, p. C/2.

[44] Observer, *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 26, 1980, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, p. C/2.

[45] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, pp. C/3–4.

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motivated by the same basic drives.[46] The view excluded the possibility of US participation in an antihegemonist front. In the current situation, however, the "chief contradiction in state relations in East Asia and the Western Pacific" is not between the two superpowers and the rest of the world, but "between Soviet expansion and aggression on the one hand and the opposition to it from China, Japan, ASEAN and other east Asian countries, together with the United States on the other."[47] Hence, there is a common strategic interest in establishing a united front, despite any secondary contradictions between the partners in that coalition (such as between China and ASEAN or China and the United States).[48] Beijing knows that because of differences between the potential members of a united front, "it is not possible to express a united strategy against hegemonism in a specific form and by united action." It is possible, however, "to strengthen consultation . . . and to work together and supplement one another."[49] For China, any sort of cooperation, even if partial and limited, is a step in the right direction.

Third, time is of the essence in opposing Soviet hegemonism. Immediate action may not change the Soviets' strategic orientation. But they can be made to pay a heavy price. The anti-Soviet coalition can thereby gain time to organize itself, coordinate its policies, and build up its strength. With the world balance of power changed, it will then be able to prevent the outbreak of a third world war.[50]

In Afghanistan, immediate action means foreign aid to the rebels. China, and the other front-line states of Pakistan and Iran, have provided limited aid to the rebels. They have also acquiesced in the movement of supplies and manpower across the Afghan borders.[51] But they have held back from providing full-scale support. Egypt has been one of the few countries openly to provide support, in the form of weapons and training in Egyptian camps.[52] It has also taken steps to cooperate with the United States, making air and naval bases accessible to US forces as a deterrent against further Soviet advances. In this way, China perceives that the United States has in fact become part of a coalition of local forces, neighboring regional powers, and a global power. To the Chinese, US participation in this coalition is a welcome step, one that illustrates the possibility of a workable united front against the Soviet drive for world hegemony.

Fourth, Soviet and Vietnamese behavior must be understood to be part of the same master plan. Any concession on Afghanistan will have adverse effects in Southeast Asia. Any compromise in one area will be a precedent for compromise in the other. The results would only impede the establishment of world peace and expose the Eurasian continent to Soviet threat and blackmail. China holds that the two issues must be dealt with simultaneously.[53]

Fifth, Beijing insists on nothing less than complete, unconditional Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It rejects Soviet proposals for conditional or partial withdrawal.[54] In fact, it warns against any political settlements with the USSR, either an agreement specifically on Afghanistan (through Pakistani/Iranian talks with the Karmal regime) or a package deal linking the Afghanistan issue with the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and disarmament issues. Any such agreement would not only legitimize Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Karmal government, China claims, but also allow Moscow to retain its bases in Afghanistan while the United States and Great Britain pull out of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.[55] In consequence, China sees any negotiations on turning the Indian Ocean region into a "zone of peace" to be potentially as dangerous as the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.[56] Such negotiations could expose China in the south and critically weaken its international position.

Finally, China insists on two further conditions after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. One is the freedom for each country to decide its own destiny "without outside interference." Obviously, China expects that any such exercise—for

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[46] Editorial department of *Renmin Ribao*, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" (reprinted by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, in 1977). On China's united front doctrine, see J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

[47] Pei Monong, "The International Situation and Development Prospects in East Asia," *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 27, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 8, 1981, p. A/2.

[48] Pei Monong, "A Brief Discussion of the Strategic Relationships Opposing Soviet Hegemonism," *Renmin Ribao*, July 8, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 9, 1981, pp. C/1–3.

[49] *FBIS-CHI*, July 9, 1981, p. C/3.

[50] Chen Youwei, "Why Do We Think About 1939?" *Renmin Ribao*, July 16, 1980, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1980, pp. C/1–2.

[51] China has supplied the Afghan insurgents primarily with recoilless rifles, Soviet-designed rifles and light machine guns, and mines. It has also probably provided training to a limited number of Afghans. Egypt has contributed 81-mm mortars, RPG rocket launchers, and assault rifles. Others that have provided aid include the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), May 8, 1981; "Arming Afghan Rebels," *Foreign Report* (London), Aug. 13, 1981, p. 3. Should Pakistan supply the Afghan guerrillas with Chinese-made light weapons, it would be difficult to prove the arms had not really come from China. According to Soviet sources, there is indeed a Sino-Pakistani conspiracy to provide training and large quantities of weapons to the Afghan insurgents, a conspiracy in which the two cooperate with the United States. See Y. Agranov, "The Afghan Revolution and Peking's Treacherous Course," *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), No. 3, 1980, pp. 102–03.

[52] *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 10, 1980, p. I/2, and Feb. 15, 1980, pp. I/1–2.

[53] See Observer's articles in *Renmin Ribao*, June 19 and July 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 20, p. C/3, and July 3, 1980, p. C/2.

[54] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 25, 1980, p. A/4.

[55] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), July 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 14, 1980, p. C/1.

[56] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 7, 1980, p. A/1.

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The Pakistani Army on maneuvers in Chinese-model tanks in February 1980 at the Nowshera military base near the Afghan border.

Lambray/Gamma-Liaison.

example, free general elections—would not favor the Soviets or their proxies. The other condition is the restoration of Afghanistan and Kampuchea "to their independent and nonaligned status." When all conditions are met, Chinese spokesmen have said, China will join other states in giving both Afghanistan and Kampuchea international guarantees of independence and sovereignty.[57]

Sino-Pakistan Relations

In the Chinese view, the next three targets in the Soviet step-by-step drive south are Pakistan, Iran, and Thailand. Of the three, the closest to the PRC's heart is its ally for the past two decades—Pakistan.

What are China's interests in Pakistan? First, China professes a moral commitment to Pakistan's defense. Xiao Ke, China's Vice Minister of Defense, enunciated this commitment clearly during his March 1980 visit to Islamabad:

Our friends can rest assured the Chinese people and army will firmly stand forever by the side of the Pakistan people and armed forces in their just struggle against hegemonic aggression and intervention to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty.[58]

Second, Beijing must feel its credibility is at stake in

[57] *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 25, 1980, p. A/4.

[58] *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 19, 1980, p. F/2. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese commitment to support Pakistan has been consistently reaffirmed by China's highest authorities. See Hua Guofeng's speech in Beijing's service (in Urdu) to India and Pakistan, May 2, 1980, reported in *FBIS-CHI,* May 5, 1980, pp. F/6–8; Zia-ul-Haq's press conference, in *FBIS-CHI,* May 8, 1980, p. F/3; an editorial in *Dawn* (Karachi), May 4, 1980, p. 7, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), May 9, 1980, pp. F/1–2; Foreign Minister Huang Hua's statement on the occasion of Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi's visit to Beijing in December 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Dec. 29, 1980, p. F/1; and Premier Zhao Ziyang's statement during his visit to Islamabad in June 1981, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 3, 1981, p. F/3.

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Pakistan. It could not provide much help to Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, and its prestige suffered accordingly. If something of the same sort happened again, its credibility as a reliable ally would be seriously damaged, and its hard-won status in the Third World could be lost. Even worse, a tarnished China could not hope to rally prospective members to its united front, and a diplomatically isolated China would be in no position to oppose Soviet ambitions.

Most important, perhaps, is Pakistan's geostrategic position. Pakistan blocks further Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and toward South and Southeast Asia. It lies close by the oil-shipping lanes vital to Western Europe and Japan, as well as to other oil-importing countries in Asia and Africa. And it controls a southern avenue of attack into Xinjiang and Tibet. If the Soviets moved into Pakistan, they could take advantage of the roads leading into China, particularly the Karakoram Highway and the ancient silk route through the Mintaka Pass. With their ally Vietnam and with a possible ally in India, they would thus draw the circle tighter around China. The PRC would be further isolated physically, and it would have to divert additional resources to defense, with possibly disastrous results for its political, social, and economic development.

Such factors—self-interest, if not moral imperatives—give reason to believe that China's commitment to Pakistan is serious and viable. What threats, then, does the current Pakistani regime face? From the Chinese perspective, some are direct, i. e., those posed by the Soviet Union itself. Others are more indirect, i.e., those raised by Pakistan's own domestic difficulties.

The least likely Soviet option in present circumstances, according to the Chinese, is a direct military thrust into Pakistan.[59] The Soviet supply lines over land and by sea would be long and difficult. So long as Afghanistan is not secure, the logistics problem of fielding and supplying an army of some 500,000 men would be immense. The Soviets would suffer extensive losses of men and matériel at the hands of the tough and experienced Pakistani army. Not least, any Soviet attack on Pakistan would probably trigger a military reprisal by both the United States and China.

A more likely option is a Soviet attempt to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan. The Afghan government could encourage Pathan and Baluch demands for self-determination. For their part, the Soviets could train and supply subversive groups in the region,[60] relying in Baluchistan on left-leaning local political groups and tribal leaders. Should such efforts bear fruit in the form of a Soviet-supported Baluch state, the Soviets would gain access to an Indian Ocean port (Gwadar) strategically located near the Persian Gulf states and major oil routes. A Baluch state might also be a first step toward the disintegration of Iran, whose Baluch minority has traditionally demanded independence. In the latter case, the Soviet Union might gain access to yet another Indian Ocean port—Chah Bahar, now in Iran.

A third Soviet option would be simply to destabilize Pakistan. The Soviets could support underground groups—Al Zulfikar (a Soviet- and Afghan-backed terrorist organization based in Afghanistan) and Mazdoor Kissan (in the North-West Frontier Province). They could also undertake limited military harassment along the border.[61] The danger, of course, is that border skirmishes might get out of hand and escalate.

India must be a factor in all such calculations. India could try to reoccupy Azad Kashmir—a possibility that cannot be discounted out of hand. It could launch a two-pronged attack with the Soviet Union and simply carve up Pakistan. Or it could apply greater pressure in any one of a number of ways. Whatever the case, the Indian dimension adds significantly to Pakistan's defense burden. It is with some reason, therefore, that China has made efforts—for the time being to no avail—to fully normalize relations with India and to promote normalization of relations between Pakistan and India. It is for the same reason, moreover, that China has sought to counteract India's gravitation toward the Soviet Union and to impress on New Delhi the danger of having the Soviet Union on one's doorstep.[62] It is one thing to have a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union when there is a buffer in between; it is quite another when there is a common border, as the Afghan example demonstrates.

As the Chinese are well aware, however, domestic instability may prove Pakistan's worst enemy. Pakistani politics have been in unremitting turmoil since at least 1977. The elections held that year solved nothing. Nor do the military takeover by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 and the hanging of Ali Bhutto in 1979 give much reason

[59] This view is shared by Zia-ul-Haq. See his interview in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1981, p. 45.

[60] According to the New China News Agency, the Soviets were training 3,000–4,000 Baluchis in Qandahar Province for that purpose. See *SWB-FE*, Apr. 11, 1980, 6392/C/1; Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 6, 1980, pp. F/1–2; "Moscow's 'Dumb-bell' Strategy," loc. cit., p. 8; and Zhang Gholiang, "Moscow Covets Baluchistan," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 10, 1980, pp. 26–27. According to this last article, the Soviets began subversive activities in Baluchistan in the early 1970's, attempting to foster pro-Moscow leanings among Baluch intellectuals in Pakistan and Iran and helping to establish the Baluch People's Liberation Front.

[61] There have been recent reports that the Soviets have adopted this strategy. See J. Fullerton, "Cross-border chess," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 13, 1981, pp. 24–25; and "Tribal stick, aid carrot," ibid., Mar. 12, 1982, p. 16.

[62] "Mutual Understanding of Great Significance," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 18, 1980, pp. 13–14.

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for optimism. To make matters worse, Zia has managed to antagonize most of the political parties of Pakistan—particularly Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party—by banning their activity and reneging on his promise to hold free elections. Recently, the emergence of Al Zulfikar, led by Bhutto's eldest son Murtaza[63] and bent on the destruction of the current Pakistani regime, has been especially ominous.

Social problems are also numerous. Zia's emphasis on Islamization is not welcomed by the urban educated elite. It has also caused friction within Islam between the country's Sunni majority and Shi'a minority. Finally, there are a number of ethnic rivalries.

The economy is a third problem area. Pakistan has been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by declining exports, increasingly costly oil imports, labor unrest, sluggish growth, and rapidly falling foreign-currency reserves. On top of that, it has had to cope with more than 2.5 million refugees from Afghanistan and a growing number from Iran, which not only imposes an additional economic burden but may well lead to tensions with the local population. Owing to the invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan now receives US$5 billion in aid a year from a World Bank consortium, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.[64] This largesse has temporarily staved off disaster, but it may not be enough to cover the growing needs of a modernizing Pakistani army threatened by Soviet forces in Afghanistan and locked in an arms race with India.[65] It could even dry up altogether. China on its own could not and would not take on such a burden.

For Beijing, because of this complex combination of external threat and domestic instability, Pakistan clearly has become a front-line state in the full sense of the term. How has this fact affected the advantages and disadvantages China derives from its relations with Pakistan?

On the one hand, China is put in a more vulnerable

[63] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1981, p. 7.
[64] R. Tasker, "On the frontiers of fear," ibid., p. 42.
[65] On India's military buildup, see R.D.M. Furlong and G. S. Sundaram, "India—Asian Power Broker of the 1980's?" *International Defense Review* (Geneva), No. 4, 1981.



Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq visit an Afghan refugee camp at Nasir Bagh near Peshawar in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province on June 2, 1981.

—Shamin Ur Rahman/Gamma-Liaison.

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position than it would like. Obviously, a weak and unstable Pakistan is a tempting target. Its very weakness raises the probability that China might be asked to directly intervene on its behalf, a possibility China would rather not face. If China has to intervene, it would prefer to do so for a stronger and more resilient Pakistan, because that would mean a lower cost, less of a commitment, and a greater chance of success.

Moreover, there is the possibility that Pakistan will accede to Soviet pressure. Zia has dropped hints that he is willing to consider some kind of accommodation with the Soviet Union and to recognize it as a regional power.[66] Beijing, which has been trying for years to deny the Soviet Union the status of an Asian power, has urged Pakistan to step up the struggle, and neither to fall into the trap of a "political solution"—more poetically, a "withered olive branch"—nor to be cowed by Soviet threats.[67] Nevertheless, should Pakistan decide to come to some agreement with the Soviets, China will acquiesce, albeit reluctantly. China has often claimed that, as a matter of principle and unlike other powers, it will not use aid to apply pressure. It could gain little by opposing Pakistan's move, since the Soviets would probably be more than willing to supply economic and military aid to Pakistan, which now fields such relatively outdated Chinese-produced equipment as the Chinese equivalents of the MiG–19 aircraft and T–54/55 tanks.

On the other hand, China derives several substantial advantages from the situation. First, the Soviet threat has, at least temporarily, stabilized domestic Pakistani politics, which have certainly been a source of concern to China since the execution of Bhutto. Second, the flow of aid from the oil-rich Arab states and Western donors has, at least for the present, removed the threat of economic collapse and reduced the Pakistani drain on China's scarce economic resources. China might even hope to have some of its loans repaid. Third, the West, and the United States in particular, are increasingly willing to supply Pakistan with modern weapon systems. As a result, China may not need to provide Pakistan with such large quantities of tanks and aircraft, and the Pakistan army may grow into a more formidable obstacle to Soviet expansion and a more valuable military ally of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Pakistan is already shifting from Chinese military equipment to Western-produced—mainly US—weapons now that the United States has agreed to resupply and modernize its armed forces.[68] Finally, Pakistan's growing prominence in the Islamic and Arab worlds must be considered a windfall. Through Pakistan, China can attempt to penetrate the Islamic bloc in general, and the Middle East in particular.

In the meantime, the course of Sino-Pakistani relations has been smooth. Beijing and Islamabad keep each other advised on all dimensions of the Afghan problem at the highest political level. There are clear signs of close cooperation and indications that military activities would be coordinated should the need arise. Since 1979, and particularly during 1980 and 1981, high-ranking military delegations from both countries have visited and exchanged views with their counterparts in all three military branches.[69]

The Third World

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may prove to have been a watershed in China's relations with fellow members of the Third World. Since the 1960's, the Soviet Union and China have competed for influence in the Third World. The Soviets always had a clear lead, not so much for ideological reasons as for the material payoffs they could offer. Since Afghanistan, however, China has been in a much stronger position. In particular, it has been able to utilize the three larger dimensions of the Afghan crisis—Afghanistan is Muslim, it is Asian, and it was nonaligned—to embarrass the Soviet Union and win more influence for itself.

Of the three, the Islamic dimension seemed the most promising. The Muslim reaction to the Soviet invasion had been strong and swift. Nearly all the Islamic world organizations and nearly all the individual Islamic states denounced the Soviet action. The Higher Council of Al-Azhar even defined the Soviet incursion not only as aggression against an Islamic country but as aggression against the entire Muslim world.[70] This was a pro-

[66] See his interview in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1980, p. 45.

[67] *FBIS-CHI*, July 24, 1980, pp. C/5–6. Pakistan has consistently denied training or supplying the Afghan rebels or letting supplies for them pass through its territory.

[68] Most of Pakistan's army and air force equipment has been supplied by the Chinese (75 percent of its tank force, 60 percent of its combat aircraft, and most of its light naval craft). See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1981–82*, London, 1981, p. 86.

[69] See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1980, p. F/2. In the period 1979–81, PRC delegations paid several visits to Pakistan: in October 1979, a military delegation led by Zhang Caqian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; in March 1980, a military delegation led by Xiao Ke, Vice Minister of Defense; in November 1980, a navy delegation led by Liu Daosheng, First Deputy Commander of the Navy; in November 1980, a military delegation led by Wan Dingli, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; in December 1980, a military delegation led by Han Huaizhi, Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff; and in November 1981, a military delegation led by Yang Dezhai, Chief of the General Staff. In the same period, there were several Pakistani visits to China: in April 1979, a National Defense College delegation led by Chief Instructor Syed Murad; in October 1979, an air force delegation led by Air Marshal Mohammad Shamin, Chief of the Air Staff; in February 1980, a military delegation led by Lieutenant General Jilani, Secretary of Defense; in March 1981, a Navy Staff College delegation led by Commodore Razi Ahmend; and in May 1981, a navy delegation led by Admiral Karamat Rahaman Niazi, Naval Chief of Staff.

[70] *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 3, 1980, p. I/2.

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nouncement of special religious significance, for it legitimized the struggle against the Soviets as a jihad, or holy war. Members of the Islamic Conference rejected all Soviet efforts to placate them or to soften their uncompromising stand against the Karmal regime. Pakistan and Iran were sufficiently emboldened to refuse direct dealings with the Karmal government, a position strongly endorsed by China.[71]

Beijing made its approach to the world of Islam in a number of ways—among others, through its Muslim minority. In January 1981, for example, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia received a cable in which the Muslims of China declared their support for the Saudi government's "wise measures" with respect to the 1979 incident at the Great Mosque in Mecca. At the same time, sources in Beijing reported, the Chinese and Saudi governments had secret contacts, including discussions over the establishment of diplomatic relations.[72] As a result, Saudi-Chinese relations improved considerably. Such approaches, the Chinese government could hope, might earn the goodwill at once of the Islamic world and of its own most problematic minority.

The Asian dimension also proved helpful, although probably less subject to manipulation. The members of ASEAN took an active part in the diplomatic offensive against the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Asian criticism (particularly by ASEAN states) of Soviet interference in Afghanistan, furthermore, helped mute criticism of China's 1979 attack on Vietnam. China could warn more easily against the Soviet trap of using the "Chinese threat" to mask the true danger posed by the USSR to the Third World.[73]

[71] Commentator, "The Will of the Islamic Countries Cannot Be Insulted," *Renmin Ribao,* May 25, 1980, p. 4, in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Political, Social and Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA), No. 75841, June 9, 1980, pp. 1–2; and "The Powerful Voice of 700 Million Muslims," *Renmin Ribao,* Jan. 30, 1981, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 3, 1981, pp. A/1–2.

[72] On the cable, see Radio Riyadh, Jan. 26, 1981, as reported in *USSR and the Third World* (London), Vol. 10, No. 1, 1980, p. 17; on the secret contacts, see *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Nov. 6, 1981. See also *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 13, 1981, p. F/2.

[73] *FBIS-CHI,* July 22, 1980, p. C/2, and Sept. 26, 1980, pp. C/4–5.

Some of China's Muslims at prayer at a mosque in Urumchi, capital of the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

—Gamma/Pekin via Liaison.

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Several hundred Afghans demonstrate in February 1981 outside New Delhi's Vigyan Bhavan, where foreign ministers of the 95 member states of the nonaligned movement were meeting.

—Teki/Gamma-Liaison.

The nonaligned movement, in which the positions and resolutions of the Islamic Conference organization set the tone, was another arena in which the Soviet Union lost ground to China. In the United Nations, the nonaligned countries pushed through a string of resolutions condemning Soviet behavior. Moscow was dealt some of the most devastating and embarrassing diplomatic blows it had ever suffered, and Beijing could crow that it had been right all along—the Soviets were no longer the "natural ally" of the Third World and the nonaligned countries.[74] At the 1981 conference of foreign ministers of the nonaligned movement, held in New Delhi, the USSR was actually called a threat to the movement's influence in world affairs, a development unprecedented in the history of such conferences.[75] Throughout, China had the pleasure of seeing the failure of a concerted Vietnamese and Cuban campaign to forestall a strong anti-Soviet reaction to Afghanistan. Thus, it reaped the further benefit of being able to portray the USSR's allies, particularly Vietnam, as Soviet trojan horses in the nonaligned camp.

The Second World

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China seized the opportunity to seek to undermine Soviet relations with what it refers to as the "second world"—i.e., Western Europe and Japan.

Regarding Western Europe, China had been especially concerned at what it saw as European softness—whether out of naiveté, fear, or weakness—toward the Soviet Union.[76] With soft-liners in European governments, China utilized the invasion to revive the ghosts of the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finlandization is untenable, Beijing argued, for in the final analysis—as the Afghan case showed—nothing less than direct control will satisfy the Soviet Union. With the leaders of Western Europe's Communist parties, China employed much the same argument. As the fate of Afghanistan's Khalq leadership demonstrates, the Chinese contended, the Soviets simply do not allow polycentrism. Thus, the PRC took steps to further contest the Soviet claim to leadership of the international Communist movement, a longtime pursuit of the Chinese Communist Party.[77]

[74] *FBIS-CHI,* July 17, 1980, pp. A/1–3, and Nov. 24, 1980, pp. A/1–2.

[75] *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 10, 1981, p. C/1; Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), Feb. 10, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 12, 1981, pp. A/1–2; and *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 18, 1981, pp. C/2–3.

[76] Xinhua, Dec. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Dec. 22, 1980, p. A/2; and Yi Jiao, "Soviet Foreign Policy as Seen from the 26th Congress of the CPSU," *Renmin Ribao,* Apr. 3, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 13, 1981, p. C/3.

[77] See the Xinhua interview with Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo on the eve of his 1980 visit to Beijing. In the interview, Carrillo rejected the notion of a "leading center," "guiding party," and "guiding country." Reported in *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 12, 1980, p. G/1. Beijing noted that not one of the general secretaries of the three major Eurocommunist parties attended the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). See *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 14, 1981, p. G/4. See also the Xinhua report on Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the CPSU Congress, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 24, 1981, p. C/1.

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As for Japan, Beijing could be satisfied on several accounts. China found Tokyo more receptive to Chinese overtures to consolidate mutual relations further.[78] Japan's relations with the USSR, already cool because of the Northern Islands dispute, became even chillier after the invasion, as Tokyo suspended credits and imposed other economic sanctions.[79] Moreover, China benefited indirectly from Japan's growing willingness to play a more active role in Asian diplomacy, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.[80] With greater access to leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Suharto, Japan used its connections to call not only for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan but also for support of Democratic Kampuchea. In reformulating its defense concepts and policies, Japan also evinced a disposition to increase its military expenditures.[81] In China's view, a more active and defense-conscious Japan would strengthen the proposed united front and raise additional obstacles to Soviet expansion in East Asia.

The Great Triangle

In the global diplomatic arena, the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan and later the Soviet invasion and occupation of the country have had important implications for China's relations with the United States and the USSR. Some are indirect—namely, the changes stemming from hardening US-Soviet relations. Others are direct—namely, the changes in China's bilateral relations with each of the superpowers.

One effect of the invasion has been the disruption of détente.[82] China never liked détente, for it feared that under the guise of détente, the United States and the USSR might gang up against it or that the Soviets might be able to isolate and attack it without fear of a strong Western reaction.

In Chinese eyes, the Soviet invasion also served as a test of US mettle. Was the United States still so paralyzed by its Vietnam trauma that it would be an unreliable ally even when its most vital interests were at stake? If so, an accommodation with Moscow, even at the price of concessions, would be China's only rational course. Or could Washington be counted on to take steps to contain the Soviet Union? China found the US

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang seen in Bangkok during February 1981 consultations with Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda.

—Terry Schmitt/SYGMA.

reaction encouraging. The United States seemed ready to increase its military power, particularly by maintaining a permanently increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean.[83] Containment of the growing Soviet naval threat is important to China, which lacks a blue-water navy and will not have one for some time to come.

China was encouraged, too, by what it perceived to be a strengthening of the Atlantic alliance. The Soviet invasion was seen as putting a halt to what had seemed to be a growing rift between the United States and Western Europe.[84] In fact, it shocked the West into agreeing that a more cohesive alliance was better suited to deter Soviet adventurism.[85] Because China regards Western Europe as the main target of Soviet strategy, it views Western cohesion as vital to halting the Soviet drive for world domination.

China also saw gains from US economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The US grain embargo of 1980, which left 17 million tons of surplus grain in US granaries, enabled China to buy grain at a lower price—a major economic windfall.[86] More important, it

[78] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 3, 1981, p. C/2.

[79] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 3, 1981, p. D/1.

[80] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 5, 1980, p. D/1.

[81] Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), Nov. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 13, 1980, p. D/2; and Wu Xuewen, "1980—A Year for Japanese Foreign Defense Policies," Xinhua, Dec. 24, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, p. D/5.

[82] China saw this as beginning, even before the invasion, with the kidnaping and murder of US Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul, an incident in which Soviet advisers played a dubious role. See *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1979, pp. A/6–7.

[83] The Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the increased threat it poses to shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean have made the US base on Diego Garcia even more important strategically and as an indication that the United States will not let the USSR become the dominant naval power in the region. See J. Clemenston, "Diego Garcia," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies* (London), June 1981, p. 34.

[84] Zhang Mingyang, "Multipolarization of the World and Unity Against Hegemony," *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 2, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 8, 1981, p. A/1.

[85] Xiao Xi, "US Relations with the Soviet Union in the Past Year," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 23, 1980, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, pp. B/1–2.

[86] The United States and China signed a grain agreement in October 1980.

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contributed to food shortages in the USSR, and to what China expects to be major Soviet domestic difficulties.[87] In fact, in the Chinese view, a strategy of bleeding the USSR might diminish the Soviet capacity for aggression and gain other countries the time to weld a united anti-Soviet front.[88] According to the Chinese, other US sanctions have had similar impact. Beijing regards the US ban on the export of high technology as having been particularly effective. The boycott of the Moscow Olympic games is seen as less so, though it did damage Soviet prestige.

Nevertheless, Beijing seems not to have high hopes that the United States will maintain its firm policy toward the Soviet Union. The United States, the Chinese believe, must contend with its declining military strength, growing economic difficulties, and the mistaken belief of some segments of American public opinion that détente with the USSR is still possible.[89] Thus, China viewed the lifting of the US grain embargo as a sign of possible weakness—the strong statements of the new US administration notwithstanding.[90]

In Sino-American bilateral relations since Afghanistan, the global dimension has been the primary motive force.[91] Developments have tended to flow from what the Chinese see as a common evaluation of the strategic situation.[92] However, the Chinese do not foresee agreement with the United States on all outstanding issues, for participation in a united front is conditional only on having a common evaluation of the central contradiction—Soviet hegemonism. Thus, the Chinese particularly welcomed the tough anti-Soviet position of the Reagan administration, seeing it as even closer to their position than the Carter administration's had been. But they profess to interpret Reagan's Taiwan policy as a return to a two-China policy, which has set back the evolving friendly relationship between the PRC and the United States. Both sides have so far tried hard to avoid an all-out confrontation on this issue.

China's friendlier relationship with the United States has involved a change of policy: from a policy of equidistance from both the United States and the USSR, China has now adopted a policy of cooperation with the United States against the common threat from the USSR.[93] In the past, China had been concerned lest a closer alignment with the United States and a complete break with the USSR give the United States more flexibility and allow it to play China off against the USSR.[94] But following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasing US commitment to a hard-line anti-Soviet stance, China could bring to a logical conclusion its definition of the USSR as the main source of threat.[95] In other words, the Chinese leadership could argue that the danger of collusion between the two superpowers had faded and thereby justify a firmer alignment with the United States.

The immediate practical result of a friendlier Sino-American relationship has been in arms transfer opportunities. In January 1980, during a visit to Beijing, US Secretary of State Harold Brown had announced US agreement to sell "nonlethal" military-related equipment to China. By June 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, also during a visit to Beijing, expressed US willingness to sell lethal weapons to China.[96] Although China can buy all the lethal weapons it can afford, and more, in Western Europe, the US agreement had the symbolic value of cementing what the Chinese may well see as an informal alliance, a process actually begun with the formal establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations in January 1979.

China is surely looking to broaden that relationship. The US administration, having broken the taboo on Sino-American military cooperation and perceiving the need to rearm itself faster than Congress, the public, or economic conditions would allow, may consider it expedient to help finance the modernization of the PLA.[97] In that case, China might be able to avoid a difficult choice—that is, it could direct more resources toward economic development and still carry out a significant military modernization program, financed in part by the United States.

Finally, the closer Sino-American ties have resolved Pakistan's two-decade-long dilemma—the need to

[87] Xinhua cited US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's evaluation of the high costs of the grain embargo to the Soviet economy. See *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 23, 1980, p. B/3.

[88] The PRC regards Soviet economic difficulties and domestic complications as a major gain. It estimates that Cuba costs the Soviet Union about US$12 million a day, Vietnam US$3 million a day, and Afghanistan about US$4 million a day. See Yu Pang, "Moscow's Southward Thrust Menaces the Third World," *Beijing Review*, May 12, 1980, p. 25.

[89] Xiao Xi, loc. cit., p. B/2.

[90] *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 28, 1981, pp. B/2–3.

[91] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 29, 1980, p. B/1, and Dec. 22, 1980, p. A/3.

[92] *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 3, 1980, p. B/3.

[93] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, p. B/3.

[94] G. Segal, "China and the Great Power Triangle," *China Quarterly*, September 1980, pp. 502–04.

[95] On the evolution of China's perception of the Soviet threat, see Chyba, loc. cit., pp. 475–80.

[96] On that occasion, Secretary Haig declared that the United States intended to treat China "as a friendly nation with which the United States is not allied, but with which it shares many interests." *International Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1981, p. 1. The sale of arms to China has not yet materialized. It is possible that China is not willing to give the United States an excuse for evenhandedness in selling arms to Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese leadership has given a lower priority to the modernization of the PLA than it has given to the other three modernizations. The PLA leadership itself has yet to decide—if it intends to modernize through the acquisition of modern Western weapons systems—what its priorities are and from whom to buy, Europe or the United States.

[97] A hint of that possibility can be found in Secretary Haig's press conference in Beijing on June 16, 1981. See *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), August 1981, p. 37.

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Deng Xiaoping, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, confers with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig during the American official's June 1981 visit to Beijing.

—Zimberoff/SYGMA.

choose between and broker the interests and demands of its two allies, China and the United States. Although this dilemma has not been acute since 1972, it has occasionally been embarrassing, both in Pakistan's direct relations with China and the United States and in its approach to India.

In Sino-Soviet relations, too, the global dimension is paramount. China has shown extreme concern over what it sees as the Soviet determination to gain predominance over the United States. To the Chinese, the Soviet goal is supremacy, both quantitative and qualitative, and the Soviet strategy is to improve its land and sea positions to the extent that, in the long run, it can tilt the overall global balance in its favor and dictate terms to all.[98] As Beijing has stressed, the Sino-Soviet conflict goes far beyond the bounds of ideology.

With the Soviet invasion, Sino-Soviet relations came to a standstill. They had previously begun to deteriorate rapidly, as the Soviets increased their military support to the Marxist government in Afghanistan and "legitimized" their growing involvement by a succession of more than 40 treaties and agreements. China, for its part, vehemently denied Soviet charges that it had offered arms to antigovernment groups,[99] lest it be dragged into a military confrontation for which it was and still is unprepared. After the invasion, the Chinese abruptly canceled a second round of Sino-Soviet talks, which had been scheduled for early 1980. A Sino-Soviet détente seemed a very remote possibility.

Subsequent developments have confirmed initial impressions. During 1981, China and the Soviet Union kept in touch at middle bureaucratic levels—such as through Mikhail Kapitsa, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's First Far Eastern Department, and through Soviet Sinologist Sergey Tikhvinskiy, head of the Foreign Ministry's Historical-Diplomatic Administration. In March 1982, Brezhnev made his dramatic offer of talks to resolve all outstanding issues without preconditions.

[98] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Sept. 24, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1980, pp. C/1–3.

[99] Xue Yuan, "The Soviet Union Will Suffer the Consequences of Its Interference in Afghanistan," *Renmin Ribao*, June 29, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 10, 1979, pp. C/1–2.

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But Soviet efforts to woo China and exploit the hostility engendered by the US position on Taiwan have made little headway.[100] "No preconditions" is precisely what the Chinese leadership cannot accept. They do have preconditions, which they regard as essential, and they are unwilling, for the time being, to treat their relationship with the United States as if—in the phrase of one Beijing official—that relationship were "a piece of straw which can be blown off the wall by any puff of wind."[101]

According to Deng Xiaoping, the Sino-Soviet stalemate will in all likelihood remain unchanged. Unless the Soviet Union complies with China's conditions, which include a reduction of the number of Soviet divisions on the Chinese border from 54 to 10 and a withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the Mongolian People's Republic, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, "Sino-Soviet relations will not change even in 10 to 20 years."[102] China, too, has reemphasized that Soviet command over the Communist movement is unacceptable, that only full equality among the socialist countries is acceptable.[103]

It should also be noted that the border dispute between the USSR and China remains unresolved. Indeed, the Soviet border treaty with Afghanistan, signed on June 16, 1980, has aggravated the issue. Because Afghanistan has recognized the Soviet claim to a region in the Pamirs that China claims as its own, China refuses to recognize the treaty's legality.[104]

Conclusion

With the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan returned from obscurity "to the cockpit of the struggle for Eurasian hegemony."[105] Thus, the "Great Game" began again, but with much higher stakes and in very different global and regional circumstances.

China, like the West, received a rude awakening. Its first reaction was alarm, for it was unprepared to face the host of diplomatic, strategic, and military problems that arose. The grave strategic implications of its arch-enemy's sudden blow appeared to overwhelm it. But within weeks, China began to take advantage of whatever opportunities it could discern.

Indeed, with time, the threat seemed to remain relatively stable, and the opportunities to grow. The opportunities were spread along a whole spectrum, from high to low politics, from national security to economics. Furthermore, China could link the situations in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, i.e., it could completely identify Vietnam with the USSR and thus isolate Vietnam. Most of the costs to China were verbal, and the rest involved only limited aid to the Afghan insurgents and to Pakistan. In effect, China might well see Afghanistan as a blessing in disguise.

What must be frustrating to the Chinese is that while they may be able to manipulate events, they have little influence over the eventual outcome. At this point, the principal question for the Chinese leadership must be the steadfastness of the West, particularly Western Europe. Will the "fickle West" stand fast? Or will it prefer the illusion that the Soviets will be satisfied with recognition of the current Afghan regime and abandon all further plans for southward expansion? All China can do is try to convince prospective united front members of Soviet perfidy. At the same time, it can hint at and count on its trump card—the possibility of Sino-Soviet détente.[106] But here again Beijing is dependent on the Soviets. Even if the Soviet Union plays along, what price will it exact?

[100] A. Bovin, "Partnership Without Trust," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 31, 1982, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 10, 1982, pp. B/1–3. Bovin's article deals with the "failure" of the US policy of parallelism.

[101] D. Bonavia, "More than merely a straw in the wind," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 2, 1982, pp. 14–15.

[102] Beijing Service to USSR (in Russian), Nov. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 28, 1980, p. C/1.

[103] Yang Hui and Zhan Xihuang, "Internationalism or Hegemonism?" *Hongqi*, No. 23, Dec. 1, 1980, pp. 44–48, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 17, 1980, p. C/4.

[104] *FBIS-CHI*, July 22, 1981, p. F/1.

[105] Newell and Newell, op. cit., p. 118.

[106] See, for example, Chinese overtures to the Soviet Union within hours of the June 1981 Haig visit, in which the PRC called for talks on a new treaty to settle Sino-Soviet border disputes. *International Herald Tribune*, June 19, 1981, p. 1.

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Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation

By Vladimir V. Kusin

In the 1970's, the regime of Gustav Husak sought to "normalize" and consolidate its rule in Czechoslovakia, where Communist party dominance had been badly eroded and shaken by the reformist movement of the late 1960's. During the 1980's, the same regime faces an uphill struggle in trying to normalize and consolidate the Czechoslovak economy.

In securing its rule after the Prague Spring of 1968, the Czechoslovak regime enacted policies that are now beginning to backfire. This is the old story of the conflict between central control and viability, with which all Communist states have been grappling since World War II, only the nature of the dilemma has now become more complicated than ever before. Not only do party officials no longer have a clearly defined enemy—be it the bourgeoisie or revisionists—against which to lead the rank and file, but the economic task at hand far surpasses in complexity the relatively simple programs of industrialization and collectivization, with their mixture of coercion and extensive expansion, to which the Communist parties were given over and conditioned in the past. Modernization, intensification, and rationalization are the catchwords most often used to sum up what is now required. The snag is that the Communist policies of the past have destroyed many of the prerequisites—of substance, attitude, and mood—for successfully coping with the challenge.

Between Reform and Orthodoxy

Czechoslovak communism is an interesting phenomenon. Central to its history has been the conflict between reform-orientation and orthodoxy, also interpreted by writers on the subject as a clash of wills between nationalists and internationalists, or between Prague and Moscow.[1] The founding father of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS), Bohumir Smeral—later condemned for reformist deviation, and yet later, when safely dead, reinstated to an honorable place in the party's pantheon—seemed to have an instinctive insight into the dilemma right at the start. A witness reported that Smeral, pressed by V. I. Lenin and his emissary Bela Kun to finally part ways with the social democratic tradition and to found a party that would be a section of the Communist International, said to a Czech friend of his in April 1921:

It is a far-reaching step. . . . We shall become a part of a large community and decisions concerning us will no longer depend on us. . . . I do not know, I do not know. Russia differs from us, and we differ from Russia. What am I to do? What can I do? I can do nothing. Events rush past, they drag men along, as they have always done. Alea iacta est![2]

Smeral's "What can I do? I can do nothing" replicated itself in Czechoslovak Communist history several times in crucial situations. The fundamental antagonism be-

[1] See, for example, H. Gordon Skilling, "Stalinism and Czechoslovak Political Culture," in R. C. Tucker, Ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation,* New York, NY, W. W. Norton & Co., 1977; David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979; and Vladimir V. Kusin, "Communism and Nationalism in Czechoslovakia: Fusion, Coexistence or Conflict?" in N. Lobkowicz and F. Prinz, Eds., *Die Tschechoslowakei 1945–1970* (Czechoslovakia: 1945–1970), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1978.

[2] Karel Gorovsky, "On the Founding of the CPCS: the Dresden Conference in April 1921," *Revue dejin socialismu* (Prague), No. 3, 1968, p. 444. Smeral sent Gorovsky with four other Communist delegates from Czechoslovakia to meet Bela Kun in Dresden.

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At the 16th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS—KSC in Czech) in April 1981. In the front row, from left to right: Alois Indra, CPCS Presidium member and Chairman of the Federal Assembly; Vasil Bilak, CPCS Presidium member and Central Committee Secretary; Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev; and Gustav Husak, First Secretary of the CPCS. The slogan at the rear reads: "In Firm Unity of the CPCS and the People Toward Further Success in Building A Developed Socialist Society."

—CTK via Eastfoto.

tween domestic requirements, usually calling for a moderate reformist approach, and internationalist *diktat*, almost invariably imposing a radical or revolutionary solution on policy problems, has usually been resolved—even if sometimes after much soul-searching and fierce internal battles—by adopting a Moscow-endorsed course, usually hard-line.[3] Thus the CPCS opted for "bolshevization" in the second half of the 1920's, accepted the Popular Front concept in 1935–36, followed the Comintern line of "an imperialist war" in 1939 in the face of Nazi occupation, abandoned the idea of a "Czechoslovak road to socialism" after World War II, and reverted to orthodoxy in the aftermath of the Prague Spring.[4]

The General Policy Line of the 1970's

The postreformist "normalization" course of the last decade rested on what we may call the three C's: coercion, consumerism, and circuses. Let us look briefly at each of these factors.

[3] The one notable exception was the grudging acceptance in the 1950's and early 1960's of Khrushchev's insistent call for de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia.

[4] For two highly competent scholarly histories of the CPCS, see Zdenek Suda, *Zealots and Rebels*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980; and Jacques Rupnik, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Tchécoslovaque des origines à la prise de pouvoir* (History of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from Its Origins to the Seizure of Power), Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1981. On the Prague Spring, read H. Gordon Skilling's unsurpassed *The Interrupted Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976. For a detailed history of the "normalization" period, from 1968 to 1978, see Vladimir V. Kusin, *From Dubcek to Charter 77*, Edinburgh, Q Press, and New York, NY, St. Martin Press, 1978. On the Czechoslovak human-rights movement from 1977 to 1981, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

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Coercion. The Husak regime has built up a formidable police force and has readily and actively applied it against dissidents and as a means of general intimidation. The overall police apparatus in Czechoslovakia (whose total numbers have never been disclosed) consists of a specially beefed-up secret (political) police, emergency (riot) units (probably numbering more than 10,000), a 23,000-strong "auxiliary police" force (vigilantes), and evidently an extensive network of informers. A new law giving the police only vaguely restricted powers to interfere with even minute aspects of each citizen's private life was adopted in 1974. The new Criminal Code enacted in 1973 was especially designed to facilitate swift persecution of political and ideological deviance. Particularly telling with regard to repression of intellectual freedom is the blatantly political commentary on criminal offences of a dissident nature, published in 1980 for the guidance of judges.[5]

The "normalization" period has also seen a determined reactivation of the so-called People's Militia, the CPCS's 120,000-strong private army of regularized, part-time vigilantes. Their arsenal now contains machine guns, small artillery, and other weaponry beyond the small-arms class. Counterinsurgency techniques loom high in their centrally prescribed training programs.

Some 200,000 men are kept in arms, including the army, the air force, the border guards, and the civil defense troops. Czechoslovak conscripts have a long term of military service, from 24 to 36 months depending on the branch of service.[6] Sixty-six percent of the armed forces are conscripts. Political supervision over the army is total. The proportion of party members among commissioned officers is very high, probably close to 80 percent. The corresponding figure in the police is 72 percent; in the emergency (riot) squads, over 90 percent.[7]

These armed forces have been modernized, both in terms of hardware and in operations. War exercises, expecially those involving other Warsaw Pact troops, are publicized as shows of force designed to keep the population well aware of the constant bolstering of the armed might of the state and its allies.

In addition, the Soviet Union has maintained its own Central Group of Forces—some 50–75,000 men strong—in Czechoslovakia since the invasion of 1968. They keep a relatively low profile and lead a semi-secluded existence, but their presence has been forgotten by no one.

Coercion entails, however, more than what the armed constituencies of the party and the state can enforce. Since the early 1970's, there has been a sustained tightening of politically motivated regulation of such "civilian" fields as social mobility, freedom of career pursuits, and education. Some 550,000 responsible positions—political and nonpolitical—are under direct party tutelage, i.e., they cannot be filled without the party's consent or can be filled only by party members.[8] An even greater number of career openings are being watched indirectly. Victimization through job loss, demotion, or denial of employment is normal practice. Two campaigns illustrate the case in point: the purges of Prague Spring adherents in the early 1970's and the discrimination against Charter 77 signatories in 1977 and later. Children from dissident families also find their educational opportunities constricted. Vaclav Havel, the playwright and human rights activist who is now serving a four-and-a-half-year term for dissidence, poignantly complained in April 1975 in an open letter to president

[5] Karel Matys, ed., *Trestni zakon. Komentar* (Criminal Law: Commentary), 2 vols., Prague, Panorama, 1980.

Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Gustav Husak, right, is shown busts of Soviet heroes by Soviet Col. Gen. A. M. Mayorov during a May 1972 visit to the headquarters of the Central Group of Soviet Forces, located in Milovice, Czechoslovakia.

—CTK via EUPRA.

[6] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980–81*, London, 1979, p. 15.

[7] Czechoslovak Television, Sept. 9, 1981, 1830 hours.

[8] Mikulas Beno in *Zivot strany* (Prague), No. 14, 1980, pp. 6–11.

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

Czech playwright Vaclav Havel, right, one of the first spokesmen for the Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia, pictured in May 1978 with fellow Chartist Pavel Landovsky, a noted Czechoslovak film actor, at Havel's cottage 150 kilometers north of Prague. Twice imprisoned in the previous year for his stand, Havel faced trial for "activities detrimental to the security of the state."

—Peter Marlow/SYGMA.

and party leader Husak of the "rule of fear" which pervades Czechoslovak society.[9]

Consumerism. In the first half of the 1970's, the public was offered considerable consumer gains as a substitute for frustrated political and human rights aspirations. Students of the period speak of an unwritten social contract whereby the public sacrificed reformist dreams for material comforts. After a brief pause in 1969–70, the standard of living did begin a respectable rise. During the 1971–75 plan period, the country's net material product grew by 32 percent; personal consumption, by 27 percent; and real wages, by over 5 percent. This was a period of rapid motorization. In 1971, there was one car for every 17 persons; in 1975, one for every 10; and in 1979, one for every 8.[10]

It is difficult to explain exactly why the general public took to working so hard and producing good results. The fact remains, however, that the regime—while destroying attempted political opposition[11] and introducing very tight controls over intellectual activity—gained a certain measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the man in the street because the economy performed satisfactorily. The evident material benefits were unashamedly connected by government spokesmen with the advent of the nonreformist order of things.

Ironically, by the end of the 1970's, party leaders came to complain bitterly about a popular materialism whose seeds they themselves had allowed to germinate as a concomitant to their pacification programs. Attachment to material possessions was now said to reflect petit-bourgeois attitudes, which were accused of hampering progress toward Communist awareness and, somewhat illogically, of lowering economic efficiency. An editorial in Bratislava *Pravda* of February 1, 1982, criticized such relics of the past:

A much too rapid homogenization of society [presumably: egalitarianism], an all-round growth of requirements, and the fact that large funds are being pumped into certain branches without regard for their performance: all this slows down the dynamics of development. New social groups emerge which lead a parasitic ex-

[9] For an English-language text, see *Voices of Czechoslovak Socialists*, London, Merlin Press, 1977, pp. 90–125.

[10] *Statisticka rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 1980* (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980), Prague, SNTL, 1981, p. 538.

[11] For a brief survey of oppositional activity in the first half of the 1970's, see Vladimir V. Kusin, "Challenge to Normalcy: Political Opposition in Czechoslovakia 1968–1977," in Rudolf L. Tokes, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 25–59.

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istence. They fare well regardless of how they work, and—thanks to their position—they enrich themselves in a nonsocialist manner.

Circuses. Toleration of a widened range of individual entertainment formed another factor in the depoliticization scheme. Pop music (though not the more extreme styles), film spectaculars from the West, detective stories, a plethora of cookbooks, and soap-opera-type television series were allowed as the population turned to privatization. The regime encouraged private construction of family homes and weekend abodes. The number of the latter increased from 128,000 in 1969 to 160,000 in 1973 and 225,000 in 1981 in the Czech Lands alone.[12] Less than strenuous working conditions were, implicitly if not overtly, offered as a gift by the new regime to the public.[13] An early escape on Friday afternoon in a private car laden with stacks of precooked Wiener schnitzel for a weekend away from it all at a private country cottage became a typical genre picture of the mid-1970's.

For the majority of the populace, the beating of ideological drums, signalling that the hopes of 1968 had forever disappeared, turned into a not too pleasant but bearable background noise. What mattered was well-clad and well-fed recreation.

We do not and cannot know to what extent Moscow hatched the details of the Czechoslovak normalization. Certainly, the dismantling of the liberal changes of 1968 could only have begun with the superior authority of the power that had intervened militarily to cancel those changes, but this left unanswered some crucial questions. Whatever Moscow's input, the new government had to resulve two key issues: first, whether the market-oriented economic reform—designed and launched several years before the Prague Spring—would be allowed to proceed, and, more generally, whether a policy of "Kadarization"—a mixture of political control, consumerism, and a measure of social liberalization—might be pursued.

[12] See, for example, *Pravda* (Bratislava), May 28, 1973; *Kvety* (Prague), Aug. 4, 1973; Radio Prague, May 21, 1974; and Radio Hvezda, Nov. 12, 1981.

[13] By general admission, between 15 and 30 percent of working time is wasted.



Motor traffic on a new highway from the Sporilov residential district of Prague to the town of Mirosovice.

—CTK via EUPRA.

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Options Foregone

For at least two years after the invasion of August 1968, it seemed as if the economic part of the reform package would be kept alive, shorn of the more consequential features added to it during the Prague Spring and of its politically unacceptable self-management corollary. Several politicians who now wielded power spoke publicly in favor of such a reform, although others did not.[14] In the end, all meaningful reformist prescriptions were swept away, and the 1971–75 plan stressed central command and extensive growth rather than autonomous enterprise activity and intensive modernization.

One can only surmise that what the moderates wanted, the hard-liners denied them either with Moscow's backing or at Moscow's order. By extrapolation, the Hungarian course, of which market socialism was the centerpiece, was ruled out of order by the same diehard alliance.

Kadarization appeared well suited for Czechoslovakia after 1968—especially because of the strength of the Czechoslovak economy, which could have provided the basis for a social contract of the Hungarian kind, and also because the shock of the Soviet invasion had cured the majority of the population of pursuing radical political change for the moment. Indeed, on several occasions in the early 1970's, it looked as if moderate and conciliatory "normalization" might well get started in Czechoslovakia.

The first such opportunity came in the autumn of 1969, after street demonstrations on the first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion had been provoked and suppressed (proving to Moscow that the new regime was firmly in the saddle and not averse to using force against its own people) and after the top party and state bodies had been purged of the most committed reformists. Resurgence of intraparty revisionism had become improbable by that time, and the evident public frustration and apathy could well have been slowly turned into support for a measured, if centrally controlled, preservation of certain benign practices in the relationship between rulers and ruled.

Indeed, in talking to a January 1970 meeting of the Central Committee, Husak seemed to sound a Kadarian note:

He who is not against us, is our potential ally. He is not an enemy, he must be cultivated, he must be won over.[15]

But such a conciliatory approach was not to be. In short order, the CPCS launched a vicious round of purges and persecution—one which in vindictiveness and extent can be compared to China's Cultural Revolution. During 1970, about 1.5 million members of the party were screened individually by a reported 70,217 special purge committees staffed by 235,270 trusted hard-liners. Some 460,000 members were ousted from the party on grounds of having reformist leanings, and another 150,000 quit on their own initiative.[16] The purge eliminated one third of all officeholders in the party, including 9 of 12 regional chief secretaries and 59 of 112 district chief secretaries. Of the 137-member Central Committee elected at the 14th CPCS Congress in May 1971, 26 were survivors of the pre–Prague Spring days.[17]

Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, at a meeting honoring members of the People's Militia (LM).

—CTK via EUPRA.

[14] For example, the Economic Department of the CPCS Central Committee stated: "It is now necessary to purge the further progress of the economic reform of tendencies which have prevailed in its implementation recently, and to return to the starting points and objectives which the party had set out." See *Nova mysl* (Prague), No. 11, 1969, p. 1371. By contrast, Husak—judging by his speeches and articles—opposed the continuation of a market-based reform virtually from the moment he gained full power. See various items in Gustav Husak, *Projevy a stati, duben 1969–leden 1970* (Speeches and Articles, April 1969 to January 1970), Prague, Svoboda, 1970.

[15] Husak, op. cit., p. 339.

[16] Author's calculations. No reliable or consistent official statistics on the purge have ever been published in Czechoslovakia. In an interview with the American *Daily World* (New York, NY), reproduced in *Rude pravo* (Prague), Sept. 13, 1975, Vasil Bilak said that 70,934 persons had been expelled and 390,817 had suffered the somewhat lesser penalty of having been struck off the party roster. I discuss the discrepancies in official statistics at some length in *From Dubcek to Charter 77*, pp. 85–87.

[17] Compare lists in *XIII. sjezd KSC* (13th CPCS Congress), Prague, Svoboda, 1966, pp. 373–74, and in *XIV. sjezd KSC* (14th CPCS Congress), Prague, Svoboda, 1971, pp. 547–448. The purge of the Central Committee recalls in its scale the "bolshevization" of 1928–30, when Klement Gottwald assumed power and engaged in a large-scale ouster of "opportunists."

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This purge added to the ranks of the disaffected. Four earlier purges—one each in Slovakia and the Czech Lands in 1946–47, another in 1948–49, and the fourth in 1950—had already produced some 600,000 expellees or otherwise discarded members. During 1950–70, an estimated 300,000 more had left the party either on their own initative or through quiet dismissals. Allowing for mortality, the combined numbers of erstwhile card-carrying Communists at the end of 1970 stood at not much less than the membership of the existing "official" party at that time, i.e., about 1.2 million.[18] In effect, these former members comprised an alternative party, passive and unorganized, but bound together by a reformist opposition to the ruling doctrinal precepts.

More important, the purge deprived the economy of tens of thousands of able managerial personnel. Yet even after the formal purge, at the end of 1970, the new leaders (who included a number of turncoats, former revisionists) could have called a halt to the settling of accounts. The population, including the majority of its politically active segment, had been demonstrably browbeaten into submission. Had the leadership shown a conciliatory face then, it might have been rewarded with active cooperation by some. Instead, it hounded people ousted from the party from all positions of influence and replaced them with a great many incompetents.

Former Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Alexander Dubcek photographed with other ordinary citizens in Bratislava, where he had been assigned to minor managerial duties.

—UPI.

Whether as instigator or just firm endorser of suggestions originating among the Czechoslovak recalcitrants holding sway in the Prague leadership, Moscow is ultimately to blame for the purge policy in Prague. At least a partial explanation of Moscow's attitude may lie in the shift of Kremlin attention to Poland, where the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka shook and fell under the impact of popular wrath and economic slide. To salvage the situation, Moscow gave the new Polish party leader, Edward Gierek, the go-ahead for a capitalist-assisted growth explosion. With the risk center having moved to Poland, it was imperative to keep the political, economic, and ideological screws tightly fastened on adjacent Czechoslovakia.

Both the permission to Poland to incur a vast foreign debt and the prohibition of a Czechoslovak "Magyarization" were errors, as became evident 10 years later. In the Czechoslovak case, which is our concern here, the mistake was to throw out the baby of economic reform with the bathwater of a political threat to CPCS dominance. However firmly and repeatedly the party leaders in Czechoslovakia asserted the correctness of the "general policy line" adopted at the 14th CPCS congress in 1971 and reaffirmed at the 15th congress in 1976,[19] they are wrong. The results do not bear them out. Concerned above all with securing their own political tenure, they begot trouble for themselves and the country as a whole in promoting a further round of extensive industrialization at the start of the 1970's while simultaneously returning the management system to the old command model. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (for 1971–75) was once again an exercise in arithmetic economic expansion, with the hope of generating a quick return on an escalated investment drive. The success was short-lived, as will be shown below.[20]

The limits on extensive growth had already been apparent and reasonably well researched before and dur-

[18] For details about membership trends, see G. Wightman and A. H. Brown, "Changes in the Levels of Membership and Social Composition of the CPCS 1945–1973," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1975, pp. 396–417.

[19] According to Bruno Hribek, writing in *Tribuna* (Prague), Jan. 28, 1981, this was the third "general policy line" in CPCS history. The first was evolved to strip the bourgeoisie of power and to install the dictatorship of the proletariat. The second, formulated after the seizure of full power in 1948, aimed at "constructing the foundations of socialism." Having "attained" this goal in 1960, Hribek states, party caucuses proceeded to map out a policy designed to lead to "a developed socialist society." But in view of the reformism of the 1960's and the crisis of the Prague Spring, it took longer to define this "line" than had been anticipated. The line was eventually postulated at the 14th congress in 1971, further corroborated at the 15th congress, and endorsed at the 16th congress in 1981—without a change, because, so it was argued, no change was needed. On the "rightness" of a failed and faltering line, see also the editorial "Forward to the 16th Party Congress," *Nova mysl*, No. 1., 1981, pp. 14–20.

[20] The share of investment as a percent of net material product grew from 31.5 in 1970 to 35.4 in 1975, and the capital tied up in unfinished projects increased from 294.8 billion korunas to 413.5 billion over the same period. These figures were computed from various issues of *Statisticka rocenka*.

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Table 1: Czechoslovak Payments for Soviet Oil, 1971-81

Year[b]	Amount imported: Thousands of tons	Amount imported: As a percent of 1970	Total price paid: Millions of korunas	Total price paid: As a percent of 1970	Price per ton (statistical)[a]: Korunas per ton	Price per ton (statistical)[a]: As a percent of 1970
1971	10,668	113.5	1,331	115.7	124.7	101.9
1975	15,503	164.9	3,734	324.6	240.8	196.9
1980	18,803	200.0	11,086	963.9	589.6	482.0
1981[b]	19,200	204.2	12,000	1,043.5	625.0	510.9

[a] The "statistical price" conceals a special deal concluded in 1966, which set a lower price for 5 million tons of Soviet oil per year from 1971 through 1984. The overall price will soar in 1985, when this deal expires. See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1966, p. 1; and Vaclav Brodnicek, "25 Years of Czechoslovak-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade* (Prague), No. 5, 1970.

[b] Data for 1981 are estimates pending availability of official statistics.

SOURCES: Various issues of *Statisticka rocenka* (Statistical Yearbook), Prague, SNTL, and of *Jahrbuch des Aussenhandels der Tschechoslowakei* (Yearbook of Czechoslovak Foreign Trade), Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce; "Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade," *Zahranicni obchod* (Prague), No. 10, 1981; and the author's own calculations.

ing the Prague Spring. Most economists had then arrived at the opinion that the Czechoslovak economy must be steered toward structural changes and higher efficiency and that the only way of doing this was via exercise of extensive enterprise autonomy in a socialist market milieu, under the umbrella of macroeconomic planning in areas which market forces could not govern satisfactorily.[21] However, the party at the turn of the decade anathematized this potential lifeline.

The "Oil Shock"

For the first five years, developments seemed to confirm the wisdom of the leadership's orientation. The years 1971–75 in fact proved to be the most successful of all quinquennial planning periods in the country, as measured by quantitative fulfillment of set quotas.[22] The population, embittered by its political defeat, seemed to take refuge in economic performance as a kind of compensatory self-assertion. Then came the two-stage oil shock.

The first stage, triggered by the decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1974 to sharply increase world oil prices, did not shake the confidence of the Czechoslovak regime, which smugly felt that nothing could happen to a member of the socialist bloc assured of cheap Soviet oil. The self-righteousness began to crumble in 1975, and by 1980, Czechoslovakia was paying nearly five times as much per ton for Soviet oil as it had paid in 1970 (see Table 1). It is of little consolation or consequence that the country would have had to pay considerably more if it had had to import its oil from hard-currency areas.[23] What mattered was the inability of the extensive, inflexible Czechoslovak economic system to respond to the situation and generate enough exports to pay for its increasingly expensive imports, particularly oil.

Indeed, Czechoslovakia has had difficulty for many years in marketing its goods abroad. In 1980, Vasil Bilak acknowledged that only 2 percent of manufactures for export had attained world standards.[24] Czechoslovakia's foreign trade minister reported in 1981 that nearly 60 percent of Czechoslovak manufactures command less than the average international price for comparable goods. In that year, Czechoslovakia reportedly had to pay 8.6 percent more for the average basket of imported goods from nonsocialist countries than it paid in 1980, and it received an increase of only 6.7 percent in payment for its exports to the same countries.[25] It has been observed recently that Czechoslovakia is probably the only advanced country in the last decade to have systematically increased exports of consumer goods (to the detriment of the home market), heavy metallurgical goods, and raw timber, but not of engineering products.[26]

Similar conditions prevail in exchanges with the Soviet Union, only the problem is more serious in light of Czechoslovakia's heavy dependence on Soviet oil shipments.[27] Prague has received numerous signs over the last decade of Soviet displeasure at the range and quality of Czechoslovak exports to the USSR. A *Rude*

[21] These views were advocated, for example, by the working team under Professor Ota Sik, which designed the 1965 and then the 1968 reforms. See, for example, Ota Sik, *Plan and Market under Socialism*, New York, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1968; and Radoslav Selucky, *Czechoslovakia: The Plan that Failed*, London, Nelson, 1970.

[22] See fn. 10.

[23] The USSR prices its oil shipments to Eastern Europe on a sliding five-year average of OPEC prices. Hence, Soviet prices rise with an appreciable delay as compared to OPEC prices.

[24] *Nove slovo* (Bratislava), May 22, 1980, pp. 1–3.

[25] Foreign Trade Minister Bohumil Urban on Radio Prague, Dec. 5, 1981, 1240 hours.

[26] *Pravda*, Mar. 24, 1982, p. 1.

[27] In 1980, Czechoslovakia imported 19.2 million tons of crude oil, of which 18.8 million (98 percent) were from the USSR. *Facts on Czechoslovakia*, Prague, Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1981, p. 48.

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pravo editorial on January 25, 1982, acknowledged as much:

The Soviet market is becoming ever more discriminating. . . . It gives us ample opportunities, but whether we take advantage of them or not depends on us, on the technical, economic, and quality standards of our goods, and on our accurate compliance with orders in terms of time and assortment. It would be foolish to believe that the agreed volumes of trade have bound the Soviet partner to accepting just anything from us to the full extent of the contracted sum of money; not even the best of friends behaves in this way.

To compensate for inadequate exports, Czechoslovakia has sunk considerable capital investment into Soviet extracting and manufacturing industries in return for assured deliveries of raw materials. Agreements already in operation relate to the production of asbestos, artificial fertilizer, ferrous alloys, electric power, feed concentrates; the extraction of crude oil; the processing of iron ore; the laying of gas pipelines; and cooperation in nuclear energy.[28] In the past decade, Czechoslovakia has contributed some 800 million transferable rubles (or 6.4 billion Kcs, or korunas) to "integrative projects" within the framework of the Moscow-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[29] While commitments of this scope, plus other raw-material-oriented contracts within CMEA, may look very advantageous at a time when raw-material prices are high, they have the long-term effect of curtailing Czechoslovakia's capacity to modernize its own manufacturing base either through the country's own effort or by purchases of advanced machinery from the West.

(Not without reason, the only consistently active balance in Czechoslovakia's foreign trade has been in dealings with the less developed countries. One suspects that in addition to sales of fairly simple investment units, these balances reflect exports of weaponry.[30])

As a result of the oil-price shock and other factors inherent in the Czechoslovak economic system (more on these below), performance in the second half of the 1970's turned sharply worse (see Table 2). By 1981, total and per capita national income were virtually not growing, or perhaps even on the decline.

It was at this point that the second stage of Czechoslovakia's oil shock began. In 1981, it was decided that the country would purchase less Soviet oil in the years 1982–85 than had been envisaged when the 1981–85 five-year plan was being compiled—and also less than the Soviet Union had solemnly promised to deliver. There are signs that Moscow may have forced Czechoslovakia and other East European states to accept such cuts because the USSR preferred to sell oil in the West.[31]

At first, the size of the cut was said to be 10 percent of the 1980 level, although figures mentioned more recently by Czechoslovak Federal Prime Minister

[28] See, for example, Ladislav Laurinec, "Decisive Importance of Economic Cooperation with the USSR," *Revue obchodu, prumyslu, hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 2, 1982, pp. 6–7.

[29] Rudolf Rohlicek, Deputy Federal Prime Minister and Czechoslovakia's representative to CMEA, in an interview with the Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK), June 15, 1981.

[30] See Leo Dobes, *Czechoslovak Economic Relations with the Developing Countries*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford, 1980, especially pp. 241–303. On the international arms trade, see the annual volumes of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC) and *World Armaments and Disarmament* (published by SIPRI, Stockholm), plus arms trade registers of individual countries.

[31] Soviet oil deliveries to other CMEA countries are also being cut. See, for example, the Michael Dobbs story filed from Prague, "Burdened Soviets Plan to Cut Back Energy Sales to Eastern Bloc by 10%," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1981.

Table 2: Trends in Czechoslovak National Income, 1976–81[a]

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Overall national income, billions of korunas	394.1	410.6	427.5	440.6	453.1	454.0
Overall national income, percent increase over previous year	3.7	4.2	4.1	3.1	2.8	0.2
Per capita national income in korunas	26,417	27,319	28,240	28,913	29,593	29,650[b]
Per capita national income, percent increase over previous year	3.3	3.4	3.4	2.4	2.4	0.2[b]

[a] Calculations here are for "national income produced." All data are in base-year 1977 prices.

[b] Per capita figures for 1981 are very much in doubt. Only rough data are available, and the effects of a bad harvest and curbing of imports are likely to make data for "national income used" far worse than those for "national income produced."

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: *Statisticka rocenka Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky 1981* (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1981), Prague, SNTL, 1981, pp. 20–21; *Statisticke prehledy* (Prague), No. 10, 1981; *Rude pravo* (Prague), Feb. 2, 1982; and, for the percentages, the author's own calculations. For comparability with 1975, the data for 1976 were restated in base-year 1967 prices. This yields a lower 1976 growth of overall national income than is suggested by the data given in *Statisticka rocenka 1981*, pp. 20–21. That this 3.7 figure is more realistic is confirmed by the 3.3 growth in per capita national income in 1976 indicated on p. 316 of the cited issue of *Statisticke prehledy*.

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Lubomir Strougal point to the possibility of an even greater reduction. According to Strougal, the overall decrease of Czechoslovak imports of fuel and energy would amount to 2.6 million metric tons of standard fuel equivalent in 1982 and 3.5 million tons in each of the remaining three years of the present quinquennium, as against 1980 quantities. Czechoslovakia imported some 19.3 million tons of crude oil in 1980.[32] Whether 10 percent or greater, a cut of this magnitude is virtually impossible to absorb without closing down or at least severely cutting back some production programs.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view Czechoslovakia's economic problems as solely the result of the admittedly severe oil shock. By its size and strength, Czechoslovakia should have been able to survive the adversity as well as Western economies have done. Indeed, Czechoslovakia's socialist neighbor Hungary, which has persevered in economic reforms, has demonstrated an ability to cushion the shock of worsening terms of trade. In 1981, Hungary recorded a 1.8 percent growth in national income as against a nearly zero growth in Czechoslovakia.[33] Clearly, there are serious deficiencies beyond energy supply and cost that plague the Czechoslovak economic system.

Overcommitment to Investment

As already suggested, the construction sector is the least satisfactory economic sector in Czechoslovakia today. Its malaise reflects abysmal failures in the regime's investment policies and organizational skills. Even *Rude pravo* acknowledged this in a July 29, 1981 editorial:

The fact that three quarters of all construction firms failed to meet their planned targets [in the first half of 1981] signals perhaps the worst result ever achieved since socialism began to be built in Czechoslovakia.

Projects confidently blueprinted by central planners are not completed on time. This ties up resources and plays havoc with the planning process because output scheduled to derive from the new facilities is not forthcoming. By the end of the 1980, some 30,000 industrial building sites stood half finished.[34] Valued at 525 billion crowns,[35] this tied-up capital compares with a total

Construction work at the site of the V-2 nuclear power plant, being built at Jaslovske Bohunice in western Slovakia with Soviet aid.

—CTK via Eastfoto.

value of 2,500 billion Kcs for all capital funds in the Czechoslovak national economy at the end of 1980.[36] Moreover, on an annual basis, the volume of funds sunk into newly launched projects has been consistently greater than the combined value of completed projects and of the output deriving from them. In 1980, the value of capital funds in the economy increased by 8 percent, but industrial output grew only by 3 percent.[37]

In its investment policies, the Czechoslovak government may have committed a mistake comparable to that of the Gierek regime's indulgence in foreign credits and loans, except of course that the Czechoslovak push for speedy growth was largely self-financed. In both instances, policymakers made their country heavily dependent on things that they were eventually unable to put to efficient use: loans and credits from the West in the case of Poland and a mass of inoperative domestic investment in Czechoslovakia. The Poles have found it impossible to service their debts; the Czechoslovaks, their own expansion.

By 1980, even the most inveterate Czechoslovak defenders of extensive industrial growth seemed to have come to their senses. A reorientation in investment policy toward intensive modernization was decreed,

[32] See the account of a Strougal speech in Ostrava, *Rude pravo*, Jan. 27, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[33] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1981*, Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1982, Ch. 3.

[34] See Florian Kanis and Julius Krajci, "Leave the Path of Investment Romanticism," *Pravda*, July 11, 1981, p. 3.

[35] See Otto Sedlacek, "How to Make the Number of Unfinished Projects Optimal," ibid., July 22, 1981, p. 5.

[36] "On the Threshold of the Seventh Five-Year Plan," editorial in *Investicni vystavba* (Prague), No. 1, 1981, p. 3.

[37] Jaroslav Sykora, "Investment and the Outlook for Economic Development," *Tribuna*, Apr. 29, 1981, p. 13. In fact, old and outmoded factories seem to have more success than brand new ones in fulfilling plan quotas.

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and a zero growth rate for investment was set for the 1981–85 plan period.[38]

Czechoslovakia's planners are apparently working on two variants of a "maneuver" that they hope will lower the amount of funds tied up in unfinished projects, with a turn for the better expected five or six years hence. In the first variant, completion of projects is to be pushed (to the tune of an additional 20 billion Kcs in 1982 alone), to lower the total value of capital tied up in construction to below 400 billion by around 1987. The alternative is to make drastic cuts in investment expenditure for some two to four years, to be followed by a still moderate investment phase lasting another four to six years.[39] In either case, the maneuver is admittedly the most demanding one in 30 years—i.e., since the nationalization of industry and the first wave of agricultural collectivization.[40]

Use of the word "maneuver" rather than "reform" is surely symptomatic. Poland's Gierek employed the word "maneuver" when Poland plunged into foreign debt and then again when it tried to extricate itself from that debt. While other designations have also been applied in the Czechoslovak case, for example, "a decisive transfer" or "a structural reorientation" in investment policy,[41] the goal is not to change the rules of the economic game. Everything is to be done on command from the center, and the enterprises are to have even less room for independent decisions than they have enjoyed heretofore.

Planning on the Wane

Ironically, with all the emphasis on central control, planning is of decreasing utility in the management of the Czechoslovak economy. This is true both of long-term (five-year) and annual plans.

How little real bearing the 1981–85 five-year plan has can be seen from the fact that it was adopted only in December 1981—i.e., at the end of the first year in the period for which the plan was to direct the economy—and then only in the form of a guideline.[42] Targets by then had already been scaled down from earlier drafts,[43] and they will almost certainly be trimmed again. For example, the goal for growth in national income was originally set at 14–16 percent for the whole 1981–85 period, implying an annual growth rate of 2.7–3.0 percent. In December 1981, the target was slashed to 10–14 percent, or 1.9–2.7 percent annually. Official reports suggest that national income increased only 0.2 percent in 1981,[44] and even this is probably an overestimation—national income may actually have declined by 1 or perhaps 2 percent.[45] The 1982 annual plan stipulates a growth rate of only 0.6. percent.[46] Clearly, only a miraculous performance in 1983–85 would enable Czechoslovakia to achieve the gigantic economic advance envisaged in the five-year design.

Table 3: Czechoslovakia's Plan(s) and Results for 1981

(percent change from 1980)

	Original plan	Adjusted plan	Reported results
National income produced	2.8	n.a.	0.2
Industrial output	2.7	2.3	2.0
Productivity in industry	2.2	2.3	1.6
Volume of construction work	2.8	2.7	−2.0
Productivity in construction trade	2.8	2.1	−1.3
Agricultural output	2.6	n.a.	−3.4

SOURCES: for original plan, *Statisticke prehledy* (Prague), No. 3, 1981, pp. 78–79; for the adjusted plan, ibid., No. 1, 1982, pp. 8–9; for results, *Rude pravo* (Prague), Feb. 3, 1982, pp. 1–3.

As is evident from the experience in 1981, annual planning is only a shade more viable than five-year planning in Czechoslovakia. The 1981 plan was adjusted downward during the year in various sectors so as to make it softer for the stragglers, and even the lower figures proved ultimately too high to be met by substantial sections of industry and by agriculture. The latter experienced a particularly bad shortfall in grain production (see Table 3). A *Rude pravo* editorial of February 3, 1982, admitted that the results for 1981

reveal that the process of economic intensification is not continuing at a sufficient pace. . . . One must remember that we planned to achieve more, but the resources that were created made the task impossible.

One is justified in deducing that planning from the center has lost the greater part of its economic influence, while of course it retains political and

[38] "Law on the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Sbirka Zakonu* (Prague), Dec. 15, 1981, Article 7b. In fact, total investment outlays in 1981 were 3.7 percent lower than in 1980. See the report on plan fulfillment in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 2, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[39] Sedlacek, loc. cit.

[40] Ibid.

[41] See, for example, Josef Haman's speech at the 1981 Builders' Day Celebration, as reported in *Rude pravo*, July 13, 1981, p. 2.

[42] See "Law on the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Rude pravo*, Dec. 15, 1981, pp. 1–3.

[43] Cf. "Directives for the Seventh Five-Year Plan," ibid., Feb. 28, 1981, appendix.

[44] "Report of the Federal Statistical Office," ibid., Feb. 2, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[45] The official figures so far available permit computation only of "produced national income,"—i.e., only value added—rather than "used national income."

[46] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 1–2.

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ideological meaning and a certain measure of coercive effect. In place of planning, the authorities have felt impelled to resort to crisis management through ad hoc decrees adjusting particular behavior of enterprises, regulating money flows from the center, imposing additional taxes on industry, and mounting austerity programs one after another—each of them tighter than the preceding one. Planned determination of prices is no longer fully feasible. Rather, prices reflect increasing subsidies and are manipulated outside the planning process. In October 1981, the prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and lubricants were increased by 25–75 percent.[47] In January 1982, prices of meat, cigarettes, wine, rum, Czechoslovak-made vodka, rice, and restaurant meals went up. The increases ranged from 17 to 41 percent for the various groups of products. While some meat cuts remained cheap, the price of others rose by as much as 120 percent.[48]

The Economy and Leadership Politics

It is not surprising that economic problems dominate the agenda of Czechoslovakia's leadership. Economic issues clearly reflect all the political and ideological tangles that the establishment has invited for itself. Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev was right when he told his Czechoslovak hosts at the CPCS congress in April 1981 that the economy had become "the main front" for all the socialist countries; the solution of economic problems, the priority task of ideological-educational work of all the Communist parties.[40]

The seriousness of the economic challenge—underscored by Poland's plunge over the economic precipice yawning before all of Eastern Europe—is generally recognized in Prague. Federal Prime Minister Strougal, a member of the CPCS Central Committee's Presidium, has called the economic problems facing Czechoslovakia in the present five-year period "unprecedented in their scope and complexity," a "great trial."[50] Milos Jakes, a secretary of the CPCS Central Committee and Presidium member, defined the "strategic task" to be transformation of an extensive, growth-oriented economic mechanism into a frugal, intensive, and modernized one. Like others, Jakes viewed this undertaking as comparable in importance and difficulty to industrialization and to collectivization of agriculture.[51] Such

Lubomir Strougal, Premier of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, delivers a report on the "Main Directions of the Economic and Social Development of Czechoslovakia for 1981–85" at the 16th party congress in April 1981.

—CTK via EASTFOTO.

comparisons with earlier critical junctures in the course of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia indicate the leadership's concern about the gravity of the present situation.

Although the main objectives are commonly accepted, there is less concurrence on how to attain them. Vasil Bilak, the ideologist, advocates ideological and political mobilization. Thus, at a meeting of the CPCS Central Committee last October, he said that the present economic difficulties could be overcome "if we mobilize the whole of the party and the National Front; if we tighten party, state, work and technological disciplines; and if the standard of management is brought up to current requirements."[52]

Not all of Bilak's comrades in the leadership appear willing to continue to rely on exhortation as an effective instrument of economic advance. A modicum of technocratic reformism, though not necessarily of a market orientation, is discernible. For example, Strougal has called for "opening up avenues for further progress toward a qualitative transformation of the system of

[47] Ibid., Oct. 15, 1981, pp. 1–2.

[48] *Ibid., Jan. 27, 1982, pp. 1–3, and Jan. 30, 1982, p. 2.*

[49] *Rude pravo,* Apr. 11, 1981, p. 1.

[50] Speech at a CPCS Central Committee session, as reported in ibid., Oct. 31, 1981, pp. 3–4.

[51] Speech at a meeting to commemorate the February 1948 takeover, as reported in ibid., Feb. 26, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[52] Reported in ibid., Oct. 30, 1981, p. 3.

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management." He pleads for the use of "value tools"—such as prices, profits, realistic monetary rates, and credits—without which it is impossible "to measure and influence efficiency." He also speaks of "the irreplaceable power of material stimulation."[53] Some students of Czechoslovak affairs believe that the group of timid "minireformers" around Strougal includes the Federal Finance Minister, Leopold Ler, and the present Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Svatopluk Potac.[54]

The Strougal perspective has found support among some circles of expert policy advisers. An unexpected boost, or at least a call for innovation in conceptual solutions, came from Vaclav Kves, Rector of the Party Political School. Kves exhorted Czechoslovak economists not to rely on old experience but to advance constructive proposals based on research and new theoretical conclusions. He called on "certain central agencies and their officials" to stop meddling in economic control by enforcing ill-thought-out "macrostructural changes."[55] Similarly, Jaroslav Vejvoda, an associate professor at the Prague School of Economics, has forcefuly criticized the abandonment of the market principle (which he calls "supply-demand" and "commodity-monetary relations") at an early stage in the post-1968 "normalization." This "critical denial of reformist ideas" and blind return to "the status quo ante in socialist economic management," Vejvoda argues, left Czechoslovakia without "instruments with which to switch the economy onto an effective track."[56]

Never to be ignored in any assessment of the policy direction to be adopted by the CPCS Presidium are the views of Moscow. Significantly, Milos Jakes, a Presidium member known for his good contacts in Moscow, has been granted additional power in economic matters.[57] Indeed, hardly a day now passes without reference from high Czechoslovak quarters to the importance of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries in finding a way out of the dire straits. CMEA integration is particularly highly touted.[58]

Another factor of potential importance in the Czechoslovak political equation is Alois Indra, the man originally pegged by the Russians to lead a "workers' and peasants' revolutionary government" to replace Dubcek

Milos Jakes, a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and—since June 1981—chairman of its Economic Commission.

—CTK via EUPRA.

in the wake of the 1968 invasion,[59] but who subsequently had a falling-out with Husak and was relegated to the largely ornamental post of Federal Assembly Chairman. This March, Indra published an important article criticizing passivity, defeatism, opportunism, and nepotism in the CPCS. He issued a thinly veiled call for another purge:

In the interest of the party's authority . . . we are duty-bound actively . . . to suppress all signs of passivity and capitulationism. The "how numerous are we?" will always be the less important question. The "what are we?" is definitely more decisive.[60]

Indra's pitch reminds one of Bilak's, and the former is also said to have good connections with Moscow. How-

[53] In ibid., Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[54] A number of speeches and articles by Ler and Potac support this interpretation. See, for example, Ler's broadcast on Radio Prague, Dec. 14, 1981, 1000 hours, and Potac's article in *Planovane hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 1, 1982, pp. 1–8.

[55] *Politicka ekonomie* (Prague), No. 1, 1982, pp. 1–10.

[56] *Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), Oct. 23, 1981, p. 4.

[57] Jakes became chairman of the CPCS's Economic Commission in June 1981. He is simultaneously a full member of the Presidium and a Central Committee secretary.

[58] See, for example, the editorial "The Key Importance of Cooperation with the USSR," *Rude pravo*, Jan. 25, 1982, p. 1.

[59] Indra's role in 1968 was described by Zdenek Mlynar (among others). See his *Nachtfrost* (Nightfrost), Köln, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978.

[60] *Nove slovo*, Mar. 11, 1982, pp. 1–3. For another article which hammers home the need for greater vigor among the Communists, see *Pravda*, Mar. 11, 1982, p. 1.

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ever, one hesitates to regard the two as political bedfellows.

Presiding over the whole assortment of ideologists, party activators, quasi-technocrats, CMEA integrationists, and nonentities comprising the Communist leadership in Czechoslovakia today is Gustav Husak, who is simultaneously party General Secretary and President of the country. In his name and under his unquestionably skillful political leadership, the CPCS wiped out the reformism of the Prague Spring and achieved dubious fame as the harshest and domestically least tolerant member state of the Soviet bloc in the 1970's, not excluding East Germany and Bulgaria. Having defeated reformism, Husak gradually evolved from the Great Normalizer into a consensus preserver and advocate of a status quo that was largely of his own creation. He has doubtless acted in the Soviet interest and perhaps even aspires to replicate in Czechoslovakia the role Leonid Brezhnev has so successfully played in Moscow. But Husak is a derivative, subordinate political figure. And as in Brezhnev's USSR, so in Husak's Czechoslovakia, consensual conservative politics have become a dead hand on economic advance.

Informed foreigners returning from visits to Czechoslovakia talk about Husak's waning influence in all except one aspect of party politics. He is still able to hold the party Presidium in a state of uneasy equilibrium. But the price is "no innovation." No one appears courageous enough to make a radical move, lest the Presidium's balance be lost or lest he find himself exposed to a concerted onslaught by the others. "If it moves, shoot," seems to be the rule. One is tempted to recall Bohumir Smeral's lament of more than 60 years ago: "Events rush past, they drag men along, as they have always done."

What Is to Be Done?

The limits that constrain the Czechoslovak leadership in 1982 constitute a formidable straitjacket. While options exist, none of them is very promising.

First, the CPCS might pursue a Hungarian-style, market-oriented reform. Even were Prague to obtain Moscow's endorsement for such a course—which is by no means assured—the CPCS's implicit admission of having made a cardinal mistake in the vindictive policies following the Prague Spring would likely shake, and possibly shatter, the ideological consensus among the party's leaders. Time is another limiting factor. The accumulated economic problems demand an early

Proponents of modest reforms in the Czechoslovak economic system: left, Leopold Ler, Federal Finance Minister; right, Svatopluk Potac, Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

—CTK via EUPRA.

remedy. Yet, one does not change from a command to a market economy overnight. Moreover, the conceptual underpinning and practical preparations for such a transformation have been destroyed under "normalization."

A second approach—modernization via Western assistance—also appears foreclosed. Such a strategy would require foreign credits, but Poland's current adversity makes Czechoslovakia's doctrinal purists dead set against heavy borrowing. In the words of Bilak, "anyone who incurs undue debts in the West is like a Christian who sells his soul to the devil."[61] The East German example—insofar as it complements heightened domestic efforts with steady access to easy and cheap credits—is negated for virtually the same reason.

What remains is the tired conventional wisdom of Communist governance. This consists of three basic elements: tinkering with the economic mechanism and economic policies; exhortation and tightening of discipline; and close embrace of a policy of integration within CMEA, particularly with the Soviet economy.

The chances are that, as so many times in their history, the Czechoslovak Communist leaders will once again let Moscow make their choice for them. So far, such decisions have made Czechoslovakia a country of reduced political, cultural, and intellectual circumstances. They may now lead the country to economic disaster.

[61] Speech at the October 1981 CPCS Central Committee session, loc. cit.

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Books

China's Economic Development: Demise of a Model

By Jan S. Prybyla

ROBERT F. DERNBERGER, Ed. *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980.

JOHN F. JONES, Ed. *Building China: Studies in Integrated Development.* Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, distributed by the University of Washington Press, 1980.

PHILIP C. C. HUANG, Ed. *The Development of Underdevelopment in China.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC development has been the subject of much interest and scholarly attention in the West—and for good reasons. The most obvious is, of course, the sheer head count. But when this is added to the scarcity of farmland and the deficiency in technology, a developmental problem of awesome dimensions emerges.

Even without official figures for many years, it has always been theoretically possible through extrapolation and visual evidence to arrive at a fairly astute assessment of China's developmental performance since its completion of initial reconstruction in 1952. Between that year and 1980, per capita national income (in the Chinese definition, net material product, which includes "nonproductive" services like government and retail trade) increased about three times; the gross value of industrial output, more than seven times; agricultural output, 1.7 times; and foreign trade turnover, more than four times.

That is a respectable performance for any developing country. Many countries have done much worse; a few have done much better.

But China has fascinated many observers more for things other than its growth rates. Among these have been its apparent concern with the equity of income distribution (including the guaranteed grain and cooking oil allotment in the countryside, urban rationing of basic necessities, and a consumer goods pricing policy oriented toward the poor), its remarkably stable (until recently) domestic prices, its full employment, its balanced budgets, and its lack of significant indebtedness on foreign account. The fusion of the Soviet centralized planning model with Maoist "newborn socialist things" (for example, the cooperative medical service, the revolutionary committees, the three-tiered organization of the people's communes) and age-old hardheadedness (resort to semitraditional technology, as in the "five small" industries) deeply impressed many people in the West, and not just professional left-wingers.

With rare exceptions, Western reporting on China's economics was upbeat, often enthusiastic and laudatory. At the very least, every mass campaign—including the biggest of them all, the Cultural Revolution—was combed for its constructive contributions, while the damage caused en route was skimmed over or dismissed as the inevitable price one had to pay for revolutionary change and a better tomorrow. China was a country without flies, dirt, and crime. Its happy combination of material progress, equity, and moral probity constituted a new societal model from which other developing (and developed) countries could learn. People were fed and clothed "adequately," they had a roof over their heads, they were in decent physical health, the worst social abuses had been rectified (in part by repeated "study" imposed on powerholders), and a spirit of healthy asceticism—long lost in the consumerist West and in revisionist Russia—made people content with simple pleasures. This was the net picture that emerged, although the precise argument was couched

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more cautiously and qualified by many clauses and disclaimers.

Then something happened to deeply upset this pastoral odyssey. After the death of Mao and the arrest of the "gang of four" (the midwives, together with Mao, of the newborn socialist things), a flood of economic, social, political, and cultural horror stories poured forth from Beijing. There had been growth, yes, but the growth was highly skewed and erratic. Balanced development with agriculture as its centerpiece was, we were told, a myth. Asceticism had been forced down people's throats, as had been excessive egalitarianism, now accused of playing havoc with the incentive structure. The increase in industrial real wages had been minimal for more than 20 years, and in agriculture, real per capita incomes had stagnated or declined (per capita income from work in the rural social sector was less than US$56 a year in 1979). The investment rate was excessive, and much investment had been squandered. Full employment had been bought at the price of underemployment and low and falling labor productivity. The efficiency of enterprise operations was dismal, not just in the neglected light industry but in priority heavy industry as well. While soil melioration, water conservancy, and afforestation had been pursued with one hand, enormous ecological damage had been done with the other through wrong-headed grain-first policies. Gross violations of personal rights had taken place, with the abuses having been directed not only against those whose social categories were "incorrect" but against peasants, intellectuals, national minorities, and others—some 100 million persons in all. Suddenly, there were flies, there was dirt, and there was crime. Exit utopia. Enter pragmatism. Exit cadres "helicoptered" by the Cultural Revolution. Reenter the old guard, modernization banners flying. The traumatic seeking of truth from facts, as Deng Xiaoping put it, peaked in the Democracy Movement of 1978–79. Much that until then had been hidden from the eyes of outsiders, or would not be seen by visitors, was spread out for all to see.

A good portion of Western literature on the Chinese economy written in the late 1960's and early 1970's was thus put right out of business. However, since the presses could not be stopped, much less reversed, more of the same kept coming for a while longer. The blood-and-sweat model of Dazhai, for example, was still being academically dissected in the West while already discredited in China. So were egalitarian modes of income distribution.

When the dust settled in early

Reviewers in This Issue

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1981, people stopped talking about the "Chinese model" because the model had been largely dismantled and the wrecking crews were still hard at work (e.g., on the concept of commune). Instead of "Is the Chinese developmental model transferable to other countries?" the question now became: "What developmental model can the Chinese borrow to get them out of their bind?" At one point, there was even open talk in China about how well Taiwan had done. That, however, did not last. What is important is that the model was taken apart, not as an act of vengeance by the formerly oppressed and now ascendant party regulars, but because the model did not work in its most quintessential form. It was particularly deficient in terms of economic calculation—that is, in promoting least-cost growth, "intensive" growth, and allocative optimality. The output side, while not perfect, was satisfactory. The input side was a mess.

SO IT IS with eager anticipation that one turns to the three recently published books on Chinese development under consideration here, expecting to get help in their more than 600 pages to better find one's bearings. Unfortunately, all three, in different degrees, are a big letdown.

China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective is at first glance the most impressive, if only because it is the thickest (347 pages) and peopled with scholars of high repute in both the broad field of economic development and the narrower one of China's economy. The binding theme is the relevance of China's experience to that of other developing countries, although this theme is not always adhered to in the individual essays, as specialists pursue their favorite subjects and tack on some comments on transferability at the end.

While there is much that is interesting and useful in the book, one leaves it disappointed. The problem is that the book is in large measure obsolete. In their dust jacket blurb, the publishers deny this. The analysis of China's fundamental organization presented in the book, they say, "will not soon be outdated." Wrong. Large parts of the book are obsolete because of the huge amount of information that has become available since 1976, changes in leadership temper and perspective, and the demystification and now-advanced decomposition tion of the so-called Chinese model.

The problem is capsulized in some of the first words used by Benjamin Ward in his chapter on "The Chinese Approach to Economic Development": "The key [Chinese] task for the next generation or so is not modernization but the stabilization of a humane agrarian regime." It crops up again in parts of Dwight Perkins's analysis of "The Central Features of China's Economic Development" ("borrowing from abroad in order to increase imports is regarded as a particularly dangerous method of expanding trade"), and in Thomas Rawski's sanguine account of China's technological history since 1960, especially as regards the authority of professional managerial and technical staff within industrial units and the strong emphasis put on such things as cost and quality control. According to Rawski—but not according to the post-1976 Chinese analysis—these policies, instituted in 1961, were "maintained without major change to the present day." (So what happened to the Cultural Revolution?)

The book finally appeared in 1980. By this juncture, China's world had changed very significantly. The immanence of this change, its historical foundations and direction are not captured by the essays. What the book demonstrates, if indeed demonstration is needed, is that economic analysis remains an art or, at best, a very "soft" science.

In the wrap-up chapter ("Is the Model Transferable?"), editor Robert Dernberger and Françoise Le Gall try to contain the damage to the book's concept wrought by time. The model in toto is not transferable, but some of its myriad techniques "could be of great use to other developing countries." Their "ironic" conclusion:

Although China's development experience over the past three decades has been cited by many as a successful model for other developing countries, the dramatic events in China since the death of Mao have seen the Chinese leaders hold forth Western science, technology, and even economic principles and methods as a necessary solution to their development problem.

The irony resides perhaps in the fact that this statement was made by conceptual model-builders who did not have to live in the real-life model.

Some of the difficulties with any economic model are due to the difference between how the model is supposed to work (e.g., consultation in the process of planning) and how it actually works ("commandism"). Beyond that, there was in the Maoist Chinese model an undoubted appeal to the utopian socialist streak in some people—particularly the intellectuals. The fact is, however, that the basic behavioral assumptions of the model are flawed. Most people will put up with asceticism (low living standards) because they have no choice, but they will not go out on their own and look for poverty—not even most monks and nuns these days. If the fruits of labor are distributed in the form of pats on the back (moral incentives), there will not be much fruit. If they are distributed equally among all the fruit growers, most will sit back, relax, and help

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themselves from the common pot, for extra effort is not worth their while. Learning by doing is fine, but it is a costly way of learning because it often means learning by spoiling. Economic planners, factory managers, and nuclear scientists do not really gain much by rubbing shoulders with poor and lower-middle peasants and production-line workers. In fact, they all may end up disliking each other more than before. Meantime, the experts lose their expertise, and the planned economy loses its planners. These problems are not really addressed by the book.

THAT IS where the second of the three volumes comes in. *Building China: Studies in Integrated Development* is a collection of studies on a variety of developmental topics by members of the faculty of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The thematic thread here is "integrated development," which is defined by editor John F. Jones as the coalescence of "economic progress and social betterment."

Sobered by one's experience with the first book, one approaches the second with critical sensors greatly sharpened. It proves to be a wise course, for the book adds very little to what is already known about both Chinese economic progress and social betterment.

In his introduction, Jones warns the reader that there may be "from chapter to chapter different slants, biases, and even conclusions. But that, after all, is the nature of open enquiry." This reviewer does not detect such variety. On the contrary, there is a certain slanted consistency to the volume which one might describe as "armchair socialist."

To say this is not to impugn in any way the obvious effort by all concerned to strive for scholarly objectivity. In the interest of objectivity, however, one need not bend over backward to swallow even the most incompatible things that come out of the mouths of Chinese official spokesmen. Broad generalizations—regarding the rural commune system, for example—are drawn from guided visits to and briefings at a couple of communes. Much of the information is obsolete. The post-1977 system of production responsibility in the countryside, which represents a potentially significant systemic change (amounting in some places to de facto decollectivization), is hardly mentioned. Some of the chapters read a little like the transcripts of travelers' briefing notes that used to appear in the papers in the early 1970's and that went something like this: Traveler's question: "What is the crime rate in Shanghai?" Cadre's answer: "The crime rate in Shanghai is zero." It is disappointing that students of China located right on China's doorstep, with rich informational resources presumably at their command and Chinese culture in their bones, cannot produce something more penetrating, novel, and insightful.

There are also occasional statements that are questionable on factual grounds. It is asserted, for example, that after 1970, the "well defined" agricultural policy "certainly helped to raise the income of the communes and, therefore, of the peasants." This does not seem to be accurate.

Marxism is a theory of both "fairness" of income distribution and growth through the intervention of the material productive forces. In Mao's model, political consciousness, sharpened through mass mobilization, would lead to fairness, which would lead to growth. Now, growth through a calculated harnessing of the productive forces ("objective economic laws") comes first, and perhaps eventually it will generate fairness at a higher level of income. The book does not really come to grips with the issue of the trade-off between fairness and growth—which is a pity, because it is the central issue in integrated development.

THE STORY behind the last book, *The Development of Underdevelopment in China,* seems to be the following. In 1978, Victor Lippit, an associate professor at the University of California, Riverside, submitted an article to *Modern China.* In his article, Lippit did three things. First, he gave a thumbnail sketch of Chinese economic history since 960. Second, he critically examined and rejected the major theories that had been advanced in the past to explain (each by itself alone) the development of underdevelopment in China—Ragnar Nurkse's vicious circle of poverty, Paul Baran's and K. Griffin's colonialism and imperialism, and Mark Elvin's high-level equilibrium trap. As a review of these constructs, this part of Lippit's article is useful for the general reader unacquainted with theories of underdevelopment that had been floating around academia for years. Third, Lippit advanced his own understanding of the development of underdevelopment in China:

China became an underdeveloped country in the late imperial era because the interest of the gentry class was in preserving the status quo, because the economic and social changes associated with economic development would have undermined the social order that provided everything it wanted. And China remained an underdeveloped country in the first half of the twentieth century because the class structure and relations of production remained largely unchanged. . . . The development of underdevelopment in China, then should be understood in terms of the emergence of a constellation of domestic

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forces inhibiting progress, into which a rapacious West intruded.

The editors of *Modern China* apparently found this thesis sufficiently weighty to make it the basis of a symposium that included some of the people whose theories Lippit had criticized. The results were then published in July 1978 and, for reasons that are not altogether clear, later republished in book form (1980).

One of the participants in the symposium comments thus:

Possibly there are yet some students of modern China to whom it is a novel proposition that the interests of the mainstream of the gentry and the Confucian ideology which protected them were inimical to modern economic development. It is difficult to believe, however, that the weight of that useful proposition is increased merely—and this is all that Lippit adds for his innocent readers—by the wisdom implicit in the words "class" and "relations of production." Except for those incredibly isolated from useful books, these sobriquets can hardly arouse now any sense of new discovery.

This sets the tone for one of those testy academic storms in a teacup that, in the estimation of this reviewer, serves no useful purpose. Granted that Lippit's thesis is slim, what point is there in building a symposium around it and then republishing the whole thing as a book?

MY CRITICAL appraisal of these three recent works dealing with the origins of China's underdevelopment and the country's socialist construction is not intended to belittle the effort that the authors involved have expended to arrive at an assessment of the record. As with earlier studies of state socialist economies (notably of the Soviet prototype), outside workers who labor in this field are greatly hampered by the Communists' obsession with secrecy—the broad definition of paramilitary state economic secrets—and the Leninist view of statistics as weapons to be used in the cause of proletarian dictatorship. When faced with spotty, disjointed, and selective information about the economy, these workers, in the interest of scholarly objectivity, tend to put the best construction on what is rationed out to them by the authorities. Their tools of analysis are in themselves less than optimal. They were designed to deal primarily with market-oriented systems, and are imperfect even at that. Certainly, they are not foolproof political lie-detectors. For these and other reasons, therefore, students of state socialist economies need to marshal other sources of information, including refugee testimony, and to make use of historical experience that is by now abundant. Ultimately, such healthy skepticism and historical common sense pay off in the accuracy of conclusions.

After an interlude during which the post-Mao leadership traced almost all of China's developmental ills to leftist illusions and the arrogance of the gang of four, official diagnosis has become comparatively more perceptive and less facile. In addition to policy errors, there loomed at all times, as is now recognized, an awesome objective obstacle to development and social betterment—namely, factor proportions. The administrative command system succeeded only very partially in dealing with this problem. Current official analysis, however, still has a dangerous propensity to regard the pre-1958 systemic arrangements as by and large correct and to endow them with positive qualities they did not, in fact, possess. This is to say that the current diagnostic pragmatism is relative and in danger of being swept aside if the material aspirations it raises are not fulfilled within a reasonably brief time span.

The fundamental challenge to China's policymakers is to halt the slide toward a "lemon" socialism, in which the state subsidizes most of its sources of revenue, including industry, agriculture, and transportation. The remedies are at best elusive, at worst extremely painful and fraught with political perils. But they are not beyond reach.

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Communism and Philippine Reality

By Philip Dion

RENATO CONSTANTINO (with Letizia R. Constantino). *A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War*. New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1975.

RENATO CONSTANTINO (with Letizia R. Constantino). *The Philippines: The Continuing Past*. Quezon City, The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978.

BENEDICT J. KERKVLIET. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

HALF A CENTURY after its birth, the Communist movement in the Philippines still lacks a comprehensive study. The wonder is why, for its history contains all the elements of a 20th-century saga—including whole families caught up in the ideological struggle, intense squabbling among the movement's high priests, and a nucleus of major actors who have lived to see their own historic acts analyzed, argued over, and rejected.

The material seems to be there, available for facile narration and consideration in neat time frames. For instance, one section could run from the obscure founding of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas—PKP) in 1930 through the Depression and World War II, detailing especially the PKP's formation of an effective anti-Japanese guerrilla force—the People's Army to Fight the Japanese (Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon—or "Huks").

A second part might relate how, following disbandment and supposed disarmament in 1945, the Huks resurfaced—this time as a response to extensive repression and abuse of peasants—and carried on full-scale guerrilla war in the heart of the Philippines into the early 1950's. It would also tell how the rebellion was quelled and most of its leaders were jailed, leaving the PKP moribund until the late 1960's.

Still another section could tell how a new generation in the 1960's, reacting to the economic injustices of the times, established the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist), or CPP (M-L), and in 1969 created a new guerrilla force, the New People's Army, with the objective of overthrowing the government. The CPP (M-L) saw its founding leaders captured just a few years later, while freed PKP leaders publicly espoused parliamentary accession to power and actually cooperated with a right-wing martial-law government.

But it would be a little more difficult to find a clear theme for the final—most recent—period. Although the elements of the story still seem to exist, they may not be of sufficient import to relate at any length. This raises a recurrent question about the entire history of communism in the Philippines: Does it really yield a story that has all that much relevance to the larger history of the society in which it is unfolding? Let us examine some recent works for what they may contribute to our understanding of this issue.

AMONG the few general histories of the Philippines that discuss communism in the island nation in its relevant historical framework are the two recent volumes by Renato Constantino reviewed here. Unfortunately, learning much from either of them is a daunting task.

Constantino floats back and forth between a kind of loose leftist, nationalist polemic and relatively unencumbered exposition of historical high points. His *History of the Philippines* provides useful thumbnail sketches of (1) peasant grievances against landlords in the 1920's and 1930's and resulting peasant organizations, leaders, and uprisings; and (2) early labor groups. Both are strands that contributed to the formation of the PKP. His general theme is that "labor unions and peasant movements finally evolved into radical political associations of workers and peasants" (p. 343). He observes that peasant-worker

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"mass actions" of the 1930's brought about a "new level of political consciousness and organization" (p. 372), and he closes the volume with a description of Central Luzon just before the beginning of the Pacific War, i.e., at a time when rallies, demonstrations, and some violence caused a dozen provinces to be placed under Constabulary control and "the projection . . . was for heightened conflict" (p. 382).

The second Constantino volume, *The Continuing Past,* is a disappointing collection of ideological one-liners. In regard to communism's most important and most successful venture to date, the Huk rebellion, Constantino has only this to say: US "reoccupation of the Philippines" after World War II brought about economic problems manifested in part by "a political crisis caused by the upsurge of Huk strength which for a brief period seemed to threaten the very existence of the government" (p. 322). According to Constantino, the US then "introduced new neocolonial devices of suppression," and the armed forces of the Philippines, "operating under a CIA-created and -assisted secretary of defense, instituted a counter-insurgency program which crushed the Huks" (p. 322).

Hardly more than a dozen other pages deal with the broader subject of communism. The Communist resurgence in the late 1960's after a long period of inactivity would seem to be of some interest to a historian writing in the late 1970's, but Constantino chooses not to touch it. He instead merely concludes that "US imperialism has been and continues to be the central fact in the life of the Filipino people" (p. 320).

Constantino does, however, let drop a significant point, one which he unfortunately does not bother to develop in his text to any extent. Talking about the pre–World War II years, he says:

> *The more politicized among the leaders of the peasants and workers tried to . . . make the masses aware that American colonialism was a fundamental factor in their poverty and oppression, but the anti-landlord thrust of peasant struggle remained primary.* (*History,* p. 391)

This primacy of domestic concerns in the peasants' struggle was something that Communist leaders either did not perceive, or if they did perceive it, did not adequately reflect as they continued to stress anti-imperialist themes, whether in the 1930's (when anticolonial, anti-imperialist, anti-American propaganda might have had some validity), in the late 1940's, (when the Philippines was already a republic and anti-imperialist propaganda was clearly irrelevant to the peasants' situation); or in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. Thus, it is not difficult to discern at least one major reason why communism has not gathered a large following in the Philippines. In Constantino's words, a "lack of knowledge of Philippine reality" helped blunt the efforts of those who "sought to organize dissent and channel its attention to the fundamental causes of Philippine social and economic problems" (p. 395).

EXISTENCE of this gap between the perceptions of the revolutionary leadership and Philippine reality is confirmed by Benedict J. Kerkvliet's book on the Huk rebellion. The volume—a lengthy and detailed effort to see "peasant revolt through the eyes . . . of those who rebelled" (p. xi)—relies largely on interviews with perhaps a hundred people from one village regarding events that took place 30–40 years before (although Kerkvliet did work through some 1,200 captured documents apparently not used in previous research and took other steps to try to check the accuracy of his data).[1] While the oral history approach has its problems with respect to selectivity of memory, this study argues persuasively that the aims of Philippine Communist leaders and of the peasants who fought beside them during the Huk rebellion after World War II were quite different.

It is worth quoting Kerkvliet at length on this point:

> *Oversimplified, the party wanted revolution whereas peasants did not. The party after 1948 wanted to overthrow the Philippine government; peasants only wanted the government to stop its repression. The party wanted to end the tenancy system, redistribute land, set up cooperative farms, nationalize industries and end American imperialism. . . . Most peasants . . . wanted to reform the tenancy system, paid little attention to nationalist issues, and saw little connection between their problems and American imperialism.* (p. 265)

But from this disparity Kerkvliet draws a strange conclusion. Communist "leaders," he says, "never caused the unrest or the rebellion. They only helped to shape it. Sometimes leaders were not even in the lead. . . . the PKP did not inspire or control the . . . Hukbalahap or the Huk rebellion itself" (pp. 262, 264).

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[1] While Kerkvliet is one of the few foreign scholars to attempt this approach, the method has also been applied by Eduardo Lachica, a Filipino journalist. In fact, Lachica conducted interviews for his *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (New York, NY, Praeger, 1971) in an adjacent Central Luzon province about a year earlier (1969) than Kerkvliet conducted most of his interviews.

Lachica's purposes were broader than Kerkvliet's—to look at reasons for peasant unrest in the late 1960's in a country seeking to modernize, as well as to understand the rebellion of two decades earlier—and the result is a more complete book. The conclusions are starkly opposite. Kerkvliet asks a "veteran of the peasant movement" why the Huk rebellion failed and is told: "No strike, no demonstration, no rebellion fails. Protest against injustice always succeeds" (p. 269). Lachica, by contrast, concludes: "Revolution failed in the Philippines; it probably was not even possible in the first place" (p. 249).

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It is not difficult to accept the fact that the unrest that developed in Central Luzon in the 1940's sprang from social and economic conditions which Communists had no part in creating. But the idea that thousands of peasants just sort of simultaneously turned to rebellion in 1946 with weapons that just happened to be nearby—although it has a certain familiar romantic ring about it—stretches the imagination a bit. After all, the Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon was formed and named in March 1942 by the PKP, and when the movement was recalled to action in June 1946 and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, or People's Liberation Army, it was again the work of the PKP. In both periods, the Huks were led by the same commander-in-chief and the same vice commander-in-chief, both of whom, as Kerkvliet himself notes, "were in the party's central committee—practically at the top of the party's hierarchy" (p. 184).[2] Consequently, it seems idle to suggest, as Kerkvliet does on p. 264, that the party decided "not to support the rebellion from 1946 to 1948"—a period when the number of Huks increased from presumably zero to something between 3,000 and 10,000. Indeed, by all accounts, including Kerkvliet's, the organization, which had been formally disbanded in September 1945, was resurrected formally in June 1946 by 20 men, all of them Huk veterans, of whom "at least . . . six were already underground and leading armed groups by this time" (p. 169).

To be sure, there were extensive, perhaps perennial, disputes within the PKP about the direction of policy—hardly an uncommon phenomenon in any political group. But Kerkvliet makes too much of this when he asserts that the party decided "not to join or support the rebellion from 1946 to 1948." Careful examination of his text reveals that the core of the argument was over which should take priority, "armed struggle" or "parliamentary struggle," not over whether or not "armed struggle" should be allowed at all.

In fairness, Kerkvliet's study is not primarily about the role of communism in the Huk rebellion. Its initial focus, and one of the central questions he sets out to answer is: What causes peasant discontent, protest unrest, rebellion? His thesis is that the rebellion had roots reaching as far back as the early 1930's. It is not necessary to accept all of his conclusions to appreciate the value of the human element he features and the tables he provides detailing incidents of unrest in the 1930's and the numerous organizations that took up the peasants' cause. Kerkvliet concludes that traditional landlord-peasant (patron-client) ties broke down in the 1930's and immediately following World War II. Moderate demands by the peasants for restoration of those ties were rejected, and there soon followed repression by the government and "the elite." The peasants of the Philippines, Kerkvliet sums up, felt that, simply on the basis of "local customs" and "decent human behavior" (that is, morality), their rebellion was justified.

TURNING to the post-1954 history of communism in the Philippines, we find a lamentable dearth of comprehensive treatment. This is only partially offset by the highly competent passages on the Philippines in Justus M. van der Kroef's larger study *Communism in Southeast Asia.*[3] The author lightly threads his way from Marxist-oriented groups dating from the turn of the century forward through the decades until the mid-1970's (for the latest period he also enumerates other opposition groups).[4] In the process, van der Kroef clearly and succinctly differentiates the respective programs and declared tactics of the two Communist parties in the Philippines. The PKP, which has praised the Marcos government's basic land reform program (p. 138) and still talks about heightening "the proletarian class consciousness of the rural working masses" (p. 150), ultimately seeks legalization. The CPP (M-L) concentrates on guerrilla war, "armed struggle," and "revolutionary politics." It seeks to forge a "united front" of "workers and peasants," "petty bourgeoisie," and "national bourgeoisie" which it aims to lead in a "revolutionary struggle" against the "US-Marcos dictatorship" (p. 136). Organizationally, the CPP (M-L) is distinctive for its combination of "democratic centralism" and "territorial organization" (p. 185), which allows for nine self-governing regional party organizations throughout the archipelago.

Van der Kroef also delineates the respective positions of the two parties vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing. Although, the PKP rejects a pro-Moscow label, it supports the "Soviet point of view" because the USSR takes a "progressive and principled position" while Beijing is "chauvinistic and pro-imperialist" in its views (p. 217). The CPP (M-L) is sometimes called the CPP (Mao Zedong Thought) and considers Moscow revisionist (p. 88). Both Moscow and Beijing have diplo-

[2] Commander-in-chief Luis Taruc was chairman of the Military Department of the PKP at the time of the creation of the People's Anti-Japanese Army in 1942. According to Eduardo Lachica (*op. cit.*, p. 107), Taruc even then wanted to call the group the People's Liberation Army.

[3] Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980.

[4] On the current political setting, see also the excellent study by Larry A. Niksch and Marjorie Niehaus, *The Internal Situation in the Philippines: Current Trends and Future Prospects*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 20, 1981; also Carl H. Landé, "Philippine Prospects After Martial Law," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 1147–68.

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matic relations with Manila now and appear to be keeping their distance from the Filipino Communist parties.

But van der Kroef's book is only as good as what it claims to be, i.e., an introduction to Communist movements. Thus, its coverage of the Philippines, as of other countries, lacks documents, biographical material, and deep analysis of the national social and economic environment in which the Communist movement operates.

SO THE SIGNIFICANCE of the Communist movement in the Philippines today remains murky. Recent press reports are contradictory, recording both gains for the revolutionaries and disarray in the movement.[5] To keep in perspective such reports, printed in the Asian and American press, it is useful to bear in mind that observers a decade and a half ago were saying:

"An ideological storm is fast approaching the Philippines," [a] leading news weekly warned [recently], noting that the entrenched power of the landlords and the restiveness of Central Luzon tenant farmers were continuing to feed the Huks with new recruits. The Huks, moreover, appear to have gained new self-confidence. When government forces raided a Huk stronghold . . . last August, they captured documents indicative of plans to train a "regular" Huk army of over 20,000 men, with a fully organized command structure.[6]

If those words had been printed last week, with "New People's Army" substituted for "Huks," a certain amount of alarm would indeed seem in order. But what, in fact, is the current situation?

Late last summer, President Marcos said that "small bands and groups of subversives, although inconsequential in the general assessment of national peace and order . . . are irritations that should be immediately attended to," while his defense minister declared that the NPA is stronger now than it was in 1972.[7] The former commander-in-chief of the NPA, who has been in a government jail since 1976 and is not even sure who the current leaders of the CPP (M-L) and NPA are, maintains that during the eight years since the impositon of martial law (in September 1972), the NPA has increased "at least five-fold in armed strength" and "expanded from Cagayan in the north to Mindanao in the south"[8]—virtually the entire length of the Philippine Islands.

There have been reports of "incidents" in more than half of the country's 72 provinces.[9] While this activity may mean that guerrilla operations are widespread, statistics indicate that operations are sporadic. There may be 5,000 guerrillas, or only 3,000, or as many as 7,000.[10] Even if there were 20,000, as NPA propaganda claimed in the mid-1970's, the guerrillas have no "rear" or base, they are least active—or inactive—in the largest concentrations of population, and most Filipinos are not affected by their actions. In sum, isolated statistics, or even series of statistics—that is, any numbers not presented in the *overall* Philippines context—cannot be accepted as representing anything more than a fraction of the total picture, and conclusions drawn from them cannot be accepted as anything but proximate, at best.

THIS LEAVES unanswered our original question concerning the significance of communism in the larger history of Philippine society. It is this observer's hypothesis that World War II created a unique confluence of conditions and circumstances in the Philippines (although not just there) that allowed communism a brief, very temporary spasm of success that will not occur again. This hypothesis rests on a number of historical observations which deserve further serious inquiry.

The first of these is that in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Huks and PKP were the only organized groups opposing the government and that they enjoyed a rough parity in arms and numbers with government ground forces and had the benefit of extensive wartime experience against the Japanese. These unique circumstances no longer pertain.

For one, government forces are today superior to the NPA in numbers, organization, mobility, arms, equipment, and intelligence, and have had extensive counterinsurgency experience. While guerrilla forces can always carry out individual acts of insurgency, they require sophisticated weaponry and a stable territorial base to launch a full-scale revolution, and an endless number of other favorable conditions, quite

[5] See, for example, "The drift to the Left," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 21, 1981, pp. 17–24; "Time to Get Tough," *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 11, 1981, pp. 26–37; *The Washington Post*, Nov. 22 and 23, 1981.

[6] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communist Fronts in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1967, p. 75, citing Edward R. Kiunisada, "The Approaching Storm," *Philippines Free Press*, Oct. 22, 1966, p. 72.

[7] *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, pp. 37, 36.

[8] Ibid., p. 27.

[9] "Incidents" may vary from a two-hour battle in which 32 NPA members were killed and 20 rifles, plus dynamite, hand grenades, and ammunition, were captured, to a March 1979 raid by 100 NPA guerrillas on the rural town of Silvino Lobos in northern Samar, during which the mayor was held "hostage for several hours." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), May 12, 1981, p. P/2; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 27, 1981, p. 32.

[10] The low figure of 3,600 is an estimate by Philippines Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, cited by Sheila Ocampo in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 21, 1981, p. 22. Ocampo noted that US Embassy "officers tend to give a reduced estimate." Elsewhere, Enrile has spoken of 3–5,000 "warm bodies." See *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 30. A range of 5–7,000 is given by Rodney Tasker in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 21, 1981, p. 18. The figure of 5,000 is closest to intelligence estimates.

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apart from material, to effect an actual takeover.

Moreover, it is not the NPA, but the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with as many as 15,000 to 20,000 members, that today constitutes the most serious military problem in the Philippines. The MNLF, openly backed and surely supported and equipped by at least one outside power,[11] consists of persons who are fighting, as did their fathers and grandfathers before them, on home ground for home ground. While there have been occasional attempts to show that there has been significant cooperation between the MNLF and the NPA on Mindanao,[12] there is nothing approaching a link-up of NPA regulars and the far more numerous MNLF forces. Indeed, it is difficult to see what advantage the MNLF would gain from making anything more than specific one-time cooperative insurgency efforts with the NPA, from taking anything other than a dominant role in any kind of relationship, or from subjugating itself and its much larger following to an ideology antithetical to its own propelling Muslim beliefs.

Whether or not the MNLF was formed because of the larger social and economic problems of the Philippines—and an argument of linkage can be made along those lines—it would be hard to demonstrate that the growth of the movement throughout the 1970's was because the MNLF purported to gain power in order to solve those national problems. Its objective in a bloody war that has seen some 15,000 die during the past 10 years has been not to overthrow the national government, but to gain autonomy from it for 2 million Filipino Muslims.

Of greater importance to the fortunes of Philippine communism is the state of the society. The nation now numbers more than 48 million people.[13] All arable land is under cultivation, so no more economically viable land will become available. Yet there are too many people on the land, and many are underemployed or unemployed. The major problem is no longer how to distribute the land among them, but how to get them off the land into productive nonagricultural jobs. Such jobs, however, are not available, and there will be a need for more than half a million new jobs a year for the rest of the decade.[14] Meanwhile, the rural-urban distribution of the population has shifted markedly, and urbanization has greatly increased.[15] Less than half of the labor force is now employed in agriculture.[16] The number of people employed in services has tripled; in industry, doubled. One-third of those 18–24 years of age attend institutions of higher learning. Government administration has been centralized and strengthened.

In the presidential election of 1946, about 15.5 percent of the Philippines' approximately 18 million people were registered to vote, and nearly 90 percent of them did so. In the 1969 presidential election, nearly 30 percent of the country's doubled population (36.5 million people) were registered to vote, and almost 80 percent did so. In only one of the seven presidential elections held in those 24 years did the voter turnout rate drop below 75 percent (in 1949); and in only one biennial local election did it fall below 79 percent.[17] Through participation in the balloting process, today's Filipinos—87 percent of them literate and most not old enough to have experienced the years of the Commonwealth under US tutelage, or the trauma of World War II and the Huk rebellion—have reached a certain level of political maturity. All indications are that, given the opportunity, they would choose a representative party system of government; there are no indications that they would join or support a violent movement to achieve such a government.

These are just a few of the numerous considerations that differentiate the Philippines of the 1980's from the same country in the early post–World War II period. Do they constitute a unique set of circumstances ripe for revolutionary exploitation? Or do they say in effect that the real revolutions—including political—

[11] For instance, Landé writes that, in their "resort to arms," the Muslims were "assisted by Libya with weapons smuggled in through the North Bornean states of Malaysia." Loc. cit., p. 1154. See also van der Kroef, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, p. 93.

[12] The latest was made by Benjamin de Vera, head of the NPA's "Mindanao Commission," when he was captured in May 1981. Defense Minister Enrile says he has evidence of an NPA attempt to link up with the MNLF, but believes MNLF leaders are "not receptive to the idea." *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 36. See also Niksch and Niehaus, op. cit., p. 98, and van der Kroef, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, p. 94.

[13] The May 1, 1980, figure was 47.9 million, as reported in the *Preliminary Report: 1980 Census of Population*, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, National Census and Statistics Office, n.d.

[14] There are about 600,000 new entrants to the labor force every year. See the World Bank's *Report to the Executive Director on a Proposed Structural Adjustment Loan*, August 1980, unpublished.

[15] According to 1981 World Bank working figures, 36 percent of the population now lives in urban areas.

[16] For population estimates, see *1975 Integrated Census of the Population and Its Economic Activities*, Vol. 2, National Summary, Phase 1, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, National Census and Statistics Office, pp. 1–6; *1979 Philippines Statistical Yearbook*, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, pp. 24–33; and *World Population 1979: Recent Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World*, Washington, DC, Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, 1980, pp. 240–42.

[17] For voting trends, see Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965, pp. 117–33; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response, 1830–1970*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1971; Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Elections, *Canvass of Votes Cast in Philippine Elections 1946–1963 for President and Vice President and Senators;* and Hirofuni Ando, *Elections in the Philippines: Mass-Elite Interaction Through the Electoral Process, 1946–1969*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1971, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Ando's voter tallies are the most comprehensive and precise. His analysis is complex, and his conclusions are much different from the one given here.

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have already taken place? It is unlikely that the answer will be provided by the Communist parties of the Philippines. Except during one brief period in its 51-year existence, Philippine communism has never accurately analyzed or significantly affected the events taking place around it. Although its own high priests may disagree, it may never have amounted to anything but a minor element in a much more important story—perhaps the real saga—the story of a society attempting to adjust to and make accommodation with the revolutionary social, economic, and political changes of the 20th century.

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Romania's Travails

By Aurel Braun

DANIEL N. NELSON. *Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist Politics*. Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1980.

ROBERT R. KING. *History of the Romanian Communist Party*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

DANIEL N. NELSON. *Romania in the 1980s*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

DIONISIE GHERMANI. *Die nationale Souveränitätspolitik der SR Rumänien* (National Sovereignty Politics of the Romanian Socialist Republic). Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981.

POLISH TURMOILS have tended to divert attention from the economic difficulties faced by other East European regimes. Romania, usually viewed as a maverick in the Soviet bloc, has also not escaped such difficulties. In fact, its economic situation might be as severe as Poland's. Productivity growth rates in Romania have been declining, and it has encountered repeated agricultural failures at a time when farm products have taken on importance as export commodities. Its hard-currency debt is staggering.

In spite of the economic difficulties, however, the Romanian regime continues to be perceived as successful in asserting its distinctiveness in both domestic and foreign policy. That is to say, Romania—which describes itself as a "developing" socialist state in contradistinction to the other "developed" East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—continues to follow its own economic development plans. In its foreign policy, Romania continues to enjoy greater scope of action and to hold positions at variance with those of the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The four books under review analyze Romanian internal political and economic developments, as well as the policies, domestic and foreign, pursued by the Romanian regime under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. In *Democratic Centralism in Romania,* Daniel N. Nelson attempts to "explore the relationship between socio-economic and political changes in the Romanian case" (p. xii). He employs a comparative, subnational focus and tries to apply "fairly common" assumptions about "developing/modernizing" politics in the non-Communist world to a Communist state. He conducted field research in four Romanian counties (Brasov, Cluj, Iasi, and Timis), where he interviewed deputies to the people's councils. He then applied standard sampling techniques to analyze the responses to his orally administered questionnaire.

Though this may appear to be a worthwhile exercise initially, the work is plagued by several problems. It is not only a question of whether one really needs tortuous statistical analysis to demonstrate propositions that can be proved in other ways, but also whether this type of methodology is applicable to such studies at all. The difficulty in getting data, the extremely small sample, the lack of opportunity to conduct repeated sampling as a check—all should act as a warning. Nelson is not unaware of these methodological pitfalls, but he bravely plows on. His choice of the four Romanian counties is somewhat curious, since they do not adequately represent the diversity of Romania, despite the differences that Nelson found among them. The conclusions arising from his research—that there is diversity in local politics and that development/modernization may yield some antithetical results—are hardly novel. More far-reaching conclusions are scarcely justified by his data. Since his sample was so small, Nelson admits that he was reluctant to discount an interview unless "all indicators were that the session has produced responses without substance" (p. 161).

Nelson's book shows the limitations of applying various development models anchored in the expe-

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rience of Western and Third World countries to a Communist state. Unfortunately, Nelson compounds the inherent difficulties of the task he has set for himself by relying in some instances on outdated statistics when more current information was readily available.[1]

Nelson himself appears somewhat uneasy in evaluating the results of his research. On finding that deputies in Iasi county were more willing than deputies in the other three to voice their opinions on local politics, he writes:

From such tendencies we can tentatively infer that actors in local politics from the locale with lowest socio-economic levels, but which is changing most rapidly, have backgrounds and opinions that adhere less to the Party than deputies from areas where change is slower but socio-economic levels are higher. (pp. 146–47)

Nelson concludes:

Ceausescu now realizes that principally as a result of efforts to develop/modernize, subnational political life is involved in a transitional stage, where "the interaction between . . . ideological goals and the requirements of the social system . . . will generate a process that in time modifies both the ideology and the reality" of socio-economic life that the Party initially set out to change. (p. 149)

Robert King's book is a much-needed work on the development of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). A meticulously researched study, it traces the rise of the PCR from a small underground group of true believers in the interwar period to a ruling party exercising tight control over Romania since World War II. The Romanian party, King shows, acquired power through the Soviet army. Party membership rose from around 1,000 in August 1944 to 1,060,000 by 1948 (p. 64). By contrast, peak membership in the interwar period was 5,000, in 1936.

King carefully traces the factionalism in the party and its unpopularity in interwar Romania. He finds that a major reason for its lack of appeal was its willingness to follow the Soviet policy line in general and a non-nationalist policy in particular.

Infighting continued in the Romanian party after it came to power. The two major contending factions were the "native" group represented by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and, after his death in 1965, by Nicolae Ceausescu, and the "internationalist" group which returned from the Soviet Union with the Red Army, whose main leaders were Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca. By the early 1950's, the native group had prevailed over the Pauker-Luca faction.

The postwar Romanian party made efforts to gain acceptance and legitimacy in the country. Although industrialization became a key priority of the leadership as well as the chief initial means through which the party sought justification for its right to rule, the memories of interwar unpopularity had a significant impact on the postwar Communist leadership, particularly the native group. They realized that one of the best ways to increase the party's popularity and thereby enhance its legitimacy was to identify it with Romanian national traditions and with nationalistic foreign policy goals.

After 1962, according to King, Romania commenced an autonomous foreign policy (p. 57). King is aware of the problems that the PCR has created for itself in acquiring what he calls a distinctive Romanian coloration, especially in its dealings with Romania's large national minorities. Nevertheless, he concludes, "through longevity, the elimination of viable alternatives and political and economic success the PCR has achieved a fair degree of acceptance, legitimacy and authority" (p. 149). Whether this will continue to hold true in the 1980's will depend on a number of factors, among which the state of the Romanian economy might well be decisive.

Prediction is more of an art than a science, as Bertrand de Jouvenel has noted.[2] Nevertheless, in *Romania in the 1980s,* editor Daniel Nelson and several other contributors have tried to assess Romania's past developments and to project on this basis developments in this decade. The volume includes an excellent paper on Romania's economic development and prospects by Marvin R. Jackson, who details the problems encountered in evaluating official Romanian data on that country's economic performance. These stem both from poor statistical methodology and from a Romanian penchant for "truth-bending" (p. 261). Walter M. Bacon provides a very good assessment of the role of Romanian military policies within the broader political context. Mary Ellen Fischer supplies valuable insight into the Ceausescu cult. Some of the other contributions, however, seemed less adequate to this reviewer. The section on Romanian foreign policy, by Ronald H. Linden, provides but a superficial overview showing little insight into the nuances of Romanian policies, despite a plethora of footnotes and social-science jargon. Nelson, in his contribution to the volume, contends that Romania "has been the only Warsaw Pact member to deviate consistently from Soviet foreign

[1] For example, this 1980 book cites the *1972 World Bank Atlas* for the Romanian gross national product.

[2] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Art of Conjecture,* New York, NY, Basic Books, 1967.

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policy norms, and it remains the sole Eastern European country to avoid oil imports from the Soviet Union" (p. v). Even a cursory overview of Romanian foreign policy or a reading of the articles in the volume itself would reveal that Romanian deviation has not been consistent. Moreover, a variety of sources have reported that Bucharest has been importing oil from the USSR since 1979.[3]

Dionisie Ghermani of the Southeast Institute in Munich has written a detailed study of the politics of national sovereignty in an attempt to explain Romanian foreign relations. He uses Romanian sources extensively and provides a salient chapter on the theoretical foundations of Romanian foreign policies. He discusses Romania's foreign relations with the Soviet Union, with other immediate neighbors, and with China. His analysis of the difficulties with the Soviet Union and Hungary over Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania provides many very helpful insights. However, the two chapters on Romania's participation in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and in the Warsaw Pact lack the depth that the complexity of the subject requires. The work on occasion suffers from a definite anti-Soviet tilt; as a result, the analysis at times verges on the polemical.

These four works collectively give useful analyses of the domestic and foreign policies of Romania. However, the rapid changes—particularly in the economic sphere—which that country is experiencing now might also bring about changes in these policies. This would in turn necessitate some major reappraisals on the part of analysts of Romanian developments.

PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU has often repeated his goal, first enunciated in the late 1960's, of building a "multilaterally developed society" in Romania. Rapid industrialization was given a vital role in this multilateral development. Indeed, statistics did indicate a very impressive economic growth rate, with Romanian industry outperforming that of other East European states in the 1970's. The growth of net material product also showed a performance superior to that of other East European states. It is undeniable that substantial growth has been achieved, particularly in heavy industry. On closer examination, however, the record is not uniformly impressive. To begin with, when the 11.3 percent reported annual growth of net material product in the period 1970–75 is translated into Western rates, it comes to only 6.1 percent.[4] More important than the actual rate of growth, however, is the quality of development.

It is in this area that the shortcomings of Romanian economic development have become apparent. Industrial growth has been largely extensive instead of intensive, fueled by an infusion of labor from rural areas. Despite massive investment, labor productivity growth rates have often been lower than those in other East European states.[5] Furthermore, industrial development has been significantly skewed toward the standard Marxist-Leninist model of heavy industrial development, to the detriment of light and consumer good industries. Other flaws range from too many prestige projects, innumerable bottlenecks, and underutilization of labor, to the failure to absorb Western technology effectively. The sight of huge oil refineries standing idle is perhaps the most telling evidence.

In the late 1970's, overall economic growth began to deteriorate badly in Romania and other CMEA states. The German Institute of Economic Research in West Berlin estimated that the combined growth rate for the six East European members of CMEA declined sharply in 1980, to 1.1 percent, with only East Germany managing to increase its rate over that of 1979.[6] Romania sustained one of the steepest decreases. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates of Washington, DC, concluded that Romania's overall economic performance in 1980 was its second worst since World War II.[7] In 1981, growth was at a postwar low: national income increased by only 2 percent, instead of the planned 7 percent.[8] Degeneration in the performance of Romanian industry was accompanied by disastrous failures in agriculture. The 1981 Romanian grain harvest of slightly more than 20 million metric tons fell well short of the target of 23.7 million.[9] In fact, farm output dropped below 1979 levels in both 1981 and 1980.[10] Underutilization of machinery, a lack of spare parts, and transport bottlenecks all contributed to severe losses during harvesting. Romania, which in any case has the lowest standard of living among the European members of CMEA, was hit by shortages of eggs, meat, potatoes, and sugar in 1980. In 1981 these shortages became exacerbated. Long lines

[3] Reuter and UPI, Nov. 1979, as cited in Radio Free Europe Research, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich), Jan. 29, 1980; Radio Moscow, June 5, 1980, in ibid., Oct. 10, 1980.

[4] Paul Marer, "Economic Performance, Strategy and Prospects in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, Aug. 2, 1977, pp. 523–66.

[5] Yu. Kormnov, "Scientific-Technological Progress and Integration of CMEA Member Countries in Machine Building," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1977.

[6] As reported in *Financial Times* (London), June 19, 1981.

[7] As reported in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), July 8, 1981.

[8] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Feb. 10, 1982.

[9] *Financial Times*, Dec. 4, 1981.

[10] *Toronto Star*, Feb. 24, 1982.

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formed outside shops, as in Poland. The government had to introduce rationing of such staples as bread, sugar, and cooking oil, and to promulgate antihoarding regulations. In mid-February 1982, the Romanian government also ordered price increases averaging 35 percent on basic food products.[11]

Nevertheless, the Romanian long-range plan, adopted at the 11th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1974, to become a "developed" socialist state by 1990,[12] has not been revised. As Marvin R. Jackson points out, at the 12th Congress of the PCR in 1979 the Romanian leadership reiterated this goal and projected a rise in per capita national product from US$1,900 to US$3,000–$3,500 by the year 1990 (*Romania in the 1980s*, p. 255).

Despite the retention of these goals, the increasing difficulties of the economy in the latter part of the 1970's forced some reexamination of the highly centralized planning mechanism. Yet, the Ceausescu regime seems wary about introducing substantive reforms. The reforms that have been instituted resemble more closely those introduced in the Soviet Union and East Germany in the 1960's than the significant decentralization measures of the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary. Bucharest's new economic mechanism, introduced in 1978, is to provide for some decentralization and a shift of emphasis toward worker self-management, profit-sharing, and the use of "net profit" instead of gross output as an indicator of performance.[13] But these measures, limited as they are when compared to those in Hungary, have been only partly implemented. Ceausescu has always preferred fine tuning to substantive change. He has usually resorted to a rotation of ministers and party leaders, or to their dismissal. In 1981, several officials, including the finance minister, the planning chief, and the agriculture minister, were dismissed.

The poor performance in agriculture highlights the need for structural corrections in this sector. It has been acknowledged by Romanian officials that foul-ups at all levels of agricultural administration were more responsible for shortfalls than the bad weather.[14] Even Ceausescu himself admitted in February 1981 that agriculture had been neglected in favor of industrial development.[15] He announced that more investment would be allocated to agriculture in the next five-year plan. Nevertheless, given the structural problems of the Romanian economy as a whole and the usual party and bureaucratic resistance to change, the prospects are slight that additional investment in Romanian agriculture would yield any better results than such investments have yielded in the Soviet Union.

ROMANIA'S GROWING internal economic problems have been worsened by external developments. Since the early 1960's, Romania has been extremely careful to diversify its trade partners in order to shield itself as much as possible from the pressures that could result from economic dependence. The availability of domestic energy resources made this possible in the 1960's. In the 1970's, however, Romania's domestic energy production began to fall, and the country became a net importer of crude oil. Most of the oil imports used to come on a barter basis from Iran and Iraq. At present, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict has largely dried up this source of oil. Romania had to purchase additional oil on the spot market for hard currency. Although Bucharest had been very careful not to have to rely on the Soviet Union for oil, in 1979 it turned to the Soviet Union for some supplies. In that year, Romania purchased 400,000 tons of oil; in 1980, 1.5 million tons;[16] and in 1981, it negotiated for additional supplies. Romania also decided to purchase natural gas from the Soviet Union.[17]

Internal economic problems and external supply difficulties have therefore induced Romania to move closer to the Soviet Union and to CMEA. This shift has taken place despite the fact that a large portion of Romania's trade continues to be with Western nations and despite Romania's unique ties (for a CMEA state) with the European Economic Community (EEC). Romania attempted in November 1981 to reach an accord on economic cooperation with the EEC to reinforce the existing trade pact.[18] Nevertheless, at the 35th CMEA session—held at Sofia, Bulgaria, in July 1981—Romania appeared eager to contribute money, equipment, and even labor in order to take part in joint projects that would assure it an expansion of energy supplies from the Soviet Union.[19]

Massive hard-currency debts are another major problem plaguing the Romanian economy. Ceausescu, like Edward Gierek in Poland, borrowed heavily in the West to finance imports of advanced technology in

[11] Ibid.

[12] *Directivele congresului al XI-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman cu privere la planul cincinal 1976–1980 si liniile directorate ale dezvolutarii economico-sociale a Romaniei pentru perioda 1981–1990* (Directives of the 11th Romanian Communist Party Congress Regarding the Five-Year Plan for 1976–1980 and the Guidelines for the Socio-economic Development of Romania for the Period 1981–1990), Bucharest, 1974.

[13] Walter M. Bacon Jr., "Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), April 1981, p. 170.

[14] Agerpress release reported in *Financial Times*, Dec. 4, 1981.

[15] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 2, 1981.

[16] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Oct. 17, 1980.

[17] *Romanian Situation Report*, Jan. 29, 1980.

[18] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 6, 1981.

[19] *The Times* (London), July 5, 1981.

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order to speed up economic growth. By 1981, the hard-currency debt amounted to US$10 billion,[20] and by 1982, according to some Western estimates,[21] it had reached US$13 billion. By 1981, Romania began to experience difficulty in meeting scheduled debt payments. In that year, it fell behind on repaying a part of a US$2.47 billion loan. Its debt service payments due in April 1982 alone amounted to US$1 billion. Some other repayments have been erratic.[22] For example, the European American Bank finally asked the US Commodity Credit Corporation in February 1982 to make good on an overdue installment of US$5.5 million on a loan Romania had taken out to buy US farm machinery.[23]

The Romanian government has taken some remedial steps. In 1981, it reduced its balance-of-payments deficit to an estimated US$1.8 billion from the record US$2.4 billion in 1980.[24] However, it also borrowed US$1.46 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Western diplomatic sources reported in November 1981 that Romania was negotiating with Western companies for delays in payments to them of up to six months in order to avoid going deeper into debt to Western banks and damaging its credit rating.[25]

Nevertheless, Western bankers have become increasingly concerned about Bucharest's ability to repay its massive debts. In spite of this, Western governments and banks have been reluctant so far to have Romania declared in default. There have been reports that US and European banks have quietly agreed in principle to give Romania more time to repay.[26] Representatives from foreign banks went to Bucharest in January and in February 1982 for talks about rescheduling Romania's debts to private banks.[27] Should Romania's creditors either decide to call in the loans or begin to impose conditions calling for Romania to slow down its current very modest economic growth further, then, as the Institute for Comparative Economic Studies in Vienna has suggested,[28] the results for the Romanian economy could be catastrophic.

OTHER FACTORS in addition to the deteriorating economy have contributed to domestic problems and have induced a sense of malaise among the population. The Ceausescu regime represses expressions of popular dissatisfaction as ruthlessly as any socialist state in Eastern Europe. A large-scale strike by 35,000 miners in the Jiu valley in August 1977 was swiftly quelled. Thousands of workers were fired or sent back to their native villages. The leaders of the strike committee were arrested.[29] An attempt in 1979 to form a "Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers" was also quickly stifled by the Ceausescu regime. According to Amnesty International, two leaders of the movement, Ion Cana and Gheorghe Brasoveanu, were confined to psychiatric institutions, and a third was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.[30] During 1980–81, there have been Western reports of over 50 work stoppages in factories and mines (including stoppages in the Jiu valley), of sabotage, and of other acts of protest.[31] However, these seemed to be spontaneous and uncoordinated occurrences with little impact on government policies.

The policy of Romanianization has also produced considerable friction in the country. The measures of cultural repression against the large Hungarian minority (numbering close to 2 million) have evoked repeated protests from this minority and from Budapest.[32] Such policies can only bring further alienation from the regime.

Ceausescuism, the vast and at times comic personality cult of the Romanian leader, has fostered increasing cynicism in society. In the past few years, this personality cult has been extended to Ceausescu's wife Elena, who has become the second most powerful person in the country. The Romanian leader has also ensured the rise to high positions within the party and the government for sundry other relatives. This nepotism is extensive even by Balkan standards. Some wags in Bucharest have asserted that "Ceausescu has succeeded in achieving socialism in one family."

The regime continues to enforce rigid cultural conformism which has stifled artistic creativity. Only the crudest socialist realism in art is condoned—as is most evident in painting. This has only added to the corruption of an intelligensia that was already not noted for courage or principle.

IT HAS BEEN widely assumed that the pursuit of foreign policy autonomy and a safeguarding of national sovereignty have been vital among the many ways in which Ceausescu has compensated for domestic shortcomings. Indeed, several works reviewed here have suggested that by these means the

[20] *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.
[21] *The Globe and Mail*, Jan. 16, 1982.
[22] Ibid.
[23] *TIME* (New York, NY), Mar. 8, 1982, p. 73.
[24] *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.
[25] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 5, 1981.
[26] Ibid., Feb. 2, 1982.
[27] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1982; and *TIME*, Mar. 8, 1982.
[28] As reported in *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.
[29] *The Times*, Oct. 6, 1977; Agence France-Presse, Oct. 11, 1977.
[30] Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1981* (London), p. 314.
[31] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 2 and Dec. 3, 1981.
[32] Karoly Kiraly's letter was smuggled out of Romania and published in *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1978, and in several other Western papers.

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Romanian Communist Party has tried to achieve a greater degree of legitimacy. External threats, it is argued, have traditionally functioned as a unifying factor in various countries. In Romania's case, foreign policy autonomy in the 1960's may also have been a prerequisite for the pursuit of the domestic goal of rapid industrialization. This in turn enhanced regime legitimacy. Furthermore, such linkages between domestic and foreign policies are not uncommon.

Such assumptions provide an attractive and plausible explanation for Romanian behavior. Furthermore, in the past, evidence to support this hypothesis was abundant. Nevertheless, like most hypotheses, this one also needs to be subjected to reexamination. One needs to ask how autonomous Romanian policy really is; whether it increases regime legitimacy; and, ultimately, whether it may be explained purely in terms of rational decision-making.

Robert King and Dionisie Ghermani both provide numerous examples of foreign policy stands taken by Romania that differed sharply from those of the Soviet Union. Bucharest's refusal, at the 1978 Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact, to agree to increased military spending or to acquiesce to greater pact integration under Soviet command brought sharp condemnations from the Kremlin.[33] Romania has also, at least indirectly, condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,[34] and Ceausescu has warned against foreign intervention in Poland.

Yet, despite such stands in foreign policy and manifest Soviet displeasure over them, Romanian autonomy functions within certain limits.[35] These are defined by Soviet core interests. Thus, while one is justified in characterizing Romanian foreign policy as autonomous, it would be unrealistic to call it independent. Furthermore, it should be recognized that some Romanian policies encompassed dimensions which either directly or indirectly supported Moscow's policies. While Ceausescu asserted that no state has the right to intervene in Poland, he also strongly condemned the activities of the Solidarity trade union movement in language not unlike that of the Kremlin. The Romanian government voiced its approval of the imposition of martial law in Poland, declaring that this move ought to help Warsaw with its "unflinching advancement on the luminous road of communism."[36] At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meetings in Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1980–82) Romania's position on some issues was distinctly at variance with that of the USSR. In rejecting Western criticism of the violations of human rights in the socialist states, however, Romania's position was similar to that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, although several Romanian proposals at Madrid on European security issues might well have been made to safeguard Romanian autonomy, they could also have been damaging to the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[37]

Although it is sometimes difficult to document precisely, there is little doubt that Romania has had to pay a price for going its own way within the Soviet bloc. This price comprised fairly overt Soviet economic and political pressures—e.g., reluctance to supply Bucharest with oil and other raw materials, as well as the more hidden obstacles placed in the way of Romania's exports to the USSR—and more subtle intimidation through military threats. One need but contrast the treatment of Bulgaria, a loyal client state of Moscow, with that of Romania to see that the Soviet Union can and has been willing to provide important benefits to selected East European states.

Playing on Romanian chauvinism and national pride undoubtedly helped the regime in the past to enhance its legitimacy. Yet, appeals to patriotism are also subject to the law of diminishing returns. The population eventually becomes inured to them and perhaps even cynical about them. At any rate, today there is a perception in Romania that foreign policy autonomy has extracted a burdensome price. The low standard of living has made the people look with envy not only toward Hungary but even toward Bulgaria. Furthermore, there is a growing feeling that Ceausescu's penchant to assert Romanian autonomy by involvement in the Third World has been costly. As a member of the Group of 77 and a guest at meetings of the Nonaligned Movement, Romania has had to provide very substantial foreign aid by East European standards—or so it is felt. There is a recognition that Bucharest has derived some economic benefits from its ties to the developing nations, but there is also a sense that a good deal of the effort and cost have been directed to ensuring Ceausescu's prestige as an "international statesman" rather than Romania's interests. If such perceptions become general, foreign policy autonomy may increasingly be perceived as responsible for at least some of the domestic shortfalls. In such circumstances, legitimacy is more likely to be eroded than enhanced.

LAST, one needs to ask whether Romanian foreign policy initiatives

[33] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 16, 1978.
[34] *Scinteia*, Jan. 24 and Dec. 4, 1980.
[35] For further elaboration, see my *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.
[36] *The Globe and Mail*, Dec. 16, 1981.
[37] *Scinteia*, Nov. 15, 1980.

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continue to serve rational goals. Besides assumptions about linkage between domestic considerations and foreign policy, analysts of Romanian developments have by and large judged that Ceausescu's foreign policy has been clever and cunning and that he has been alive to every international opportunity. As noted, Romanian foreign policy had cogent economic and political rationales in the past. This is much less certain recently. Some Romanian challenges to the Soviet Union have been gratuitous. Ceausescu's visit to Beijing in the spring of 1978, for instance, and the mandatory reciprocal visit in August 1978 by Hua Guofeng—during which Hua made anti-Soviet speeches—provoked Moscow's ire without yielding visible benefits for Romania. On this occasion, Romania appears to have broken one of the tacit, yet cardinal rules of its foreign policy, namely: "use, but never be used." Ceausescu also exhibited unseemly haste at the funeral of Josip Broz Tito in May 1980 in trying to assume the Yugoslav leader's mantle in the Nonaligned Movement. Ceausescu's courting of various Third World leaders seemed almost farcical at times, and undertaken more for the gratification of his ego than for the sake of tangible benefits to Romania.

The mounting panegyrics for Ceausescu cannot camouflage the gross mismanagement of the economy, the repressiveness of the regime, or the multiplying miscues on foreign policy. Despite some natural gravitation toward Moscow, Romania's foreign policy could remain autonomous (and thereby continue to garner certain economic benefits) if the policy goals were clearly thought out. Yet, Ceausescu's policies are beginning to show fewer linkages to domestic requirements and seem to be less well anchored in rationality.

Although the four works reviewed here provide many insights into Romanian domestic and foreign policies, they can offer only limited guidance to future Romanian developments. Widening fissures in society have become apparent in the last few years. The increase in corruption has been startling even by Romanian standards. The seriously deteriorating economic conditions add to the uncertainty. The disenchantment with the Ceausescu cult could find unpredictable expression.

In view of such factors, there is the temptation to compare Romania and Poland. Yet, too facile an analogy with Poland before the imposition of martial law would be highly misleading. I agree with Nelson's conclusion and that of the other contributors to *Romania in the 1980s* that it is highly unlikely for Romania to experience a challenge similar to Solidarity's in Poland. For one thing, the catalytic agent of political culture is different in the two states. In Romania, the worker disturbances and free unions seem to have been stifled in their infancy.

It is remarkable also that there is so little discussion of reform, especially among the intelligentsia. It is highly unlikely that anything similar to the Polish Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR) or the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) could be formed in the near future. An alliance of workers and intelligentsia seems improbable in Romania. The intelligentsia have sold out long ago and appear much more interested in the "pecking order" than in supporting civil liberties. The church in Romania is also weak and disorganized. The large Hungarian minority is alienated and in the future may be made a scapegoat for domestic difficulties. The imposition of martial law in Poland may also act as a deterrent to organized pressures for change.

Yet, as Romanian economic difficulties increase, so will domestic tensions and malaise. Though this may not block the government's ability to rule, it might erode the legitimacy of the Ceausescu regime and isolate it. A change in leadership could bring about not only significant alterations in domestic policies but also a redirection in foreign policy.

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Moscow in the Middle East

By Karen Dawisha

YAACOV RO'I. *Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947–1954.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Press, 1980.

ROBERT S. WISTRICH, Ed. *The Left Against Zion.* London, Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1979.

YITZHAK SHICHOR. *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

GALIA GOLAN. *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1980.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN. *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970,* Revised Edition. New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1978.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN, Ed. *World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979.

THE MOTIVATIONS informing Soviet policy in the Middle East have long been the subject of considerable controversy among analysts. Some observers see Moscow's policy as an outcome of the ideological impulse to expand Marxism-Leninism to other areas of the world. Others, although they agree that the Soviets are expansionist in outlook, attribute the desire to increase the USSR's influence to more traditional imperialist objectives. Still others would concede that Moscow might have an overall grand strategy, yet they would posit that the key impulses behind Soviet strategy in the Middle East are not essentially offensive calculations—whether ideological or imperialistic in nature—but defensive considerations arising from the need to secure the areas contiguous to the southern borders of the USSR. In this view, the Soviets are merely taking advantage of opportunities presented by the decline of Western fortunes in order to expand their own influence in the area. This last explanation sees Soviet policy in the Arab world as reactive and opportunistic—more a conglomerate of tactical dexterity and realpolitik than the product of predefined and rigid strategic designs.

Disagreements over how to interpret Soviet policy in the Middle East would be of only academic interest were it not for two circumstances. The Middle East has lately become even more of an area of vital strategic importance to the West than was previously the case, and the growth of Soviet power, particularly in the military field, has greatly reduced the constraints on Moscow's capability to achieve whatever objectives it chooses to set for itself in the area. The success of Western policy in the region, therefore, is likely to depend increasingly upon the ability of Western statesmen to correctly assess the root motivations of Soviet policy. To put it crudely, you can cure a disease only when you know what it is.

The most striking recent example of the need for the West to accurately appraise Soviet goals was provided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Those who saw it as an expression of expansionism held that force could only be met by force and that the inbuilt momentum of Soviet policy necessitated a strong Western military response to contain the inexorable march of the Russians "in the direction of the Gulf." This view found strong adherents in the United States—especially in official circles—as reflected in the moves toward establishing a rapid deployment force.

However, such assessments of Soviet goals in the invasion of Afghanistan are in striking contrast to those put forward by many in Western Europe and the Arab world. There the dominant view is that the invasion of Afghanistan was a limited and defensive move, designed to secure the USSR's southern boundaries and not to serve as a bridgehead for further southward expansion. Hence, the Russians, it is contended, can be pacified only if they are cajoled, not cudgeled. Now that they have the military means to defend their interests, the argument goes on, an overly aggressive posture by the West could have the

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opposite effect from the one desired. That is, such a posture could so alarm Moscow that Soviet leaders might overreact and increase their military activities even further.

In addition, it is maintained that the Soviet Union is unlikely to make substantial headway in the area if it is denied the opportunity to increase its influence through the exploitation of local conflicts between and within states. Thus, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular is seen as the major reason for continued Soviet influence on those Arab combatants who feel they require ever more modern weapons and the guarantee of rapid resupply in the event of war.

THE BOOKS under review both reflect and shed some light on this debate over Soviet motivations and opportunities in the Middle East. Several of the books focus especially on the development of Soviet policy in the postwar period and so seek to fill a major gap in the literature. Yaacov Ro'i, whose book is an expanded version of his doctoral thesis, goes far in enlightening the reader about the origins of the shifts in Soviet policy toward Israel after Iosif Stalin's death in 1953. His analysis of the place of relations with Israel in Moscow's wider regional and global strategy is most convincing, except that it almost entirely ignores the impact on policy formulation of the Soviet leadership transition at that time. Since Ro'i has entitled his book *Soviet Decision Making in Practice,* one could have expected to see more attention devoted to this topic.

Ro'i does state, however, that after Stalin's death, "the Soviet leadership tried to sever foreign policy from internal problems and to conduct it with a new flexibility on the basis of Soviet national interests" (p. 469). In particular, the phase in which the antisemitism of the late Stalin period affected Soviet policy toward Israel came to an end. Policy was once more motivated by state interests and a desire not only to improve Soviet relations with the Arab states but also "to establish and preserve a normal and positive relationship with Israel" (p. 491).

These conclusions are in marked contrast to those drawn by Robert S. Wistrich in the chapter which he contributed to *The Left Against Zion.* Wistrich sees "antisemitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel motifs" (p. 285) as the predominant motivations of Soviet policy even after the demise of Stalin. However, Wistrich, like many of the other contributors to the volume he edited, makes no attempt to distinguish between these very different motifs. In general, the defensive attitude of the contributors (typified by the editor's introductory comments on p. ix that "anti-Zionism has become the great bazaar in which Soviet and Chinese Communists, Arabs and Third World Marxists, anarchists and Castroists along with feudal Sheiks, conservative Islamic rulers, oil companies and capitalist interests in the West . . . can find common ground in their hatred of the Jewish State") leads many of them to make incredibly ahistorical statements. Thus, Wistrich seems unaware of the vast literature about the fact of Israeli involvement in the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956. He merely states that "the Sinai campaign of 1956 in which Israel was identified with Anglo-French aggression against Egypt greatly reinforced the anti-Israeli motif in Soviet foreign policy" (p. 286). This book should be read by anyone who is as yet unaware of the view that the entire world is against the Jewish state, but it adds little to serious scholarship. For example, while it might usefully have explored the issue of whether antisemitism has ever been a motivator of Soviet policy toward Israel, it fails even to distinguish between antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

ANOTHER possible influence on Soviet policy in the Middle East—rarely considered by Western scholars—is the state of Soviet relations with China. At issue is the extent to which Moscow tailors its policies in order to prevent China from establishing a foothold in the area. In an excellent study entitled *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy,* Yitzhak Shichor does not focus specifically on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, his basic theme that Beijing's policy in the Middle East revolves not around the Arab-Israeli dispute but rather around the Sino-Soviet conflict, provides much useful information about the USSR.

For instance, the competition between the two powers for predominance in the South Asian and Persian Gulf areas has led Moscow to withhold support from movements or regimes backed by the Chinese. Yet the fluctuations in Beijing's general foreign policy—from the peaceful coexistence of the 1950's, to the export of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, and to the normalization of relations with the United States in the 1970's and an effort to build a common front against the USSR—have also led Moscow at times to support groups to the left and at other times groups to the right of Beijing. Thus, Shichor notes (p. 172) that during the mid-1970's, when South Yemen and Moscow went through a troubled period in their relations, South Yemen pursued a policy more favorable to the Chinese. At that juncture, South Yemen established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and reduced its support for both the Dhofari rebels in Oman and the Eritrean Liberation Front, then enjoying Moscow's favor. In July 1978,

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China suffered a setback when a coup d'état (engineered by Moscow, according to Shichor) brought a pro-Soviet group to power in South Yemen. Although Shichor does not deal with Afghanistan, many of his conclusions about the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Soviet policy apply to Soviet behavior there as well. Soviet policy toward Afghanistan was certainly influenced by Moscow's perception of Sino-American efforts to build up an unbroken phalanx of anti-Soviet regimes along the USSR's southern perimeter.

IF ONE is trying to divine the principal motivations behind Soviet policy in the Middle East, one cannot long ignore the Soviet attitude either toward the key conflict in the region, the Arab-Israeli dispute, or toward one of the main subjects and objects of that dispute, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Galia Golan's book is addressed precisely to the latter topic. It is necessary to say at the outset, however, that this reviewer, expecting Golan to meet the same high standards she had achieved in her previous books on Czechoslovakia and the Yom Kippur War,[1] was disappointed by the present book. For one thing, it is atrociously printed, and there are so many mistakes and differing transliterations of Russian and Arabic sources as to frequently leave the impression that the book was assembled by a research team rather than written by a single author. Moreover, the text is not always as clearly written as it should be. The theoretical basis for Soviet-PLO relations (pp. 14–39) is never really sufficiently developed, and the chapter on the Soviet attitude toward internal differences within the PLO reads more like a confused conglomeration of facts than a careful analysis.

Having said all this, I must add that the book is challenging and has to be highly recommended. Indeed, despite its deficiencies, it is still the best book under review here.

Golan's basic thesis is that the Soviet Union lacks a clear long-term strategy in the Middle East. Most aspects of Soviet policy have been subject to change and compromise. Nevertheless, Moscow has consistently opposed Arab calls for the destruction of the state of Israel. Thus, although the PLO was established in 1964, the demand for realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people was not included until 1972 in the all-important slogans propounded on the anniversary of the October Revolution. Moscow's reticence toward the PLO, Golan makes clear, has always been the product of fundamental disagreement between them over the role of armed struggle and the objectives of that struggle vis-à-vis Israel. As a consequence, the first official contact between the PLO and the Soviet government (as opposed to the link of longer duration between the PLO and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) came only in July 1974, one month after the Palestine National Council adopted, in Moscow's view, a much more "realistic policy" toward Israel (p. 36). This was followed in the autumn of 1974 by the first Soviet public reference to the right of the Palestinians "to establish their own statehood in one form or another" (p. 55). One is struck by the length of time between the establishment of the PLO and the emergence of the strong link between Moscow and the Palestinians to which we have become accustomed—one decade, to be exact. It is Golan's contention—one which this author would support—that Moscow's closer tie with the Palestinians (and other radical forces in the area) was a reaction to its decreased influence in Egypt after the early 1970's and to its exclusion first from the step-by-step negotiating process after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and then from the diplomacy leading to the Camp David agreement. The Soviet Union is intrinsically more interested in state-to-state relations with Arab governments, but, failing those, it has been eager to use any available opportunity to prevent the consolidation of American influence via the emergence of a strategic consensus among Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, by radicalizing Arab opinion on the West Bank and elsewhere, provided Moscow with a golden opportunity to increase its influence not only over radical Arab states but also over disparate Communist organizations, such as the Palestine National Front and the Palestinian Communist Organization (pp. 169–71).

Golan's conclusions—that Moscow has in effect been left the scraps off the table ever since Egypt took to supping with Israel and, moreover, that the link with the PLO has been "fraught with complications, ambiguities, limitations, and, at times, contradictions" (p. 254)—are generally seconded by Robert O. Freedman. In his contribution both to the volume he edited and in the updated edition of his own book, his basic assessment is that "Soviet policy towards the region was primarily a reaction to a series of regional developments that the Soviet leaders not only had not caused, but that they were increasingly unable to shape to fit Soviet goals in the region, and that the Soviet position in the Middle East was much weaker in 1977 than it was in 1970" (*Soviet Policy*, p. 334).

[1] See her *Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (1972); *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era, 1968–1969* (1973); and *Yom Kippur and After* (1977). All three books were published by Cambridge University Press.

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The major events of 1977 to which Freedman is referring are the scuttling of the Soviet-American joint statement on the Middle East and the subsequent visit by President Sadat to Jerusalem. Yet neither Freedman nor John Campbell, in a chapter on the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict (*World Politics*, pp. 37–53), has pinpointed exactly who was responsible for the collapse of the plan outlined in the joint statement. Freedman suggests that it was the Soviet Union (*World Politics*, p. 64), but he himself admits only one page later that Moscow saw the statement "as a means of re-entering the center of Middle East diplomacy." It is well known that overwhelming pressure against the plan came from the Jewish lobby and from Israel, leading to the reversal of the American position. Thus, it is highly surprising that John Campbell's account of this key episode does not mention Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington and the American-Israeli working paper. Freedman mentions them, but only after putting the onus on Moscow for backtracking on the proposal.

THIS POINT is worth considering because the Soviet-American joint statement and American acquiescence to cochairmanship of the equally ill-fated Geneva talks were the only instances throughout the 1970's when the West offered the Soviet Union a role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow not only fully supported both these efforts but also put forward several other proposals designed to lead to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East with Soviet involvement. For a variety of reasons, none of these efforts came to anything. The result was that Moscow, instead of staying within the mainstream, felt compelled to promote more radical interests as a means of preserving its position.

The evidence presented by both Golan and Freedman would support the judgment that while the Soviet Union could be eliminated from the "peace process," it could not be deprived of a position of influence in the region. If one accepts the view that Moscow's support of extremist elements in the Arab world during the 1970's was tactical rather than strategic, however, one might argue that Moscow would now enjoy less influence in the area than it actually does if the opportunities to involve it in a comprehensive peace plan had not gone unexploited. Moscow benefits tremendously from the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A settlement of that conflict would remove the single greatest foothold for the USSR in the area.

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Dilemmas of Single-Party Rule in the Soviet Union

By Astrid von Borcke

RONALD J. HILL and PETER FRANK. *The Soviet Communist Party*. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

MICHAEL S. VOSLENSKY. *Nomenklatura. Die herrschende Klasse der Sowjetunion* (Nomenklatura: The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union). Vienna, Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980.

HELENE CARRERE D'ENCAUSSE. *Le Pouvoir confisqué. Gouvernants et gouvernés en U.R.S.S.* (Power Confiscated: Rulers and Ruled in the USSR). Paris, Flammarion, 1980.

A REAPPRAISAL of the evolution, structure, and dynamics of the system of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union is especially timely these days, when divergent assessments of the Soviet threat have caused unprecedented strain in the Western alliance and developments in Poland once again seem to confirm that a Communist single-party system is unable to liberalize itself peacefully, contrary to the hopes of not a few Western observers in the early 1970's.

The three books under review here examine the Soviet system from a variety of perspectives and approaches. Ronald Hill and Peter Frank have chosen an "analytical," political science approach, but one that relies strongly on official Soviet sources. Michael Voslensky's book is a deeply *engagé*, often sarcastic, settling-of-accounts by a former "insider" who, in the years 1950–72, worked in close contact with the apparat of the party Central Committee. He focuses on that special world of privilege and power engendered by *nomenklatura*, the Communist Party's system of supervision and control over all appointments considered politically important.[1] Finally, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has written a scholarly and extremely perceptive account of the evolution of the Soviet political system, one which is especially useful in its assessment of the Brezhnev era.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the picture of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that Hill and Frank present is the closest of the three to the official Soviet self-image. Perhaps because of the kind of official Soviet information available on the mundane levels of the system's operations today, the authors tend to view the system "from the bottom up." However, both the organization and the functioning of the CPSU suggest the opposite perspective. Soviet central institutions are by no means just an emanation from the local ones. Besides, more is known about the former than Hill and Frank suggest. To cite just one example, we know that during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it was not the whole Politburo that was in nearly permanent session, as the authors suggest (pp. 67, 108), but an ad hoc committee of the Politburo's leading foreign policy experts.[2]

Hill and Frank do offer some interesting citations from Soviet sources and masses of figures (albeit generally on politically "harmless" matters), but they do not really provide any essential new insights for the specialist. Moreover, their all-too-uncritical echoing of official Soviet positions—for example, acceptance of the CPSU's claim to "historical achievements" during industrialization and World War II without mentioning the costs and failures (pp. 3, 13)—makes the book not an ideal one even for the beginning student of the Soviet system.

Voslensky's hardheaded depiction of what he calls "the country of *Nomenklaturia*"—the real "legal base" of Soviet political and social

[1] *Nomenklatura* has been a decisive means by which the party has ensured its "leading role" and thus perpetuated the "monopolistic" nature of this system of political power. See Bohdan Harasymiw, *"Nomenklatura:* The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Waterloo, Ontario), December 1969, pp. 493–512.

[2] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp. 215, 238.

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life (p. 176)—is a wholesome corrective. Where Hill and Frank tend to view the ideology as a belief system, an inspiring "utopia," and even suggest some genuine striving of society toward communism, Voslensky approvingly quotes V. Shulgin to the effect that communism was merely the lever used by the new rulers to unseat the old ones (p. 129). Leninism was a justification in Marxist terms for the seizure of power in a "feudal" society (pp. 112, 115). Parenthetically, this may explain its continuing appeal in parts of the Third World.

Not all of Voslensky's trenchant judgments and assertions will go uncontested. To some extent he still adheres to the terminology, concepts, and models of Marxist thought. Thus, in speaking of the role of Lenin and Stalin, Voslensky alludes to "historical necessity," remarking that they "possessed, to a greater extent than other people, the qualities that under given conditions were necessary" for a leader of party and state (p. 87). However, such an implicitly apologetic view ultimately might lead to the most problematic ethical consequences. It adds up to the ideological rationalization of anything—it is good because it exists. This, of course, is by no means the point that Voslensky wants to make.

The reviewer also wonders to what extent one can regard Soviet leaders (since Trotsky at least) as more or less merely executing the collective will of the apparat (p. 366). Voslensky himself makes a bow to the personality factor when he advances the very controversial hypothesis that Stalin had been an agent of the tsarist Okhrana,[3] which could suggest that the purges of the CPSU reflected a psychological urge by Stalin to cover his tracks. Indeed, the really intriguing question about Stalinism would seem to be the extent to which Stalin deliberately worked to bring about a situation that seemed to call for a "man of steel."

Voslensky's "insider" account provides some glimpses into leading Soviet institutions—most fascinating, into the Politburo (see pp. 373, 380ff., and 391ff.). Since 1929, the operations of this body—the actual "government" of the Soviet Union—have been shrouded in a secrecy dispelled only a bit by Nikita Khrushchev and generally restored by Leonid Brezhnev. While Voslensky may not revolutionize previous interpretations developed by the best Western historians and "Kremlinologists," he does describe the type and form of information demanded by the political leadership—specifically, all information was to be written in layman's language and to be limited to no more than two typewritten pages for discussion of a resolution or five for background information (pp. 394–95). Moreover, he offers some revealing information on the real mentality of the Soviet new "ruling class"—in particular, their preoccupation with power and privilege. In contrast to Jerry Hough,[4] Voslensky tends to stress the ongoing conflict between the party and the state administrations (p. 197). He also notes conflict between the apparat and the ordinary party membership (p. 189).

The Voslensky volume affords aperçus on prominent Soviet personalities, which in turn are illuminating of the system. One example is his discussion of Konstantin Katushev, a former chief engineer at the Gor'kiy automobile plant who was promoted to a Central Committee secretaryship in 1968 (he was shifted to deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1977). Looking at his career from the point of view of a purely quantitative "elite" study, one might have concluded that Katushev's meteoric rise was another example of the party's policy of "co-opting" specialists into the apparat with a view to modernizing the system—a strategy of innovation analogous to that used by Western corporations. However, Voslensky's remark that Katushev's father had been a close friend of the Brezhnev family (p. 371) reminds us that alongside "systemic requirements" (and Voslensky concedes that Brezhnev had a knack for recruiting competent specialists), nepotism and clientelism have also played an important role in appointments during the Brezhnev era.

As already suggested, the reviewer is quite partial to Carrère d'Encausse's survey of the origins and development of the Soviet political system and of its increasingly problematic relationship with a changing society. (I would hope this work is soon translated into English.) However, lest I be accused of fostering a "cult of personality," I would note several minor caveats to her otherwise commendable analysis. For example, one might wonder to what extent the modest representation of the political police on the Central Committee really demonstrates insignificant potential political weight, as Carrère d'Encausse suggests (p. 74). After all, "socialist legality" has yet to become legality *tout court,* as the author points out, and remains subject to the dictates of *partiynost'* (party-mindedness). Every "ideocracy" requires some kind of political police, and in the case of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the sheer weight of

[3] Voslensky discusses this matter on pages 68–76. He mentions, in particular, the memoirs of the Social Revolutionary S. Vereshchak. Vereshchak's memoirs are discussed in Edward Ellis Smith, *The Young Stalin,* New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967.

[4] See Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969.

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its allegedly about half a million collaborators[5] must lend it significance. Indeed, KGB chief Yuriy Andropov has been a member of the Politburo since 1967 (a full member since 1973). This reviewer would also evaluate differently the internal significance of the progressive "militarization" of Soviet foreign policy (more on this below).

THE ESSENTIALLY historical approach used by Carrère d'Encausse and, to some extent, by Voslensky explains best how and why the Soviet system has acquired its specific traits. Let us trace this evolution in brief.

It starts with the concept of the revolutionary "vanguard," a "party of a new type," which was Lenin's special contribution to 20th-century political life. Claiming to represent social "consciousness" (Lenin was a profound admirer of the radical Russian "enlighteners" of the 1860's[6]), the Bolshevik party in fact sought to substitute itself for civil society to "confiscate" society's powers (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 134). Already at the time of the October coup of 1917, Lenin had a police nucleus created within the Military Revolutionary Committee, which in December was to become the Cheka—an unequivocal demonstration that the new regime, even more than its predecessor, would base itself upon a coercive apparatus "alienated" from society (see Carrère d'Encausse, p. 19). Moreover, in the ensuing Civil War, the original egalitarianism of the October Revolution was corroded, as a bureaucratic second economy began to operate in secret (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 24).

Stalin's historical achievement, as Robert C. Tucker has remarked,[7] was to restore *gosudarstvo,* i.e., the state. Yet, in itself Stalinism was still not a viable political system (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 43). To make possible his quasi-"total" personal dictatorship, Stalin strove to suppress all centers of independent social power, indeed, all purely personal allegiances. But Stalin's technique of the "permanent purge,"[8] culminating in the Great Purge of 1936–38, was in conflict with the stability, regularity, and legality called for by the progressive bureaucratization that naturally attended forced-draft industrialization "from above." New values—hierarchy, competence, patriotism—and new "elites" called for consolidation.

Immediately upon the death of the old tyrant in 1953, his successors abolished mass terror. This meant that the regime had to find a new modus vivendi, an accommodation with society. Indeed, once having become supreme (though not uncontested) "boss" (*rukovoditel'*), Khrushchev began to push new priorities: a renewed populist egalitarianism, increased consumer welfare, and after the Cuban missile crisis, détente.

In his struggle for reform and supreme power—the two inextricably intertwined—Khrushchev proceeded to alienate all the most powerful bureaucracies of the Stalinist system: the police, the managers of heavy industry, the military, and beginning in the early 1960's, also the very party apparat. Despite having reinstitutionalized the party as a principal basis of support in his struggle with his rivals in the Politburo, Khrushchev subsequently—in the interest of his reforms—kept the party from exercising its "leading role" and began to bring increasing "outside" pressure upon the party's central decision-making organs. This course culminated in the splitting of the party apparatus in November 1962, endangering the very "monism" of the system. As the leader of the Georgian Communist Party, V. P. Mzhavanadze, remarked retrospectively, one had been ready to bear almost anything, but when Khrushchev began to meddle with the party, that was too much.[9] From November 1962 until Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, the Soviet Union may have been on the brink of a systemic transformation, as Carrère d'Encausse remarks (pp. 50, 63). However, Soviet society—lacking in political experience and, above all, in autonomous channels of communication and possibilities for organization—was unable to become a political force. The bureaucracies, offended by Khrushchev's "participatory" initiatives, won out. The First Secretary himself had erected a barrier against his new kind of "enlightened" one-man rule when, in 1956, he had dramatically denounced Stalin's "cult of personality."

Ironically, what ensued was

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[5] See the reviewer's survey of the Soviet internal political situation in Wolfgang Berner et al., *The Soviet Union 1976–77: Domestic, Economic, and Foreign Policy,* Vol. 4, trans. by Hannes Adomeit, London, Holmes and Meier, 1979, pp. 17ff.

[6] Contrary to the assertion of Hill and Frank (p. 10), the Russian Marxists did have "models." Significantly, the Mensheviks, following Pavel Aksel'rod (and ultimately the democratic tradition of Russian populism), found their model in German Social Democracy. Lenin, on the other hand, rediscovered the organizational techniques (and philosophy) of the Russian conspirators. He envisaged "Social Democratic Zhelyabovs." The question of the national roots and political "essence" of Bolshevism is treated in Astrid von Borcke, *Die Ursprünge des Bolschewismus. Die jakobinische Tradition in Russland und die Theorie der revolutionären Diktatur* (The Origins of Bolshevism: The Jacobin Tradition in Russia and the Theory of the Revolutionary Dictatorship), Munich, Johannes Berchmans Verlag, 1979.

[7] Robert C. Tucker, "The Image of Dual Russia," in Cyril E. Black, Ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 595.

[8] I borrow this expression from Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1956.

[9] *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 24–26 marta 1965: stenograficheskiy otchët* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 24–26, 1965: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1965, p. 89.

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essentially "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," as Beijing acidly points out. The new leadership sought to modernize the Stalinist system internally and, in foreign affairs, continued to pursue "peaceful coexistence," as a more controlled form of "competition" with the West.

At the same time, the relative fluidity of the post-Khrushchev transition in the Kremlin and the beginning of the American military involvement in Vietnam led to a new assertion of military influence in Moscow. In the years 1965–67, as after Stalin's death, there was a great debate in the USSR about national security. As earlier, the military pressed for more professional autonomy (see Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 55ff.). Although the party has repeatedly reasserted its primacy in political decision-making, with particular vigor after the death of Marshal A. A. Grechko in 1976, a certain "militarization" of Soviet society has nevertheless taken place under Brezhnev.[10] The increased weight of the military is an inescapable consequence of the party's own political priorities. It may also help explain some of the ambiguities of "peaceful coexistence." For example, the SS-20s may have been the price for SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks).

Beginning in the early 1960's and accelerating from the mid-1960's, the Soviet leadership pursued an unprecedented buildup of military power, which already by 1969 brought the USSR to parity with the United States in some key strategic categories. Buoyed by this new correlation of forces, the Soviet Union in the mid-1970's embarked on a more assertive, expansionist foreign policy course in the Third World.

Carrère d'Encausse suggests (pp. 290–91) that this new military might did not solve any of the regime's internal problems, but here I would be very skeptical. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet regime achieved what had been a major aspiration even of its tsarist predecessors: "catching up with" and possibly even "overtaking" the West, first and foremost in the military domain. The legitimating function of this achievement should not be weighed lightly.

Likewise, Brezhnev's careful internal political strategy of "muddling through" and "incrementalism" (bordering on immobility) has not been without its political rationale. Indeed, it has ensured an unprecedented political peace and stability, at least among the Russian "elites."

This era could, however, be coming to an end—i.e., a crisis may be in the making. Détente seems moribund; a new arms race, likely. The Soviet economy is sluggish, in considerable part because huge defense expenditures have detracted from capital investment in the civilian sector. Voslensky asserts (p. 251) that in 1965–66, 82 percent of industrial output was destined for the producer-goods and defense industries![11] Three successive bad harvests (1979, 1980, and 1981), despite massive investment in agriculture, threaten to endanger a social stability that has been founded on a steadily, if moderately, rising standard of living. Political stability is problematic also in Eastern Europe, as the events in Poland show. No matter how these competing problems and priorities may be dealt with, it seems safe to predict that in the 1980's, there will be growing demands upon the limited resources of the economy and therefore increased likelihood of political conflict.

What are the implications for the Soviet system in these developments? For the time being, neither a return to Stalin's "totalitarian," revolutionary methods nor a turn to radical reform seems a likely alternative. Brezhnev appears to hope for a resuscitation of some form of détente, as a prerequisite for a further evolutionary modernization, while the military and many leaders of the party and security apparatuses seem to be calling for an essentially conservative "beleaguered-fortress" sort of regime. A precise prediction is, of course, hazardous because of the complexity of the factors involved, above all the situation in the leadership, the increasing political weight of the apparatuses, and last but not least, the "parameters" set by Western policies.

CENTRAL to any prognosis about the future configuration of Soviet rule is a reexamination of the CPSU and the way its "monistic" rule conditions it to respond to new pressures.

Sigmund Neumann has long since pointed out that the CPSU cannot be considered a "party" in the traditional sense of a "part" of a pluralist whole.[12] Although Hill and Frank would dismiss this distinction as mere semantics, or even as "intellectual bankruptcy" (pp. 138–39)—they would view the Politburo as a kind of cabinet (p. 67)—such facile identification of the Soviet system with pluralist systems is crucially misleading.

Parties (in the plural) serve as a means of channeling communica-

[10] See, for example, William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1976, pp. 34–51.

[11] Western experts have estimated that in 1960 some 11 percent and in 1975 some 19 percent of Soviet durable-goods output was allocated to national security. See Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers No. 147–48, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1977–78, p. 11.

[12] Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1965, p. 119. (The first edition appeared in 1942.)

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tion *from society to government.* The single party, by contrast, in its origin is not a "vote-getting," but a fighting machine, a command structure. Claiming to represent the "whole," it has taken over functions traditionally associated with the concept of "state." Moreover, by enforcing a particularist "class" conception of the "general good," it leads to "a society that must be chained."[13] To term such an organization simply a "party" is an example of that type of conceptual "stretching" encouraged by modern, quantitative political "science" and Third World studies that all too easily leads to false identifications.[14]

The single-party system—a regime keyed to emergency and crisis—not surprisingly has proved to be a not very efficient way of managing a modern, increasingly complex society. The latter requires autonomous initiative and "objective feedback loops instead of subjective, administrative levers," as two Soviet cyberneticians affirm.[15] This would involve more for the CPSU than simply increasing its "trust" in its own members, as Hill and Frank propose (pp. 148–49), in view of the fact that almost all occupants of leading positions must be party members.

The "construction of communism," Soviet ideologues stress, is not a "spontaneous" process. To put things more bluntly, society would not by its own free will opt for a Communist system. Thus the very raison d'être of Communist single-party rule has been to prevent the emergence of social autonomy and hence of genuine pluralism, of autonomous interest articulation and aggregation and therefore of effective "civic competence" (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 247). To this day, all the main Soviet bureaucracies seem to agree on one point: social influences are to be kept out of central decision-making, at least to the extent that they are not mediated by the apparatuses themselves, first and foremost by the party. "Participation" Soviet style has remained essentially (heteronomous) "mobilization," socialization by means of controlled activity (Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 236, 233).

However, in practice it becomes ever more difficult to manipulate over 17 million party members (Hill and Frank, p. 49). The sheer size of the CPSU, reflecting the functional requirements of running a large modern society, makes the party membership increasingly representative of society, or, to be more precise, of society's "functional elites." This has caused growing strains between the party membership and the apparat (Voslensky, pp. 189–90). However, contrary to the hopes of many Western observers, the party since the mid-1970's has again stressed its "leading role" and the principle of *partiynost',* even if it has tended to become more "professionalized" itself. The conflict between the demands for modernization and rationalization of the system, especially of its economic mechanism and state administration, on the one hand, and the requirements of maintaining the party's monopoly of political power, on the other, has remained unresolved. "We have to keep on searching," Brezhnev concluded with some resignation at the CPSU Congress in February 1981, in discussing problems of managing the Soviet economy.[16]

As a universal "broker" and guardian of "substantive rationality," the party theoretically fulfills genuine functions in the quasi- if not totally bureaucratized system. However, it is also a bureaucracy in its own right and an essentially conservative force. Pushing through reforms in such a system may indeed (as Max Weber's reflections on bureaucracy suggest[17]) require "charisma," i.e., a more or less "revolutionary" leader in alliance with some "public."

In a broad sense, the formation of a genuine, politically more sophisticated civil society may be in its embryonic stage, as evidenced by the various forms and techniques of dissent that have arisen in the Brezhnev era (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 217). An increasingly urbanized, educated, and informed Soviet public will no longer be characterized by the political apathy of rural Russia of former times. But what remains an open question is the extent to which Soviet society will succeed in obtaining institutions that will genuinely channel its demands to the political leadership, making the latter responsive and, ultimately, responsible. Even a reforming leader in all likelihood will have to be a man in control of the party apparat. While a post-Brezhnev leadership will be better educated and less constrained by the memories of Stalinism and the Great Patriotic War, even such a leader (or leaders) will have been recruited and socialized by the apparat. Indeed, this phenomenon may explain why Khrushchev ultimately remained halfhearted in his reforming zeal, although in the end he may, as Robert Conquest suggests,[18] have

[13] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 57.

[14] For an important essay on this topic, see Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), December 1970, pp. 1033–53.

[15] A. I. Berg and J. I. Tschernjak, *Information und Leitung* (Information and Management), trans. by Günter Tschacher, 2nd ed., (East) Berlin, Dietz, 1969, p. 62.

[16] Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress, *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[17] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft—Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Economy and Society—An Outline of Interpretive Sociology), 5th ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübinger, J.C.B. Mohr. 1972.

[18] Robert Conquest, *Russia After Khruschev*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965, pp. 121–22.

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come to doubt the suitability of this apparat for running a modern society.

It is hazardous to try to predict the Soviet future with any precision, all the more so since, in the 1980's, the regime may again be confronted with fundamental choices. The basic determinants of its foreign policy will remain essentially the same: competition with the West, possibly even with a Western-Chinese alliance, for power in the world; and the enduring fear of encirclement on the part of a great power without real friends (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 294). Internally, too, the basic structures of the regime have proven to be remarkably stable. Among the imponderables will be the personality of the next top leader, who may be expected to emerge after a period of renewed stress on "collective leadership." For in the Soviet system, the style and personality of the leader have tended to play a greater role than in any other modern nation. Who this leader will be cannot be predicted today. Brezhnev has been hesitant either to institutionalize the succession or to advance a "crown prince" (by now conceivably K. U. Chernenko).

When it comes to prognoses about the shape of the Soviet Union in what seem likely to be the troubled 1980's, political and historical analyses hardly make political judgment superfluous, as the vivid differences in values and approaches of the three books reviewed here attest. By analyzing the fundamental achievements, problems, and dilemmas of the Soviet single-party system, these works have at least marshalled the essential facts and interpretations which must be the foundation for any realistic and balanced judgment about the "nature" and likely future of the Soviet political system.

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The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia

By Harley D. Balzer

SHEILA FITZPATRICK. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

KENDALL E. BAILES. *Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1978.

NICHOLAS LAMPERT. *The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1979.

ROBERT LEWIS. *Science and Industrialization in the USSR.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1979.

WILLIAM A. KNAUS. *Inside Russian Medicine: An American Doctor's First-Hand Report.* New York, NY, Everest House Publishers, 1981.

NANCY MANDELKER FRIEDEN. *Russian Physicians in an Era of Reform and Revolution, 1856–1905.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

THE SOVIET UNION in the era of Brezhnev is probably the most technocratic society in the world.[1] Nowhere else do individuals trained as engineers occupy so large a share of top political positions. Nowhere else is life as pervaded by discussion of the "scientific-technical revolution." The "social myths" of technical progress and social mobility constitute major elements of legitimacy for the Soviet government. Science and technology are key aspects of the image Soviet leaders present to their own people and to the outside world.

The books reviewed here constitute a major contribution to the history of the Soviet scientific-technical intelligentsia—specialists trained in the natural sciences, technology, and medicine, and the smaller number of "self-taught" individuals practicing those professions. Having been frustrated in their aspirations for professional autonomy by the tsarist regime, these professional groups were initially ambivalent about the Bolsheviks. In the 1920's, an accommodation was reached, based on necessity, patriotism, and economic incentives. During the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32), this accommodation was shattered, as Stalin sought to replace suspect cadres with rapidly credentialed Communist specialists. This brief experiment was followed by a return to more traditional patterns of education and recruitment, but the period of experimentation—known as the Cultural Revolution[2]—had a lasting impact on the Soviet intelligentsia and the entire Soviet system.

Both the specific individuals who now lead the Soviet Union and the institutions they administer are products of the Cultural Revolution. In some respects, the Cultural Revolution defined new relationships, while in others it reinforced traditional attributes of the Russian style of science and technology. Although appearing to put a decisive end to professional autonomy, the Cultural Revolution in fact changed not the terms of debate but the forum. Since the First Five-Year Plan, professional interests have sought to influence Soviet political life from the inside.

THE VOLUMES by Sheila Fitzpatrick, Kendall Bailes, and Nicholas Lampert concentrate on the genesis

[1] "Technocracy" has been used both in a very specific sense (for example, by Thorstein Veblen), to postulate a society directly run by engineers, and in a much more general sense, to suggest that technical specialists and their "culture" exert a dominant influence in a society. I am using it in this second, general sense.

[2] I have adopted the usage suggested by Gail Lapidus in her essay "Educational Strategies and Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Soviet Development," in Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978. Noting that "cultural revolution" has been used to describe both a long-term process of "gradual ideological transformation" in socialist societies and also the specific campaigns to radically alter Soviet social life during the First Five-Year Plan, Lapidus proposed capitalizing the term when referring to the events of 1928–31. She is particularly instructive as well on the similarities and differences in the Soviet and Chinese cultural revolutions.

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of the Soviet technical intelligentsia. The simultaneous appearance of three monographs dealing with the technical intelligentsia in the 1930's affords an unusual opportunity to examine the assumptions and explanations three highly competent historians have brought to the same topic, and to compare their differing interpretations.

The most important issue on which the studies intersect is the social transformation of the technical intelligentsia that took place during the Cultural Revolution—a process which included the education and socialization of a new elite. The creation of a new Communist elite required not only the immediate occupation of the cultural bureaucracy by party activists but also a restructuring of the entire educational system to attract and train the "proper" sort of cadres. Beginning in the spring of 1928, Soviet professionals experienced an upheaval as shattering as the (simultaneous) restructuring of the peasantry by collectivization. In virtually every area of "creative" or "intellectual" labor, prevailing assumptions were called into question. New approaches, suited to a new socialist society, were required. If existing cultural elites could not adapt to the requirements of developing socialism, they would be replaced by new elites, drawn from the ranks of proletarians and peasants—and especially from their most conscious representatives, the members of the Communist party.

Fitzpatrick focuses on a major aspect of this process—the *vydvizheniye* (literally "promotion"), a policy of discrimination to facilitate movement of "workers and peasants into white collar jobs or into higher education." This massive effort at social engineering, which Fitzpatrick considers analogous to recent American programs of "affirmative action," quickly "provided a substantial proportion of Soviet industrial managers and party cadres" (p. 4). In something of a departure from her general interpretation of the Cultural Revolution as an outburst of radicalism that the leadership could not fully control, Fitzpatrick views the *vydvizheniye* as a conscious and highly successful policy attributable directly to Iosif Stalin.[3]

If any single event may be said to mark the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, it was the Shakhty affair in 1928—the arrest of more than 50 specialists in the mining industry and their prosecution in a highly publicized show trial. The affair provided Stalin with a rationale to exert pressure on old specialists and an excuse to launch a program for the creation of a reliable "proletarian intelligentsia." Fitzpatrick, citing Stalin's speeches from the spring of 1928, tells us that the policy of recruiting workers and party activists to higher education was Stalin's—"he was the only member of the leadership with a clearly formed concept of the policy which the trial represented" (p. 118).

In contrast to Fitzpatrick's emphasis on Stalin's conscious and successful social engineering, Bailes regards the policies of the Cultural Revolution as products of complex political and social conflicts, connected by the common thread of economic planning. He maintains that "the Soviet technical intelligentsia was more active than previously throught in changing the social structure of the Soviet Union and the cultural values of its people in this period" (p. 8). Neither Bailes nor Lampert disputes the view that Stalin turned the Shakhty episode into a club with which to beat both bourgeois specialists and political opponents. But Bailes's account indicates that the case against the Shakhty engineers originated in a local conflict involving a police official with a dubious past and that Stalin seized upon the affair as a cause célèbre no earlier than February 1928.[4] While not invalidating an interpretation arguing that Stalin used the Shakhty affair to implement policies he had carefully prepared, Bailes's interpretation emphasizes Stalin's opportunism. It also raises serious questions about how well the policy was planned—questions reinforced by the chaos that the policy produced in the educational system.

The Cultural Revolution ended in what has been called the "great retreat"—a turning away from the extremes of the First Five-Year Plan with the setting of less utopian goals for the Second. Fitzpatrick contends that in educational policy this change was part of a coherent program lasting throughout the remainder of the Stalin era. Her Stalin is an all-powerful and farsighted leader standing above Politburo squabbles, in contrast to Bailes's suggestion that Stalin suffered a defeat on this issue and subsequently made the victors' position his own. Fitzpatrick believes that Stalin, presiding over a political party threatened by numerous enemies, decisively defeated them by creating a new intelligentsia of proletarians and loyal Communists. Once these new cadres were educated and moved into position, he elevated them to top jobs by purging their competition. In an article summarizing her argument, Fitzpatrick

[3] See especially the last paragraph of Chapter 9 in *Education and Social Mobility*, p. 205. This should be compared to Fitzpatrick's treatment of other aspects of the Cultural Revolution in her essay "Cultural Revolution as Class War" in *Cultural Revolution in Russia*, pp. 11, 17ff.

[4] As late as December 1927, Stalin was publicly praising the technical intelligentsia for its cooperation. See Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1949, Vol. 10, pp. 318–19.

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states directly what is implied several times in the book—that Stalin may well have been contemplating the purges already in 1928.[5] Fitzpatrick's own account, however, provides documentation for Bailes's "conflict and cohesion" interpretation.[6]

Institutional interests constitute the dominant factor in Bailes's explanation. He attributes the 1931 policy reversal to actions by a group of "moderate" leaders who had direct responsibility for industry and the economy. Although Stalin made the first public announcement of the change, this was preceded by strenuous efforts on the part of G. K. Ordzhonikidze and his "allies" to induce the Central Committee to change its policies (pp. 150–51). Bailes ties this specific case to the broader issue of the emergence of a "moderate bloc" within the Politburo and Central Committee in 1933 or 1934, a group which he sees as influencing policy as early as 1931. He also shows how political debates reflected policy options articulated by competing interests—in this instance, a conflict between Stalinist advocates of political solutions implemented by *vydvizhentsy* (including *praktiki,* or workers promoted without formal specialized education) on the one side, and the Kirov-Ordzhonikidze-Kuybyshev group emphasizing economic rationality and educational quality on the other.[7]

Lampert emphasizes the relationship between the technical intelligentsia and the state, and views the Cultural Revolution as an effort to impose political solutions in place of "rational" decisions based on specialized knowledge. Although his judgments are expressed in muted terms, his analysis comes much closer to Bailes's than to Fitzpatrick's. For example, he identifies the leaders of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (*Vesenkha*), industrial administrators, and party *apparatchiki* as sources of "pressure" to protect technical specialists.[8]

WHATEVER the immediate causes for the policies of the Cultural Revolution, there is no question that the period constituted a decisive formative experience for the individuals who currently rule the Soviet Union. One of Fitzpatrick's major contributions is to identify the *vydvizhentsy* as a crucial group in the Soviet elite. Bailes notes that two thirds of the current Central Committee and 80 percent of the Politburo are representatives of the technostructure. Fitzpatrick takes the analysis a step further, pointing out that a majority of current government ministers and of Politburo members—including, of course, Leonid Brezhnev himself—were *vydvizhentsy* during the First Five-Year Plan. In light of the crucial importance of these individuals during the last 40 years of Soviet history, even more discussion of the implications of this common background would have been desirable, but Fitzpatrick backs away from drawing some seemingly logical conclusions regarding the quality of education and the nature of group cohesiveness among the new elite.

Certainly, the quality of education received by *vydvizhentsy* could not have been very high. Fitzpatrick hints at its deficiencies in several places, citing the high dropout rate and chaotic conditions in the early 1930's, as well as the extra burden imposed on *vydvizhentsy* by social and administrative responsibilities (pp. 66, 105, 110, 132, 204, and 217). Bailes's chapters on "The Educational Experience" confirm these impressions.

If the quality of specialized education received by *vydvizhentsy* was inferior to that of previous and subsequent generations, then we must look to something other than technical competence to explain their long political dominance. I would suggest that the key word is loyalty. The surviving *vydvizhentsy* constitute a "club" of men, with mediocre education but highly developed political skills, who have stuck together for a very long time. Their formative experiences included advancement from party work to higher education during the period of "class war" in the schools, followed by rapid promotion to important political and administrative positions during the purges. As Fitz-

[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), September 1979, p. 401. The same article indicates that Stalin had achieved his objective by *1939,* not 1931 (p. 399).

[6] For example, Fitzpatrick notes that the change in policy toward bourgeois specialists announced in June 1931 really amounted to ratification of policies already being adopted in industry. Compare her statements on p. 211 in *Education and Social Mobility* with those on p. 214.

[7] See pp. 174ff. A few additional shreds of evidence supporting Bailes's interpretation have recently appeared in Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1981, particularly pp. 61, 74, 79–80, and 112. Also see the Russian edition, *Portret tirana* (Portrait of a Tyrant), New York, NY, Khronika Press, 1980, pp. 110–11.

[8] One can only speculate on what Lampert might have achieved had he employed a greater range of materials. He tells us his "argument is based mainly on a reading of Soviet publications of the time" (p. 11). While it is perfectly reasonable for a historian to insist on the "historically specific" nature of a topic, it is not acceptable to make the same claim for one's sources.

Bailes drew upon an enormous body of secondary and memoir literature and upon much recent Soviet scholarship to document things at which Lampert can only hint. In addition, Bailes took advantage of materials from public and private archives in the United States—particularly the Harvard Project—as well as from the State Department Decimal File and the British Foreign Service Archives. He made particularly good use of unpublished Soviet dissertations, confirming the impression that much of the best scholarly work done in the Soviet Union is available in this form. Many Soviet dissertations never appear in print, or appear in published versions with some of the most interesting material deleted, and Western scholars ignore these studies to their own detriment.

Lampert omits even so obvious a source as V. N. Ipatieff's memoirs, *Life of a Chemist,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1946. Moreover, although Lampert's decision to ignore dissertation literature may be understandable, there is no excuse for his failure at least to take note of Bailes's article "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking Among Soviet Engineers," *American Historical Review* (Washington, DC), April 1974, pp. 445–69.

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patrick has observed elsewhere, "the Brezhnev generation was a minority but tended to monopolize the top jobs."[9]

The purges and the Stalinist economic system decisively influenced these future leaders' careers. Many of the *vydvizhentsy* were promoted to responsible positions when senior people were arrested. At the same time, the insecurities of work in production led many specialists to opt for jobs in local party or police work, placing them in excellent positions to climb the political ladder. One might suggest that the "retreat" in 1931 was permanent because it served the interests of both the "industrial lobby" and the *vydvizhentsy* themselves. Once the schools returned to normal, a group of upwardly mobile politicos with weak technical education would have had a definite interest in ending the recruitment to higher education of individuals with both proletarian and party credentials.

An emphasis on politics and careerism should not obscure the very real impact technical training has had on the Soviet leadership. Bailes's discussion of aviation in the 1930's suggests the attractiveness of legitimation through technology. Heroic achievements enhanced the regime's status both in the eyes of its own people and in the international arena, where public display of technological gains could also aid defense policy. A similar case may be made for the Soviet space program in the 1950's and 1960's and for the recent emphasis on the scientific-technical revolution.

Pointing out the propaganda value of science in no way implies that Soviet leaders lack a genuine commitment to technical progress. If anything, their training as engineers has left them overly enamored of technological solutions. Emphasis on the scientific-technical revolution and a seemingly incessant search for some sort of technological "quick fix" to cure the nation's economic ills attest that Soviet technocracy is more than just window dressing.

THE DURABILITY of arrangements concocted during the Cultural Revolution is attributable not only to continuity of personnel but also to the strength of institutional interests and the effects of the Soviet system of planning. In the long run, the structural factors may be of the greatest significance. The Brezhnev generation will be gone in a few years; the structural characteristics of the Soviet economic and political system are less likely to change any time soon. Institutional interests appear to have surprising longevity and the capacity to convert administrators to their point of view, while the Soviet planning system has reinforced certain historical attributes of the Russian scientific-technical community.

Struggles over the training of technical cadres are a seemingly inevitable product of educational requirements generated by industrial development. The institutional conflict over control of education between *Vesenkha* and the Commissariat of Education (*Narkompros*) is well documented by Fitzpatrick. She might have added that this was in many respects a continuation of the century-old struggle between the tsarist Ministries of Education and Finance, and that a similar conflict took place in other European countries in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The importance of institutional interests within Soviet administration is underscored by the way Ordzhonikidze's perspective altered when he became head of *Vesenkha*. No student of politics will be surprised by a finding that the person appointed to head a bureaucratic apparatus quickly becomes the patron of groups traditionally supported by that bureaucracy. Both the need to make the bureaucracy function and the logic of maintaining one's own power base *usually* induce a new leader to act as spokesperson and protector for such clients. Yet, there has not been enough investigation of these questions in Russian and Soviet history. After I. A. Vyshnegradskiy became Minister of Finance in 1887 with the support of allies in the Ministries of Interior and Education, he aroused bitter disappointment by adopting many of the positions traditionally defended by tsarist ministers of finance. There are striking parallels in Ordzhonikidze's becoming the patron of industrial specialists in the 1930's.

Perhaps the most general structural principle to emerge from the works under review is the decisive influence that planning exerts, both by enhancing previously existing characteristics of the system and by fostering informal mechanisms to achieve results or protect participants. Prerevolutionary Russian science and technology were characterized by the assignment of higher status to theory than to applied research or work in production; by deep-seated conservatism; and by weakness in design and innovation, encouraging a tendency to rely on imported technology. The Soviet planning system has reinforced all of these attributes. Dangers and pressures associated with work in production reinforce a long-standing preference for more prestigious research positions. New ideas and practices not only disrupt routines but threaten the fulfillment of the plan. It is safer to adopt a proven technology from abroad than to risk production delays or even failure by

[9] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Reply," *Slavic Review*, June 1980, p. 290. Bailes proposes a similar interpretation when he stresses school and production ties as major reasons for the political dominance of the First Five-Year Plan group (pp. 268–69), and Lampert notes the "careerist" motives of some party members (p. 73).

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attempting to introduce an indigenous innovation.

This is not to suggest that nothing has changed since 1917. One of the most impressive achievements of the Soviet regime has been the creation of an extensive network of scientific research institutes. Robert Lewis, in *Science and Industrialization in the USSR,* provides figures showing that Soviet expenditure for scientific research as a percentage of national income exceeded that of the United States in the mid-1930's, and he notes that the Soviets were ahead of everyone in endeavoring to plan scientific research. Yet, as Lewis also points out, the return on R&D investment and the achievements of planning were, and continue to be, paltry. The Soviet Union, although a world leader in basic research, performs poorly in technological innovation. While the problems in innovation in the Soviet economy have already been subjected to careful scrutiny,[10] the books reviewed here extend that analysis, placing the problems in historical context and showing how they evolved from the planning system in both science and industry.

The system of planning introduced in the Soviet Union, as Lampert reminds us, "was not a method for providing an orderly coordination of the production process," but rather was intended "to achieve a shortcut expansion of industrial production" (p. 81). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that coordination of research with industry was not a major priority. The result has been a system in which scientific research is viewed as important *in itself* but has never been linked in a meaningful way to production.

Planning priorities undermine technical development in a number of ways, as Bailes and Lewis demonstrate. One major problem has been the geographic and administrative separation between science and industry. Soviet science planning has generally been dominated by individual researchers—the "grass roots"—while industrial priorities are determined by the "command economy." Removed from contact with production, researchers are not likely to focus on the questions most relevant to industry. In the 1930's, an effort was made to resolve this difficulty by placing industrial research under the control of related enterprises, but such an approach frequently resulted in diversion of personnel and resources to meet immediate production quotas. Similar difficulties have been reported in the 1970's.

Stalinist attempts to encourage mass participation in invention likewise led to an impasse. Campaigns for practical inventions from worker-inventors brought a flood of time-consuming nonsense. Yet to ignore the "crackpot" engenders a risk that real geniuses will be passed over.

Finally, the Soviet planning system encourages the "engineering fallacy"—pursuit of technical solutions regardless of their economic rationality. While not unknown in the West, this difficulty is more severe when the researcher totally ignores profit and cost.

Despite a generally disappointing record, Soviet science has demonstrated an ability to make significant achievements in specific areas. Both Bailes and Lewis seek to explain this success in priority areas through case studies of aviation in the 1930's. Lewis puts forward a series of characteristics which he believes made aviation one of the more successful spheres of Soviet technology. The list includes concentration of design and production facilities in Moscow; competition between designs, with production decisions made only after the testing of prototypes; and the existence of good development facilities. Recognizing the importance of aviation R&D, the leadership freed it from the most detrimental constraints of the planning system. The best people were mobilized—which created a sort of ripple effect—and individual initiative was rewarded. Last but not least, there was follow-through. Soviet aircraft designers were not engaged in hypothetical exercises; they were determined to see their ideas fly.

Relative success in military aviation suggests a model for the operation of the Soviet R&D system. What might be called "functional dysfunctions" are maintained throughout the system as a way of guaranteeing political control. In priority areas such as military aviation, the party intervenes to cut through normal obstacles. The amount of effort required in such situations is enormous, but there is no sacrifice of political control at any level.

Yet even nonpriority sectors must function somehow, and the key here is in the development of informal arrangements. Lampert provides a great deal of evidence from Soviet sources illustrating the importance of informal mechanisms at various levels: among managers and party officials sharing responsibility for plan fulfillment, and between workers and managers, whose common interest in material rewards outweighs conflicts. He would not dispute Bailes's view that such arrangements are rooted in the institutional structure of Soviet planning and are unlikely to be seriously influenced by changes in personnel or piecemeal reorganization.

A comparison of efforts at reform

[10] The classic work on the subject is Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry,* Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1976. There are excellent discussions of the difficulties of relating scientific research to industry in the chapters by Thane Gustafson and Bruce Parrott in Susan Gross Solomon and Linda L. Lubrano, Eds., *The Social Context of Soviet Science,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980.

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in the 1920's and 1930's with proposals put forward in recent years is particularly instructive in this respect. Lewis notes that the suggestion of linking research to industry made in the 1920's sounds very similar to the science-production association (*ob"yedineniye*) reform adopted in 1973. The Scientific Research Sector created under *Vesenkha*'s Planning, Technical, and Economic Administration in the 1930's appears to be a forerunner of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Not only do recent reforms look quite similar to earlier panaceas; they have failed to produce much better results. Soviet difficulties with industrial production and innovation are systemic, arising directly from the planning process, and they will not be significantly alleviated without a major alteration of that process.

Effective reform would have to be carried through on a broad front, and the current Soviet leadership shows not only a lack of inclination to act decisively but even a lack of ability to conceptualize changes of such magnitude. Reform requires reformers, yet the individuals with specialized expertise and the capacity to develop real alternatives are not easily discernible in the Soviet bureaucracy. Bailes does suggest that there may recently have been a revival of the traditional Russian "critically thinking intelligentsia," and that engineers and applied scientists have played the leading role in this development (p. 7). Nevertheless, such movements must be kept in perspective. As David Joravsky has pointed out, the significant statistic may be not that a few hundred people sign a petition despite enormous personal risk and the virtual certainty of unpleasant consequences, but rather that out of more than a million members of the technostructure only a few hundred sign such petitions.[11]

Soviet concern to prevent the emergence of any independent centers of power may have been so effective that it has stifled any potential for creative solutions. Although Stalin is gone and professionals no longer fear for their lives when practicing their occupations, there are strict limits on their activity. Moreover, their ideas concerning resolution of the USSR's problems often seem stale and unrealistic. Lately, for example, there has been discussion of the potential for technocracy among Soviet managers—at a time when most Western commentators would dismiss such suggestions out of hand.[12]

THE DAMAGE that can be inflicted by political choices and historical inheritances can be seen clearly in Soviet medicine. Many of the characteristics of Soviet science and technology also apply to medical science. There is the same tendency for prestige to accrue to theory and basic research rather than to practice; there are enormous distortions generated by the planning system ("death quotas" for hospitals being the most ghoulish); and while there has been a tremendous effort to correct shortcomings, producing an impressive increase in the provision of medical facilities, the return on that investment has been less than should have been expected.

As is true in almost every profession, the Soviet general practitioner commands less prestige and a lower salary than specialists or medical researchers. Many observers have made the obvious connection between the low pay and status of "ordinary" Soviet physicians and the preponderance of females in that occupation. In his volume under review, Dr. William Knaus attributes the dominance of women in Soviet medicine to Stalin's decision to adopt a "no frills" health care system in which women would be the practitioners (p. 83). Knaus also suggests, however, that "as in the rest of the Soviet economy, part of the reason for the low wage is the high percentage of female workers in medicine" (p. 334). One might think that Knaus would need to make a choice between these two propositions. Either medicine became a low-salary, low-prestige occupation in the Soviet Union because most practitioners were women, or many women ended up in medicine because it was a relatively low-paying and low-status occupation. Knaus never untangles the two issues, preferring instead to make generalizations about Soviet women and their careers.[13]

Fortunately, the work of serious scholars offers a corrective to Knaus's confusion. Nancy Frieden has produced a carefully re-

[11] See David Joravsky, "Political Authorities and the Learned Estate," *Survey* (London), Winter 1977–78, pp. 36–41. Bailes does seem to recognize this consideration in his conclusion, p. 425.

[12] For example, see V. G. Grafskiy, *Gosudarstvo i tekhnokratiya* (The State and Technocracy), Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p. 282.

[13] One does not have to be a feminist to find in Knaus attitudes toward women that might make him perfectly at home in Soviet society. He suggests that "some Soviet women, unable to marry . . . have made medicine their life and developed careers as professors, scientists or researchers" (p. 95). A few pages later, on the basis of a single interview, he adds: "As Natalie demonstrates, few Soviet female physicians are aware of, or even interested in, the political aspects of their profession" (p. 97).

In broader terms, Knaus's interesting personal observations are frequently counteracted by distortions of history, and some of his errors impugn the integrity of his entire study. Knaus informs us in his preface that "to travel to another city a visitor, *like a Soviet citizen*, needs a visa" (p. 13, emphasis added). Unfortunately, this mistake pretty much sets the tone for what follows. We are told erroneously that "in February 1917, the Social Democrats took over the government and forced Nicholas to resign" (p. 74); that the *zemstvo* "represented a return-to-the-land movement in Russia" (p. 62); that in 1974 the government came up with the "new" idea of awarding the title Heroine of the Soviet Union to women bearing 10 children (p. 200); and that Gosplan is the Soviet Ministry of Finance (p. 217). One might be inclined to be less harsh if Knaus did not claim that he was presenting "a truly scholarly work" (p. 12). A traveler's account generally tells more about the traveler than the place visited. This book is no exception.

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searched and thoughtful analysis of the Russian medical profession, focusing on the period before 1905. In the current context, one of her major contributions is to show that the great majority of doctors in Russia were always poorly paid and low-status employees of the state. No one who reads Frieden's excellent chapters on the cholera epidemic of 1891–92 and on the status of physicians will ever confuse the social, legal, or financial status of Russian doctors with that of their American counterparts. There was a determined movement among prerevolutionary physicians to change their situation through professionalization, but it was not successful.

When Stalin sought to restructure Soviet society in the 1930's, the dual goals of increasing the labor force and maintaining the family reinforced traditional male-dominated hierarchies in virtually all professions.[14] But some professions were more likely to become overwhelmingly female domains, and medicine was one of them. This situation is attributable both to medicine's low prestige before the revolution and to its continued low priority thereafter.

Knaus does make a contribution by indicating the influence specialists may exert on Soviet policy decisions and by chronicling the recent revival of professional aspirations among Soviet physicians. The movement for professionalization which Frieden describes was seemingly destroyed by Stalin, yet many of the same issues are reemerging. In return for a willingness to abandon direct political claims, many professional groups wield major influence on decisions affecting their areas of expertise. This policy role of professionals, as opposed to "interest groups," is emerging as one of the most promising topics of investigation for students of Soviet politics.[15]

In analyzing professional groups, it is essential to pay special heed to the professional goals that they formulated before 1917—the best evidence available for how these professionals saw themselves in the Russian context. Attention should also be devoted to cleavages within professions, as Bailes shows in his excellent discussion of the tensions between educated specialists and *praktiki*. Such studies can shed light on the nature of the compromises and accommodations that specific professional groups made with Soviet power, on the levers Soviet leaders were able to use in subjugating professional groups, and on the interests reemergent professional groups are likely to articulate.

THE SOVIET UNION will shortly experience a succession with unprecedented potential for change. An entire leadership generation—the one dominated by *vydvizhentsy*—will pass from the scene in the 1980's. In the inevitable struggle for power, the balance of institutional interests that has been maintained by Brezhnev may be called into question, and perhaps altered.

Prospects for fundamental reform, however, appear remote. The need for such reform is already generating tensions between professional specialists who see the defects of the system and the conservative ideological-political bureaucrats who are threatened by change. The historical record suggests that serious reforms threaten enough established interests among both specialists and bureaucrats to ensure that these groups will resist or circumvent significant change. But past experience likewise suggests that problems resulting from the system and consequent pressures for change will not be eliminated.

[14] For a particularly perceptive discussion of these issues, see Gail Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development and Social Change*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978. Chapter 3 deals with the Stalinist "solution."

[15] See particularly Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 167ff; and Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chap. 6 and passim.

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Terrorist Trends and Ties

By Douglas S. Blaufarb

ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN and DARRELL M. TRENT. *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1979.

CLAIRE STERLING. *The Terror Network.* New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, 1981.

YONAH ALEXANDER, DAVID CARLTON, and PAUL WILKINSON, Eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

HERBERT ROMERSTEIN. *Soviet Support for International Terrorism.* Washington, DC, The Foundation for Democratic Education, 1981.

THE TROUBLE with trying to think about modern political terrorism to some purpose is that it is so widespread and so varied in form that there are few general statements that apply to all important elements except that they all use violence. A large and growing literature by Western journalists and scholars has grappled with the problem.[1]

The reason for the interest is not far to seek. Any novel social phenomenon will, of course, engage the interest of the community whose business it is to study such matters. This certainly happened in the 1950's and 1960's, for example, when guerrilla warfare loomed as an important new factor in the less developed world. In addition, political terrorism is by no means limited to remote and relatively primitive areas. For the Western world, the fascination of terrorism lies in its appearance right here, in the midst of our unexciting, suburbanized, homogenized modernity, shouting out to us between commercials for false-teeth adhesives and stomach-soothers. It has the same shock value as if a war party of Indian braves were suddenly to descend on Pennsylvania Avenue taking the scalps of commuters and file clerks on their lunch hour. Moreover, it turns out that the war party is not composed of real Indians but recognizable young compatriots from the privileged minority—Mark Rudds, Bernadine Dohrns, and Katherine Boudins. No wonder we seek to determine what it all means.

The focus here is on urban terrorism, as distinguished from the organized violence for pressure and propaganda purposes that accompanies rural insurgencies of the type conducted and advocated by such as Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara. Urban terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it frightened our ancestors in Europe and America in the last half of the 19th century. However, as an instrument of left-wing revolutionaries, it was eclipsed and somewhat discredited from the time of the Russian Revolution until quite recently. Its reemergence as a tool of the militant Left seems to have been a matter of virtually spontaneous combustion, although some exemplary role was certainly played by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) Provos, the extremist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Trotskyites in Argentina, none of whom were in a position to follow the precepts of rural guerrilla warfare. It was quickly taken up in Latin America after the resounding failure of Castroite insurgency in Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere. After Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil became the testing grounds. While advocates of urban terrorism presented it as guerrilla warfare conducted in the cities,[2] the urban environment is really not suitable for guerrilla operations, and the phenomenon remained terrorism plain

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[1] A reasonably thorough run-down on English-language materials is August R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, Eds., *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980. This guide categorizes some 1,000-plus titles topically and geographically, and includes a novel section on terrorism in fiction. It is, however, limited by its omission of works in German, Italian, or French, not to mention less accessible languages. A student seeking the titles of works by the early anarchist Johan Most would not find them here. They are written in German. Similarly with the untranslated work of Franz Fanon and Regis Debray, available only in French.

[2] See the most influential tract on the subject, Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,* reproduced as an appendix to Robert Moss, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare,* London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.

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and simple. It nevertheless spread rapidly to most parts of the world (except the Communist areas), a fact brought home graphically by television and the other media.

THERE ARE various categories of urban terrorist movements, the principal division being between nationalist and separatist movements (IRA, PLO, Basque, Quebecois, Puerto Rican, and so on), on the one hand, and militant left-wing movements in democratic or near-democratic states, on the other. What "success" terrorism would appear to have had—and certain successes doubtless underlie the persistence of the phenomenon—seems to have come in the first category. A host of modern states have emerged in part as a result of urban terrorist activity. The technique goes back at least as far as the struggle of various nations for independence from the Turks and of the Irish from England. Attached to this category as a subspecies are those desperate little separatist movements whose message is: "Do not forget us," or "Revenge is ours." Among them are Croat, Armenian, and South Moluccan groups.

Of the urban terrorists in the democratic world, we can distinguish movements in the still not fully developed nations (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico) and those in the fully industrialized democratic nations of the West, including Japan. It is in the former that urban terrorism has had its greatest, if most perverse, political impact. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Turkey, relatively democratic regimes have been overthrown by military coups reacting against terrorism, and the terrorists themselves have been largely destroyed. That is virtually the only political result of any of the terrorist movements in noncolonial settings since modern political terrorism emerged as a noteworthy phenomenon. However, such destruction of democratic systems by right-wing counterterror, it should be noted, has been and remains a first objective of these allegedly left-wing movements: the hope is that the people at large will become sufficiently aroused by right-wing suppression to support the militants in a subsequent serious bid for power.[3]

Perhaps the most bewildering to the public and experts alike have been the urban terrorists in industrialized democracies. What motivates these scions of privilege—the Baader-Meinhof Gang of West Germany, the Angry Brigade of Britain, the Red Brigades of Italy, the Weathermen of the United States, and numerous other grouplets, many comprising a mere handful—who burst upon our awareness mouthing irrational cries and brandishing machine guns? In their study of terrorism, Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent suggest that terrorists of this stripe "seem to be propelled by a profound self-hatred, a nausea concerning their own historical-material identities that leads them to seek the negation of the very culture that nurtured them." More and more, they have tended toward violence for its own sake, as a more exciting form of self-expression.[4] The terrorists bespeak a desperation most people do not feel. The unreality of their pretensions and of their analysis of the scene about them, as well as the radical disconnection between their alleged goals and the means they advocate for reaching these goals, cause them to be viewed by their compatriots as dangerously disturbed minds rather than as the vanguard of the future.

In none of the democratic countries has the incoherent rhetoric or violent episodes evoked any detectable political response. This lack of response, problems of morale (disciplined terrorist activity can be very dull work performed over long periods of time), and improved police work seemed by the end of the 1970's to be leading to the disappearance of this social pathology from the democratic, industrialized world.

Yet in 1980 and 1981, new episodes perpetrated by a new generation of militant desperadoes broke upon us. The attempts on the lives of Pope John Paul II and Generals Frederick J. Kroesen and James Dozier, the Brinks robbery, and many other less spectacular events remind us that urban terrorism has not fully spent its power. By and large, the new generation of "decivilized" bomb-throwers appear less coherent, less rational, less well organized—mere epigones of their predecessors—and are inclined to flirt with the drug culture while plotting to bring down society. One should note, however, the continued existence of another, small category of "career professionals" of preeminent skills, available on demand so long as the goal is vaguely "revolutionary" and the resources generous. These include the famous "Carlos," a Venezuelan trained in Russia and employed by the PLO, and—probably—the Turk Mehmet Ali Agca, who carried out the attempt on the Pope.

One should also recognize the existence of terrorism of the right wing. Some observers believe that this kind is likely to increase especially in European countries with a fascist

[3] A point made by Claire Sterling in *The Terror Network* (p. 22). Walter Laqueur makes a similar point, stating that the strategy dates from 19th-century terrorist theory. See his *Terrorism*, Boston, MA, and Toronto, Little Brown and Co., 1979, p. 186. Laqueur's study was reviewed in Abraham Ascher, "Lessons of Russian Terrorism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1980, pp. 70–74.

[4] Walter Laqueur describes the terrorists as suffering from "the crisis of identity, suburban boredom, the desire for excitement and action, a certain romantic streak, in short terrorism as a cure for personality problems." Op. cit., pp. 209–10.

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past. Recent events such as the bombing of the railway station in Bologna and the brief takeover of the Spanish parliament by a group of younger army officers add credibility to this prediction.

At any rate, the landscape is generally familiar, although there are a few strange new wrinkles. For example, Claire Sterling mentions in *The Terrorist Network* that right-wing terrorists have been welcomed at some of the Middle Eastern training camps set up by the Communists and have trained there side by side with militant leftists. Neo-fascists in Italy have also accepted help from Libya, which at the same time aids and nurtures leftist terrorists. This trend suggests that less may separate the two extremes of the political spectrum than either would be prepared to admit.

In European history, threats and acts of violence from the Left have always brought forth similar threats and acts from the Right, which, because of support from the military, can usually prevail. The rise of fascism between the wars reflects this dynamic. It certainly cannot be ruled out that terrorism of the Left will bring on a resurgence of fascism with a new name. One might envision such a scenario in countries—notably Spain, Portugal, and especially Italy—which have sizable Communist movements allied to militant trade unions with a tradition of violence and which have already in modern times experienced long periods under dictatorial regimes. So far, however, only in Italy has modern urban terrorism attracted sufficient numbers of recruits, many of a high caliber in terms of education and dedication, to make such a scenario even remotely possible. And the Italian nation, despite a crushing load of serious social problems, still clings to democratic norms and fights with increasing effectiveness against the threat.

FOR ALL the difference in approach and fortunes of the terrorists, there are certain common requirements of terrorism, no matter where or by whom it is applied. Most obvious is the need for compartmentalized, cellular organization, clandestine communication, and careful attention to security.

However, the authors of the books under review point to other similarities which are of greater interest. One is the "propaganda of the deed," an old idea inherited from the 19th century but multiplied manyfold in importance by the instantaneous and dramatic effect of modern media, notably television. Instant notoriety and recognition create the illusion of success in restless and aggressive minds and stimulate their owners to further feats; they also attract emulation and thereby create a snowball effect. Something like this took place after 1968 when a phase of spectacular airplane hijackings, kidnapings, and murders was launched by the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, followed quickly by similar acts by other groups in the Middle East and Western Europe.

At the same time, the piling up of episode upon episode produces a jaded reaction and no lasting effect. Where does the terrorist turn when he has deployed his bag of tricks more than once, is still far from gaining his ostensible aims, and feels himself slipping back into obscurity and helplessness? He can, of course, change targets, techniques, and locales, but that merely postpones the reckoning. The temptation exists to try for ever more spectacular episodes, with the threat (noted by many commentators in the books under review) that the terrorists might seek to wreak mass destruction through the use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. In *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response,* Kupperman and Trent set the problem thus:

Violent acts against the government and society are possible today and may not be totally improbable in coming years. The LaGuardia bombing and the specter of "Philadelphia fever" convey the message; the clock is running, the irrational may occur.

The authors take the threat seriously enough to provide detailed analyses of vulnerabilities and of the state of preparedness in the US to deal with major catastrophes.

In their useful review of recent work on terrorism, Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson also ponder the threat of mass destruction. David Carlton, writing on "The Future of Sub-state Violence," points out that until now, political terrorists have generally been "conservative" in their modalities of violence, relying mainly on bombs and automatic firearms, but he predicts that terrorists will become progressively more violent and destructive, and raises the possibility that in time the threat of mass destruction will become more serious. However, trends toward less political rationality—which would underlie any threat to destroy the very masses in whose interests the threat is ostensibly made—and toward feebler organization among the terrorists would tend to reduce their ability to mobilize the technical skills required to make a threat of mass destruction possible and to keep arrangements secret. The possibility of such threats cannot, of course, be ignored. It is prudent to improve our defenses and our ability to cope with large-scale disaster, but the menace of mass destruction should not preoccupy us to the exclusion of other threats, which evidence a more rational calculation of costs and benefits to the terrorists.

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EVEN MORE important as a common factor than playing to the media and the resulting pressure for more sensational exploits is the interlocking and cooperative nature of many of the terrorist enterprises and, beyond that, their dependence not only on each other but also on certain political movements or governments for the means to carry out their programs. Most obvious among the latter are Cuba and the militant enemies of Israel in the Arab world, notably the PLO, Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen. But, if we probe further, we find that these, in turn, depend upon the training and guidance of such states as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and finally, of course, the Soviet Union.

This is the simplified essence of the somewhat breathless but still highly factual account laid out by Claire Sterling in *The Terror Network.* Her book attracted much attention when it appeared more than a year ago at the time of the installation of a new administration in Washington and the charges by the new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, and others that the Soviets were supporting and encouraging terrorism. Although Sterling has been criticized for going beyond the evidence and for such political lapses as "undermining détente," her volume is in fact a carefully crafted amassing of detail culled largely from already public sources. Unlike most journalists' accounts, hers is in large part footnoted and sourced. The involvement of the Soviet Union through many surrogates is not very much of a secret—all the other books under consideration here make the same charge. What Sterling does is attempt to build a complete picture, to show in the most specific terms how the Soviet involvement works.

In making the case about Soviet involvement, Sterling explicitly denies that the evidence shows the Kremlin to be masterminding a worldwide terrorist conspiracy. What Moscow has done—and continues to do—is to facilitate, improve, strengthen, and encourage left-wing terrorist activities wherever they spring up against non-Communist governments. It pursues this course through education and training on a large scale (in South Yemen, North Korea, the USSR, and elsewhere) and guidance of the secret services of friendly governments in similar training efforts, through the channeling of subsidies through intermediaries, and through the provision of weapons and other support services of every kind—usually, again, via intermediaries. On the other hand, it does not in most cases plan or direct the activities of the groups it supports. It merely makes them possible.

A similar point is made more briefly by Herbert Romerstein in his pamphlet *Soviet Support for International Terrorism.* Romerstein cites some of the same evidence and some additional material to demonstrate Soviet involvement in supporting terrorism. He does not, however, go into the more difficult question of whether or not Moscow tries to direct terrorist activities.

The cost-effectiveness of this involvement by the Soviets and their cohorts is sobering. According to a CIA estimate cited by Sterling, the USSR puts the equivalent of about US$200 million a year into its support activities for so-called "wars of national liberation." This investment ensures a highly professionalized apparatus and a continuing flow of trained recruits to take the place of those who fall by the wayside. It helps embed Soviet propaganda and ideology in the minds of the terrorist cadres, with the result, carefully documented by Sterling, that the IRA, the Basques, Palestinians, and Marxist anti-Khomeini Iranians all spout the same crude "anti-imperialist" catechism. The resulting terrorism becomes a serious problem for governments whom the Soviets regard as ideological enemies, embarrassing them and exposing them as weak and vacillating, and causing serious internal strains. All of this comes at less cost than one heavy cruiser or a few modern bombers.

The beauty of the situation from the Soviet standpoint is that there have so far been no costs of a nonmonetary nature. As Sterling points out, the target governments have bent over backward to avoid confronting Moscow about its behavior and have done their best to keep what they know from coming to public attention. Indeed, there is little these governments can do directly except to put relations with the Soviet Union in the deep freeze and explain why, frequently and emphatically. Such a policy, it appears, would be unpalatable to large elements of their publics, at least in Western Europe, and would reverse policies of rapprochement with the East in which the governments, ironically, have sizable political investments.

In the past, some observers have described Soviet policy regarding terrorism of the "anarchic" type we are discussing as being firmly "negative."[5] On the other hand, Walter Laqueur has traced what he sees as a consistent thread of ambiguity in the Bolshevik stance, and opines that the Soviet Union finds itself in a dilemma vis-à-vis terrorism—between the goal of international respectability and the desire not to leave the field to its ideological rivals on the left.[6] However, there is little sign of either negative views or ambiguity in the tale that Sterling

[5] See, for example, Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon,* Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1960, p. 237.

[6] Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 197–201.

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tells, and one fears that Laqueur has overlooked the effectiveness of the Soviet tactic of working largely through intermediaries.

WHAT, on balance, is the threat of urban terrorism? If we look at a map of the world, it is not the urban terrorism in Israel, Ulster, Spain, or Italy, but the combination of terrorism with rural insurgency in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, or Guatemala that seems to pose the greatest danger.

The latter, attacking backward regimes with limited capabilities (if unaided) to defend themselves, is a pressing problem for consideration by the US and other industrialized democracies. But that is a story for another time. As for urban terrorism, it is an extremely nasty and costly problem. But it is hardly a threat to the societies in which it has appeared, except as a factor which might in some circumstances trigger a successful right-wing response.

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Western Intellectuals and Communist States

By Peter W. Rodman

PAUL HOLLANDER. *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978.* New York, NY, and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.

THE ATTRACTION of communism to Western intellectuals is a subject long noted and much examined. Paul Hollander, a sociologist, has singled out an interesting aspect of the phenomenon—the "political pilgrims," that is, the Western writers, scholars, and students who, generation after generation, have traveled to Communist countries and come away fascinated and admiring. In studying this particular aspect, he sheds new light on the broader phenomenon.

Hollander is in a position to make thoughtful judgments about Communist societies and the Western intelligentsia, having firsthand experience with both. Born in Hungary, he emigrated as a young man after the events of 1956. He studied at the London School of Economics, at the University of Illinois, and at Princeton University, where he received his doctorate in sociology. He is now a fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center and professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Although the writing in the volume is a bit heavy at times, beneath the academic prose there is serious thought, provocative analysis, and genuine insight. There is also a wealth of evidence, gleaned from the memoirists, of the incredible naiveté of Western visitors to Communist countries.

George Bernard Shaw, on a trip to the USSR in the 1930's during a period of widespread famine, was so convinced that reports of food shortages were capitalist propaganda that he threw a supply of provisions out the train window before crossing from Poland into Soviet territory. He later announced this action proudly to an audience of hungry Russians in Moscow—who gasped in horror. When it was suggested to him that he would have done better to throw the food out the window on the Soviet side of the border, Shaw refused to believe it.

Shaw's gullibility about Soviet realities was repeated many times over by other travelers to the USSR, before and after. And when disillusionment with the Soviet system eventually set in, as it did in later decades, other utopias beckoned—revolutionary China, Castro's Cuba, North Vietnam during its war with the United States, and others. Even Albania has been the subject of glowing reports by some adventurous West Europeans.

WHAT IS it that accounts for the continual suggestibility of so many Western intellectuals—precisely the class of men and women who pride themselves on their critical faculties, on their professional ability to penetrate beneath surface appearances in the search for truth? All the Communist regimes examined by Hollander perfected what he refers to as the "techniques of hospitality"—the art of providing physical comfort, solicitude, skillfully packaged tours, and calculated flattery. (Shaw was provided with a luxurious sleeping car and—amazing coincidence—two waitresses who turned out to be intimately familiar with his writings!) Such hospitality makes criticism difficult, by establishing a subtle sense of obligation as well as by misleading the visitor as to local conditions. Only in rare cases (that of André Gide, for example) did the flattery backfire or fail to have some effect.

But, as Hollander goes on to demonstrate, this factor is hardly a sufficient explanation. The visitors were misled because they allowed themselves to be misled. They were not tourists but pilgrims, yearning to believe in the virtue of regimes they regarded as moral experiments of vast importance to mankind. As in the case of the anecdote about Shaw, the socialist ideal was so compelling a vision that objective reality was ignored, wished away, or rationalized with an artfulness that perhaps does a perverse kind of credit to the creativity of the Western intellectual mind.

For example, one Jerome Davis, traveling in the USSR during World

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War II, was taken into custody several times by the Soviet security police (NKVD), but his arrests only increased his admiration for the country. He found the security police well trained and intelligent and "always made it a point to compliment them on their alertness in spotting a foreigner who might be a spy." Beatrice and Sidney Webb visited a model Soviet prison and concluded that the Soviet penal system was "apparently as free from physical cruelty as any prison in any country is ever likely to be." Thirty years later, Communist Vietnam, after its victory over South Vietnam, was reported to be forcing its prisoners ("war criminals") to walk through minefields to find unexploded mines left over from the war; radical antiwar activist William Kunstler said he thought he could "understand the reasoning" behind this barbaric practice. "It's part of a terrible, terrible time," he added.

Hollander traces these and other mental contortions that many learned observers have gone through to preserve the coherence of their own visions. We see a total suspension of the skepticism that marks intellectual attitudes toward most phenomena at home. Happy children cavorting in a kindergarten in a Communist country help convince visitor after visitor that the regime *must* be a humane one—as if children did not play happily in kindergartens in most countries. By a process of "contextual redefinition," those who would deplore child labor in Western societies as an abomination find boys and girls toiling in the fields in China or Cuba a positive sign of social solidarity and community. Squalor becomes picturesque; shabbiness, a sign of a more thorough egalitarianism. A group of Concerned Asian Scholars visiting China met an old woman whose job it was to remove and collect slivers of metal from oily rags. Her hands were "covered with cuts from the slivers." Asked if these were not painful, she replied: "When you are working for the revolution, it doesn't hurt." The visitors were deeply impressed.

The inversion of values applies ironically even to the treatment of their fellow intellectuals. One visitor to Cuba wrote approvingly: "The independent intellectual, the critic of all societies and all beliefs, is a luxury they [the Cuban regime] cannot afford." Mary McCarthy wrote in identical terms about North Vietnam: "The license to criticize was just another capitalist luxury, a waste product of the system. This of course is true." Thus are the most degrading conditions and the denial of the most vital freedoms excused by virtue of the higher social ideals in the name of which, or in pursuit of which, they are undergone.

ONE OF Hollander's principal conclusions, for which he shows ample evidence, is that the motivation lies not so much in the objective appeal of the societies visited as in the rejection of one's own society. The heyday of enthusiastic reporting about the USSR was not in the 1920's, the period of the New Economic Plan (NEP) and an attractive cultural vitality, nor was it in the 1950's, the time of the anti-Stalin campaign and the "thaw," which might have prompted new hopes for the benign evolution of the Soviet system. Rather, the peak for pilgrims was in the 1930's—the high point of Stalinist terror. The systemic crisis wracking the Western democracies in the Great Depression seems to have created such a powerful psychological need for an alternative ideal that there was strong incentive to overlook or suppress all thought of the horrific underside of the worker's paradise in the Stalin era (of which much was known at the time). Criticism of Western society, so strongly expressed by so many of the Western intelligentsia, seemed to require the confidence that other, better societies were within the reach of human aspiration. When the Western crisis waned, so did the impulse to idealize the USSR. In the 1950's, the USSR's own display of self-criticism and self-doubt may only have accelerated the weakening of its appeal.

The second great wave of disaffection in Western societies came in the 1960's and 1970's. Hollander devotes considerable space to the counterculture of the period and its philosophical themes, such as they were. This time the critique was one of affluence rather than of poverty, but it prompted the second great flood of political pilgrims. The new socialist meccas were now mostly in the Third World—principally Cuba and China, which it was hoped would avoid the "mistakes" of the Soviet Union. In the United States, the Vietnam war acted as a further spur, adding North Vietnam to the itinerary.

While the context was somewhat different from that of the 1930's, the results were the same. American society, which had been rejected as a pathetic failure in the 1930's, was now scorned as brutally overweening, complacent, and corrupt. Susan Sontag offered this analysis in 1969: "To us, it is self-evident that the *Reader's Digest* and Lawrence Welk and Hilton Hotels are organically connected with the Special Forces' napalming villages in Guatemala. . . ."

LUDICROUS as some examples are, the malaise of intellectuals is not a laughing matter. No society is healthy if its most educated classes are so profoundly disaffected.

The roots of alienation are many. Hollander reviews a century of sociological literature on the subject and offers his own speculations based

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on the example of the political pilgrims: the feeling of many intellectuals that they are insufficiently appreciated in their own countries; a diffuse rebelliousness toward societies that fulfill all material needs; a thirst for adventure; a yearning to identify with power (and with totalitarian systems where intellectuals often have, or seem to have, a powerful role); guilt feelings at their own lives of privilege, transposed into a yearning to identify with the "masses." The reader may or may not agree with every explanation offered by Hollander, but the discussion is thoughtful and not dogmatic.

Among the estranged, the impulse to debunk seems allied to an impulse to affirm *something*. Thus, as noted, the rejection of one's own society seems to require the faith that a better alternative is within man's capability, as proven by its existence somewhere else. If it is not—if *all* societies are fatally flawed—it is much more difficult to inveigh against one's own. Indeed, if there is no ideal society *elsewhere*, mankind is sore afflicted, and one is left in a spiritual void. And the intellectuals are precisely those among us who search most assiduously not only for knowledge but for meaning, not only for truth but for harmony and coherence in the human condition.

The quest for utopias in the modern age, concludes Hollander, is one of the delayed fruits of the secularization of Western culture, for with the decline of religious faith, man must seek fulfillment here on earth. It is "delayed" because for a time the lost religious faith was supplanted by a secular belief in Progress—a belief to which the 20th century has dealt a series of devastating blows.

The prevalent modern religious faith among intellectuals is socialism—the humane ideal of equality, justice, social harmony, and well-being. As John Maynard Keynes observed nearly 50 years ago, it is a moral, not an economic, impulse:

Communism is not a reaction against the failure of the 19th century to organize optimal economic output. It is a reaction against its comparative success. It is a protest against the emptiness of economic welfare, an appeal to the ascetic in us all. . . . It is the curate in [H. G.] Wells, far from extinguished by the scientist, which draws him to take a peep at Moscow. . . . The idealistic youth play with Communism because it is the only spiritual appeal which feels to them contemporary. . . .

It is a powerful dream, so powerful that it attracts even when continually perverted in practice. Either its failures and perversions are ignored, or else the faith persists that somewhere else, in some other newly discovered land of innocence, its feasibility will at last be proven.

How ironic that Marxism, which prided itself on its materialism and determinism, should find its appeal as an object of faith and a spiritual ideal, while Western values, which always claimed a spiritual origin, should seek their vindication in material abundance and find failure in their inability to provide meaning. How ironic also that intellectuals, who in our societies have usually been the chief defenders of freedom and creativity, should be so ready to overlook the stultifying brutality of systems whose response to freedom and creativity has always been to crush both. For, in the end, the tragedy of the political pilgrims is their abandonment of the liberal values that nurtured them. It is our tragedy as well. Hollander concludes with the disturbing question "whether or not, willingly or inadvertently, Western intellectuals will contribute to the destruction of their relatively free societies, in part because of their illusions about other societies and their recurrent fantasies of new forms of liberation and collective gratification."

It is an important book, as important as its subject.

CORRECTIONS

Several corrections should be made in the "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement'" (*Problems of Communism,* March-April 1982, pp. 77–82).

On page 78, it should be noted that the Yemen Socialist Party did attend and the Democratic Party of Guinea did not attend the November 1981 work conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism.*

On page 79, the impression is erroneously given that the Zimbabwe African National Union had a vice president on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Conference; the vice president from Zimbabwe is Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Finally, in the abstract at the beginning of the given issue of *POC,* the World Peace Council should be described as "Moscow-line" rather than "Moscow-sponsored."

* * *

The Editors' Note on page 71 of the March-April 1982 issue inadvertently miscited the source of the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981." This list is published by *Problems of Communism* jointly with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* edited by Richard F. Staar, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA.

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